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Abstract
My thesis examines the series of changes which have occurred in the patterns of 
accumulation by cultivating landowning groups in Central Bihar from the early 1970s to 
the mid-1990s, and the specific impact upon production relations of sustained struggles 
waged by agricultural labourers.
Based primarily on fieldwork carried out in 1995-96 in Nalanda district of Bihar, it 
investigates changes in the structure of landholdings, the use of technology, the forms, 
conditions, and extent of agricultural labour and other interrelated variables.
I conclude that conditions in the 1970s in this area, which is dominated by cultivating 
landowners from the intermediate Kurmi caste, indicated a potential for a transition to 
capitalism based on rich peasant accumulation. However this development has essentially 
come to a standstill during the period from the early 1980s to the present.
This ‘stalling’ is traced to the failure of land reforms and the persistence of a highly 
skewed pattern of resource endowment which has meant that unproductive economic 
activities such as moneylending, the sale and hire of agricultural inputs to the growing 
section of small and marginal cultivators, and more recently, contracting and organised 
crime have remained more profitable than investment in agricultural production.
Further, State power, rooted as it is in this same agrarian structure, has been used by 
successive landed groups to appropriate development resources through institutionalised 
corruption. This is intensifying a crisis in the availability of key inputs and the virtual 
collapse of the infrastructure.
The initial spurt of capital accumulation among larger landowners employing wage labour 
provided the catalyst for the emergence in the late 1970s of an organised movement of 
agricultural labourers, the majority of whom were from 'dalit' castes.
I discuss the questions of class, caste and gender which have shaped this movement, and 
conclude that it has succeeded in effecting a number of significant changes in production 
relations which have occurred from the early 1980s onwards.
Finally, I place the changing phenomenon of private armies and criminal gangs associated 
with landowning groups in this context of a stalled transition to capitalist agriculture on 
the one hand, and a challenge from below to both the economic as well as the political 
bases of the power of the dominant classes on the other.
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INTRODUCTION
‘In the old days, there was one big malik - he went but instead there were ten or twelve 
landowners, all trying to crush us. Then the year of the first strike, we had a chance to 
move forward. We got the courage to fight. Things have changed, we answer back, we 
talk to them as equals...We are prepared to die to get our rights.5
Shanti Devi, agricultural labourer, describing the situation in her village in Central 
Bihar, 1995.
That Bihar is India's ‘most backward5 State has become a cliche: those who repeat it often 
do so with a mixture of contempt and fascination and the phrase encompasses everything 
from grinding poverty to endemic corruption, the tenacity of caste divisions to the ubiquity 
of violence. In fact it takes many of the contradictions which are universal in dependent 
capitalist India, and makes them safely ‘Bihari5 and ‘other5, defining them as somehow 
unique to this State where they are manifested in their most extreme form.
Yet, since the early 1980s, Bihar has also become a symbol of hope and potential change 
for those who believe that only a revolutionary transformation which places power in the 
hands of the exploited and opppressed can resolve these contradictions. It was in the plains 
of Central Bihar that a new chapter of India's history of communist-led agrarian struggles 
began. These districts witnessed the rapid spread of a mass movement of mainly dalit 
women and men from agricultural labourer and poor peasant households, demanding land, 
a living wage and the right to live with dignity, basic demands which struck at the roots of 
social and economic power in the region. The revolutionary trend which had begun in 
Naxalbari in West Bengal, and was all but crushed by the early 1970s, re-emerged here in a 
new, more deep-rooted and more resilient form.
During the last two decades, this movement has continued to grow, adopting new
strategies in response to changing conditions. At the same time, the response of the
dominant landowners, and of the state, has also changed. The daily humiliations to which
the exploited were subjected, the brutality with which any small attempt at assertion on
their part was met, are no longer tolerated and have been abandoned by many individual
landowners. A number of so-called ‘armies5 or Senas set up to defend the interests of
10
specific caste-based groups of landowners against the rural poor have also come and gone. 
But today, Central Bihar is witnessing heterogeneous landed classes, the political parties 
who represent them, and the state structures they dominate, come together behind a ‘Sena’ 
of a new kind, marked not only by the unprecedented scale and viciousness of its attacks, 
but by its organic links with parties of the far right, and its coherent fascist ideology.
This was the context in which I set out to investigate the political economy of agrarian 
change in Bihar. One of the first things which struck me was that while Bihar’s agriculture 
is frequently characterised as semi-feudal, and agrarian conflict ascribed to its ‘stagnant’ 
and unchanging nature, the areas where struggles were most intense were also those where 
signs of nascent capitalism in agriculture had been identified. A process of accumulation 
and investment in agriculture was argued to be underway among a section of mainly 
intermediate caste rich and middle peasants. It was this new accumulation, and the increase 
in the rate of exploitation which accompanied it, which had intensified tensions between 
employers and labourers and acted as a catalyst for the movement.
But by the time I first visited Central Bihar in the early 1990s, there was a strong sense 
that this emerging ‘peasant capitalism’ had come to a standstill. Smaller cultivators were 
barely able to survive, and their share in total holdings had multiplied. Meanwhile those 
farmers who were still able to produce surpluses were now directing them into other 
channels: moneylending, hiring out of equipment, buying up inputs for resale on the black 
market, and for those who could afford it, larger scale corruption, crime and political 
careers. Old patterns seemed to have reasserted themselves.
Yet in the same period, the movement of agricultural labourers and poor peasants had 
continued to gather momentum. Indeed it appeared that a number of changes which had 
already occurred in agricultural production relations were a direct result of the movement.
If this was the case, it clearly had significant implications for the agrarian strategy of the
left in countries like India where a transition to capitalism had not been completed. It also
raised key questions relating to patterns of accumulation, the dynamic at the heart of
capitalist development. As the widely respected Indian political economist Krishna
Bharadwaj argued, ‘The question...is one of the process of transformation, of the
dissolution of feudal features and the onset of pervasive dominance of capitalist relations’.
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Bharadwaj identifies ‘a struggle between the forces promoting productive accumulation 
and those stabilising, perpetuating and reinforcing unproductive investment. The balance 
of forces may turn one way or the other. If the forces of productive accumulation, 
nurtured by a set of favourable initial conditions, generated a critical minimum pace, they 
could succeed in breaking through the fetters of the pre-capitalist remnants’ (Bharadwaj, 
1985:21).
In summary, then, this study aims to establish whether or not this ‘critical minimum pace’ 
has been generated in Central Bihar, and if not, the reasons for its failure. Further, it asks 
whether the left-led movement of the most exploited section of rural society is in fact 
proving a more effective agent of agrarian transformation.
To ask these questions is to address the very nature of power in this region, and the 
challenge to it posed by the most powerless. The way in which ownership of land and 
other assets, caste dominance, political position, and control over the state apparatuses and 
their resources intersect is particularly potent in Central Bihar. But the pattern is 
replicated in a multitude of forms across India. It is therefore hoped that the study will 
both contribute to an understanding of the specific experiences of the ‘flaming fields’ of 
Bihar, and have a relevance which extends beyond them.
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CHAPTER 1: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AGRARIAN CHANGE IN
INDIA
This chapter provides a brief review of the existing literature on the political economy of 
agrarian change in India. It begins by highlighting some of the key Marxist writings which 
have formed the starting point for much of this work, and goes on to examine the specific 
themes and discussions which have emerged in the Indian context, beginning with the 
influential ‘Mode of Production Debate’ which was initiated in the late 1960s.
The aim of this chapter is not primarily to examine the substantial body of empirical 
evidence which has been collected in the course of earlier studies, but to summarise those 
debates which have sought to clarify issues of definition, criteria and methods of 
identification as well as, on a political level, strategy and tactics. And in an extensive field, 
this review is not an exhaustive one: rather it focusses upon those themes which have a 
direct relevance to the present study.
1. The identification of agrarian classes and the development of capitalism in 
agriculture
Historically, attempts to identify and characterise agrarian classes within the framework of 
political economy have been closely linked with the analysis of the development of 
capitalism in agriculture. They have also been linked to a varying degree with the 
formulation of political strategy.
For late nineteenth century Marxists, the agrarian question was inseparable from the wider 
question of achieving revolutionary change in countries which continued to have large 
peasantries, where pre-capitalist agrarian classes were undergoing transformation, but had 
not yet polarised into the two opposing classes of capitalist farmers and agricultural 
labourers as predicted by Marx. It was addressed in the context of the formulation of 
agrarian programmes by European socialist/Marxist parties: debates focussed around 
which sections of the peasantry could be drawn to and mobilised by these parties. An 
analysis of the nature of differentiation which was occurring in varying forms and at 
varying paces across Europe inevitably emerged as a central theme of these debates.
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Thus in ‘The Peasant Question in France and Germany’, Engels emphasised that the only 
two regions where the peasantry ceased to be of importance were Britain and Prussia East 
of the Elbe. Yet these peasantries were in most cases highly differentiated; while noting 
significant regional variation, Engels suggested that there was a broad division between 
‘small peasants’ on the one hand, and ‘big and middle peasants’ on the other. Small 
peasant families did not hire wage labour, but they were generally able to survive on the 
land they operated without hiring themselves out as wage labour. However in some areas, 
Engels implied, they were being forced to do so to supplement their income. Big and 
middle peasants meanwhile were characterised by their exploitation of wage labour. Engels 
emphasised that the small peasants, despite the precariousness of their existence, had a 
‘deep-rooted sense of property’ and he strongly opposed what he saw as the opportunism 
of socialist parties who appealed to this sense, rather than ‘effecting a transition of his 
private enterprise and private possession to cooperative ones, not forcibly but by dint of 
example and the proffer of social assistance for this purpose’ (Byres, 1986 pp xiv-xv).
However, it was Lenin who in ‘The Development of Capitalism in Russia’, produced the 
first detailed analysis of the dynamics of the process of differentiation and class formation, 
in the context of an agricultural economy at a much earlier stage of capitalist development 
than the English countryside described by Marx in Capital. The publication of this work in 
response to Kautsky’s ‘Die Agrarfage’ shifted the debate away from agrarian policy 
formulation and focussed explicitly upon the emergence of capitalism in agriculture.
Lenin divides the Russian peasantry into three groups according to size of cultivated 
landholdings. The ‘top group’ are ‘well-to-do peasants’ many of whom employ non-family 
labour; the ‘middle group’ in total ‘provides more workers than it hires’; while the ‘rural 
proletariat’ cultivates little or no land, obtaining income from selling their labour-power 
and from leasing out the plots of land traditionally ‘alloted’ to them by the landowners, to 
the top group.
However, Lenin also focusses on the dynamics of the process which he refers to as
‘disintegration of the peasantry’ which is not simply the rise of ‘property inequality’ but
the emergence of ‘new types of rural inhabitants’: ‘a class of commodity producers in
agriculture and a class of agricultural wage workers’(Lenin, 1956:174). This process
involves the concentration of land, assets such as draught animals, and improved
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agricultural implements in the hands of the ‘well-to-do peasantry’, who employ wage 
labour, market their produce, and whose increasing net income is ‘under favourable 
conditions... invested in the purchase of land, farm improvements, etc.’(Lenin, 1956:177), 
transforming them into a ‘peasant bourgeoisie’. Meanwhile the mass of producers - at least 
50 per cent of all peasant households - are transformed into wage labourers, while the 
middle group, lacking the resources to cultivate their land effectively, is in an ‘unstable’ 
and ‘transitional’ position between the two (Lenin, 1956:61) and is gradually eliminated.
Lenin’s central aim of demonstrating the existence of powerful capitalist trends in Russian 
agriculture and countering the Narodniks’ idea of a ‘peasant community’ which could be 
treated as essentially homogeneous led him to emphasise the most striking examples of the 
disintegration of the pre-capitalist mode of production in agriculture and its replacement 
by a capitalist mode dominated by the peasant bourgeoisie. But he also refers to powerful 
factors ‘retarding disintegration’ and in particular to the fact that it is often still the ‘village 
usurers and the neighbouring landowners’ and not the representatives of the peasant 
bourgeoisie who are the ‘real masters of the contemporary countryside’ (Lenin 1956:188).
Capitalism from A bove and Below
In fact ‘The Development of Capitalism in Russia’ highlights two further interrelated 
questions which are of vital relevance to contemporary India in general and to Central 
Bihar in particular.
Firstly, Lenin contrasts two distinct possible ‘paths’ to capitalist development: ‘capitalism 
from above’ in which feudal landlords dominated the process of transition and developed 
into a capitalist class; and ‘capitalism from below’ in which, as we have seen, a capitalist 
class emerged from within the peasantry itself.
The former path is associated with the experience of Prussia and is characterised by the
retention of many pre-capitalist elements: ‘The basis of the final transition...to capitalism is
the internal metamorphosis of feudalist landlord economy. The entire agrarian system of
the state becomes capitalist and for long retains feudalist features’ (Lenin, 1956:8 ). These
features acted as a brake on the development of the productive forces. Meanwhile the
mass of the peasantry were pauperised. This had implications for capitalist development
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not only in agriculture but in the economy as a whole: on the one hand the development of 
the home market for consumer goods remained constrained by peasant impoverishment; on 
the other, the sluggish development of the productive forces, particularly mechanisation, 
implied a limited market for the products o f ‘Department I* industries(Byres, 1996:28-29).
‘Capitalism from below’ which has its roots in the process of differentiation of the 
peasantry itself implies either that there is no landlord class (or only a weak one) or that, 
alternatively, decisive control over land and resources has been wrested from it by the 
peasantry. This path, designated the ‘American Path’ by Lenin, is characterised by 
‘class-for-itself action pursued by rich peasants/capitalist farmers’; the growth of the 
capital/wage labour relationship, and the rapid development of the productive forces and 
of the home market. (Byres, 1996:30-32).
The Complexities o f Transition
Secondly, ‘The Development of Capitalism in Russia’ contains some of the earliest 
discussion of the complexities of agrarian transformation as it actually occurs, and 
identifies the mechanisms by which, while certain elements from an earlier mode may be 
retained, their significance changes as another mode emerges as dominant. As one would 
expect, this is most striking in Lenin’s treatment of the emergence of landlord capitalism. 
He describes how the pre-capitalist ‘otrabotki’ system, which consists of the landlord’s 
land being cultivated with the implements of the neighbouring peasants, payment in this 
case being made in ‘land or grounds’, ‘sometimes passes imperceptibly into the capitalist 
system of providing the estate with agricultural workers by allotting patches of land to 
them’, and is used to ‘guarantee’ landowners ‘a supply of workers at the required 
time’(Lenin, 1956:200).
Thus while Lenin’s work is more often cited for the clarity of its exposition of the process
through which one set of production relations becomes obsolete and is replaced by
another, it also referred to continuities and the changing significance of relationships which
might remain outwardly the same during periods of transition. These are questions which
are of vital relevance to contemporary Indian agriculture and whose interpretation remains
unresolved: according to one observer, for example, the weakness of ‘recent Marxist
discussion’ of tenancy has been ‘in grasping that, during transition, tenancy relationships
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may exhibit contradictory pulls and pushes, symptomatic of the pre-existing and emerging 
relationships. At the same time with the penetration of capitalism, some underlying trends 
can be discerned, even if the form of tenant relationship remains superficially unchanged’ 
(Srivastava, 1989a).
However in order to understand current discussions of the development of capitalism in 
Indian agriculture, we must at least briefly examine the work in this area which was carried 
out in the 1960s and 1970s, which drew upon many of the key ideas - as well as methods - 
employed in ‘The Development of Capitalism in Russia’, and which came to constitute the 
‘Mode of Production Debate’.
2. Lidia’s Mode of Production Debate - semi-feudalism or emerging capitalism?
A major focus of the debate was the extent to which capitalist development was occuring, 
whether such development represented a dominant tendency, and the criteria through 
which emerging capitalism could be identified (Thomer, 1982:1961). This focus reflected 
the transformations which had occurred in India’s agricultural sector - at least in some 
parts of the country - since independence, and in particular the impact of the ‘New 
Agricultural Strategy’ adopted from the mid-60s onwards. The initial striking success of 
High Yield Varieties of wheat in the north-western states in increasing yields, and the 
strong associations observed between the biochemical inputs they required and the 
introduction of mechanisation generated a series of studies which aimed to define and 
locate the new breed of ‘capitalist farmers’, and which laid the foundations for the debate.
Ashok Rudra et al.’s report on a sample survey of big farmers in Punjab (Rudra, Majid and
Talib,1969) suggested that the following tendencies characterise capitalist farmers: a) to
cultivate his land himself rather than give it out on lease; b) to use hired labour in a much
greater proportion than family labour; c) to use farm machinery; d) to market an important
share of his produce; and e) to organise his production so as to yield a high rate of return
on his investments. Rudra et al. argued that if a category of capitalist farmers existed, there
would be a strong positive correlation between all pairs of variables which represented
these tendencies. Finding no such strong correlation, they concluded that no such category
existed at the time. But this conclusion was quickly challenged. In her influential articles
based on a 1969 survey of 66 big farmers in Orissa, Andhra, Mysore, Madras and Gujarat,
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Utsa Patnaik argued that Rudra’s criterion was unrealistic: it could only be satisfied ‘if the 
process of capitalist development has been carried out to its limit so that capitalism is 
already the dominant mode of production’. The former landlords or rich peasants, she 
stressed, ‘will not overnight be transformed into a readily identifiable group of pure 
capitalists’ but will ‘necessarily carry evidence of their class origins and retain some 
pre-capitalist attributes even while tending towards capitalist operation’ (Patnaik, 1971).
However, Patnaik identified one indispensible characteristic of this tendency towards 
capitalism: the accumulation and reinvestment of surplus in agricultural production, 
leading to the generation of surplus values on an ever-expanding scale. This was 
manifested in the growth of outlay on both constant and variable capital with respect to a 
given land area, and, over time, a tendency towards a higher than average organic 
composition of capital, leading to higher productivity of land and labour. Patnaik 
emphasised that in the absence of this expanded reproduction, neither the employment of 
wage labour nor production for the market could be considered to be evidence of the 
existence of capitalism. Both commercialisation of agriculture and the pauperisation and 
proletarianisation of the peasantry were effects of imperialism which existed during the 
colonial period. In this context the choice between leasing out to tenants or operating with 
cheap hired labour represented for landowners ‘a purely contingent, reversible decision 
taken on the basis of current circumstances’ (Patnaik, 1971). Other commentators 
however have suggested that operating with wage labour may not be a ‘necessary’ 
condition for capitalist development either. For example, ‘where there is difficulty in 
ejecting, share-cropping may change from a semi-feudal to a capitalist form of 
exploitation: with the landowner taking on greater direct interest in cropping patterns, etc, 
and providing a large part of the necessary investment - at the same time extracting a far 
larger share’ (Byres, 1972). This has been an important focus of more recent work on 
Indian agriculture.
But while a number of the major contributors to the mode of production debate were
concerned with the criteria through which capitalist development - or individual capitalists
- could be identified, the apparent lack of evidence of any such capitalist transformation in
many parts of India (especially eastern India) formed the starting point for a very different
thesis: that of the perpetuation of semi-feudalism. Drawing upon a survey of 26 West
Bengal villages carried out in 1970, Amit Bhaduri defined semi-feudalism as having four
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main features: the prevalence of sharecropping, the perpetual indebtedness of small 
tenants, the concentration of two modes of exploitation - usury and leasing of land - in the 
hands of the same class, and the lack of access to the market for small tenants. In his 
study, Bhaduri found that 40-50% of cultivators were sharecroppers, (known locally as 
‘kishans’) with little or no land of their own and little security of tenure. The kishans 
provided little or none of the capital used in production. (Bhaduri, 1973, 1986).
A substantial proportion of the kishan’s own share of the harvest was taken away 
immediately after the harvest to pay off past debts with exorbitant interest. This left kishan 
households with less than a subsistence, forcing them to reborrow later in the year to meet 
their consumption needs, and thus perpetuating a cycle of indebtedness. Bhaduri assumed 
here that the entire amount owed was paid off after the harvest - the reality, he suggested, 
is often accumulated debt.
The fact that it is the landowner who is the kishan's creditor means that ‘the feudal element 
of tying a kishan to a particular landowner operates indirectly’ since the kishan cannot 
move without settling the debt, and as a ‘loyal’ tenant he has a credit-worthiness which he 
may not be ascribed by another landlord. The extraordinarily high rate of interest faced by 
the kishan reflects the fact that having no assets he has no access to the modem capital 
market. In addition, Bhaduri suggested, the kishans do not have access to the commodity 
market: forced to borrow at a time when current market prices are high, and pay back 
when they are lowest, they are unable to take advantage of price fluctuations and are in 
fact victims of them. Other writers have observed that even when the poor peasant sells 
directly to the market, a similar phenomenon occurs. The poor peasant is forced to market 
a ‘distress surplus’ immediately after the harvest to meet non-foodgrain consumption 
needs - the same commodity may well be bought back later at higher prices (see Narain, 
1988, for a discussion of the ‘distress surplus’).
On the basis of his analysis of the ‘combination of modes of exploitation’ by the
‘semi-feudal’ landowner, Bhaduri concludes that ‘technological improvements which raise
the productivity level of the kishan become undesirable to the landowner to the extent that
they reduce his requirement for consumption loans. For it weakens the system of
semi-feudalism , where economic and political power of the landowner is largely based on
his being able to keep the kishan constantly indebted to him. Further...the semi-feudal
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landowner...will be discouraged from introducing any technological improvement so long 
as his gain from increased productivity... falls short of his loss of income from usury due to 
a reduction (or complete elimination) of the consumption loans required by the kishan’ 
(Bhaduri, 1973:135).
Nirmal Chandra endorsed the basic features of semi-feudalism proposed by Bhaduri, on 
the basis of another study of West Bengal. However, he argued that ‘technological 
improvements have taken place on share-tenanted land in different parts of West Bengal 
with working capital often provided by the landowner. If one allows for a variable 
share-cropping ratio, then semi-feudal relations of production can persist even after the 
new high-yielding varieties of crops have been introduced. By lowering the tenant's share, 
the landowner can keep him as poor as he always was’(Chandra, 1974). Massive 
underemployment in the countryside underpins the ‘stability of semi-feudalism’ by ensuring 
that the real income of a share tenant can be kept as low as that of an agricultural labourer, 
and that the landlord can ‘arbitrarily alter the share-ratio in their own favour in case new 
production possibilities occur’ (Chandra, 1974). However, as Bharadwaj points out, there 
may well be a ‘limit on exploitation due to convention, tradition or economic factors’; in 
such circumstances, interlocked relationships can ‘substantially increase the exploitative 
power of the dominant classes’ (Bharadwaj, 1974b:4).
Thus once again the question arises of the real dynamic of production relations underlying 
the formal structure. While a ‘semi-feudal’ form - sharecropping - is being maintained, it is 
not clear whether Chandra's landowners are investing their surplus primarily in 
‘technological improvements’ (which would surely imply some form of capitalist 
development) or whether the usury facilitated by keeping the peasant ‘as poor as he always 
was’ remains a more significant channel of investment. The key to this question thus lies in 
the nature of accumulation which is taking place, and the presence or absence, as in 
Patnaik’s formulation, of a process of expanded reproduction in agriculture (Patnaik, 
1971).
Krishna Bharadwaj has emphasised the need for a less static approach to the ‘mode of 
production’, highlighting the centrality of the accumulation process to an understanding of 
agrarian transition:
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‘The question at issue is not whether there exist at any moment certain pre-capitalist 
features.... The question, rather, is one of the process of transformation, of the dissolution 
of feudal features and the onset of pervasive dominance of capitalist relations. I have 
briefly indicated the forces that work towards retarding and muting such a dynamic 
outcome. They can be seen, in summary, as a struggle between the forces promoting 
productive accumulation and those stabilising, perpetuating and reinforcing unproductive 
investment. The balance of forces may turn one way or the other. If the forces of 
productive accumulation, nurtured by a set of favourable initial conditions, generate a 
critical minimum pace, they could succeed in breaking through the fetters of the 
pre-capitalist remnants’ (Bharadwaj, 1985:21).
It is the likely outcome of precisely this struggle, in one specific region of India, which the 
present study aims to assess.
The Inverse Relationship
Overlapping with the ‘Mode of Production Debate’ both chronologically and in terms of 
its concerns, was the discussion which took place among Indian economists about the 
so-called ‘Inverse Relationship’: that between farm size and value of output per acre.
This debate was initiated in the immediately pre- ‘Green Revolution’ period by Amartya 
Sen (1962), who suggested that ‘by and large’, productivity per acre decreases as farm 
size increases. The most significant reason offered for this was the differential application 
of labour, which was applied more intensively on small farms using mainly family labour 
than on larger farms using mainly wage labour. Sen argued that a ‘dualism’ existed 
between the two types of labour - family labour could not be imputed ‘a wage equal to the 
market one’, since family workers would continue to apply labour beyond the point where 
the marginal product of labour was equal to the wage rate.
Rudra (1968a and b) challenged the empirical basis of the ‘inverse relationship’ hypothesis, 
arguing that disaggregated data showed little evidence of the relationship’s existence. 
However, as has been pointed out, Rudra used data referring to output per ‘gross’ acre 
rather than per ‘net’ acre. This data does not take account of the intensity of cropping, 
which is ‘one of the main avenues of greater use of labour for farms with cheaper labour
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cost’ (Sen, 1975:149). Sen also argued, more contentiously, that Rudra’s data was flawed 
because it compared farms within villages, whereas ‘labour market dualism’ was more 
marked across villages because small cultivators were ‘typically’ willing to accept wage 
employment within their own village but not outside (op cit.:150).
Sen emphasised that he was not advocating the promotion of small farms: the factor which 
made a crucial difference to productivity was not size itself but the system of farming, 
‘whether it is wage based or family based’. Therefore, he argued, large-scale co-operative 
farming using non-wage employment ‘in an integrated communal set-up’ would also have 
a relative advantage over capitalist farming’(op cit.: 153).
However, Sen’s analysis did not explore the particular conditions which compelled small 
cultivators to apply labour so intensively. Bharadwaj (1974b) argues that the concept of 
the marginal product of labour is not a useful one when applied to agricultural production, 
where the impact of labour applied by a given worker at a given time is always partially 
determined by both labour applied in other periods, and labour applied by other workers. 
In any case, Marxist economists pointed out, ‘differential factor prices facing different 
farm sizes are not the only determinants of factor-use intensities. More important and 
fundamental are the nexus of property rights and tenurial conditions that shape market 
characteristics, resource endowments, and the nature and extent of market participation by 
different size-holdings’(Dyer, 1991: 60).
Decisions to apply labour more intensively were thus not a matter of ‘choice’ or 
‘preference’ for small cultivators, it was suggested. A higher value of output per acre on 
small and marginal farms reflected a desperate attempt to survive by poor peasant 
households, and far from indicating the ‘viability’ of their holdings, masked 
‘semi-starvation’ for these households (Patnaik, 1979). These households were compelled 
to market a part of their output in order to meet vital consumption needs and service 
debts, even though this meant buying back later at unfavourable prices. This ‘compulsive 
involvement’ in produce and credit markets also led to small and marginal cultivators 
planting a higher proportion of high value commercial crops, which further increased the 
value of output per acre on their holdings relative to that on larger holdings (Bharadwaj, 
1974b).
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But while the initial discussion concerning the inverse relationship assumed more or less 
uniform technology across size-groups, the advent and consolidation of the ‘Green 
Revolution’ inevitably focussed attention on technological differentiation. As we will see, 
the new technology was subject to powerful economies of scale (Byres, 1972, 1981). The 
advantages enjoyed by larger cultivators were reflected in several studies which found that 
the inverse relationship had ‘either become much weaker in the later period or 
...disappeared altogether’(Roy, 1981: 214).
In theory, the disappearance of the inverse relation can be seen as resulting not only from 
technological change itself but from changes in the relations of production associated with 
the development of capitalism. Thus as ‘share-tenancy and pre-capitalist peasant 
proprietorship’ decline, ‘the basic causes of the inverse relation disappear’ (op cit.: 218). 
However, as has been suggested, the transformation of these relationships has often not 
been a thoroughgoing one and certain aspects of pre-capitalist relationships have been 
maintained. The present study does not offer any evidence specifically concerning the 
operation of the inverse relationship in the fieldwork area. But the question of the 
continuing existence of large numbers of small and marginal holdings, the ‘compulsive 
involvement’ in various markets of poor peasant households - and in particular the 
significance of the adoption of new technology by these households, is a key one for the 
study, and one for which the debate on the inverse relationship is clearly of considerable 
relevance.
3. Identifying classes in Indian agriculture
The focus of this chapter is upon the methods of analysis of the relations and forces of
production which have been proposed within the framework of political economy. In
practice however, these have usually been presented in the context of particular studies
which attempted to apply these methods. The conclusions of these studies inevitably had
implications for political strategy. Academic developments in the field of Indian political
economy have always been organically linked to developments in left political parties, and
in the early 1970s, this link became particularly significant once again as different sections
of the left participated in or responded to the emergence of the Naxalite movement. The
studies suggested specific and very different answers to questions such as whether left-led
agrarian movements must be primarily anti-feudal in focus, creating conditions for the
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development of capitalism before socialism can be considered; whether certain sections of 
the exploiting groups within the agricultural sector can be considered ‘progressive’; and 
which classes can be potential allies for such movements. Underlying these questions was 
that of the potential for different paths to capitalist development, spearheaded by different 
pre-capitalist rural classes (in particular the landlord capitalism/ ‘capitalism from above’ 
and peasant capitalism/ ‘capitalism from below’compared and contrasted by Lenin) 
although it was not until somewhat later that this question was addressed explicitly in the 
Indian context.
As a result the 1970s saw an increasing number of attempts at a more detailed 
classification of peasant classes within agriculture, reflecting the fact that while on the one 
hand substantial changes were occurring even in those regions whose agriculture had most 
convincingly been characterised as stagnant and ‘semi-feudal’, on the other hand 
polarisation into two distinct and opposing classes (and the elimination of any intermediate 
groups) did not seem to be taking place very rapidly anywhere in India.
Inevitably, these attempts drew most directly upon those earlier Marxist characterisations 
of peasant classes which dealt explicitly with consciousness, mobilisation, and the building 
of alliances. One of these is Lenin's ‘Preliminary Draft Theses on the Agrarian Question’, 
written in 1920 in a context where a proletarian party had seized state power without 
substantial transformation to socialism yet having been effected in the countryside. 
Whereas ‘The Development of Capitalism in Russia’ emphasised the distinction between 
the rural proletariat and other ‘intermediate’ groups, the Preliminary Draft Theses’ focus 
on strategy and potential consciousness led Lenin to bring together three groups who 
jointly constitute the ‘working and exploited people of the countryside’.
These are firstly, the agricultural proletariat, who ‘obtain their livelihood by working for 
hire at capitalist agricultural enterprises’; secondly, the ‘semi-proletarians’, who gain a 
subsistence partly by selling their labour power and partly by working their own or 
leased-in land; and thirdly, the ‘small peasantry’, who own or lease-in small plots which 
satisfy the needs of the family, and do not hire outside labour. Of these, the support of the 
third group is considered the least dependable - it will ‘inevitably vacillate towards 
unrestricted freedom of trade and the free enjoyment of the rights of private property’ -
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but can be secured ‘if the victorious proletariat deals very resolutely with the big 
landowners and the big peasants’ (Lenin 1965:371-374).
Meanwhile the ‘middle peasants’, who were earlier analysed as a more or less 
self-sufficient group which would ultimately disappear as capitalism advanced are now 
described as producing a surplus ‘under capitalism’ as well as frequently hiring in labour. 
This group cannot be won over ‘in the immediate future or in the initial period of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat’ but it can be ‘neutralised’ through a combination of 
measures such as the abolition of rent with a ‘ruthless struggle against the bourgeoisie’ 
(Lenin 1965: 374-376).
Finally, there are the ‘big peasants’ the ‘biggest of the bourgeois strata who are open and 
determined enemies of the revolutionary proletariat’ - they as a rule employ ‘several hired 
labourers’ but also perform manual labour on their own farms (Lenin 1965:376).
But whereas Lenin’s categorisation referred to a situation where capitalism was advancing 
rapidly (even though it was not yet fully established), and ‘capitalist agricultural 
enterprises’ were significant, Indian writers were confronted with an extremely unevenly 
developed agrarian economy, distorted by the effects of colonialism and by the terms of its 
continuing integration into a global system of surplus extraction, an economy in many 
regions of which pre-capitalist rent and usury remained important forms of accumulation. 
(For a discussion of how production relations in India were shaped by colonialism, see 
Bagchi, 1982). These were factors which had been incorporated into Mao’s analysis of 
classes in Chinese agriculture, which emerged out of an anti-imperialist revolutionary 
struggle in which the role of different sections of the peasantry was perceived to be of vital 
importance.
While applying to the Chinese situation much of Lenin’s analysis, Mao incorporated an 
assessment of the landlord class, which ‘lives by exploiting peasants’ and whose ‘principal 
form of exploitation is land rent’ (this class also includes those for whom ‘exploitation by 
usury’ is the main source of income), and also conveyed the heterogeneity within the ‘rich 
peasant’ group who may lease out land or lend money as well as exploiting hired labour 
(Mao Tse-Tung, 1975).
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While the Chinese experience has a particular relevance for Marxist analyses of India, 
Indian agriculture inevitably has unique features stemming from the specificity of the 
Indian social formation and the particular transformations occurring within it. For example, 
despite a number of changes, caste continues to be a significant factor in determining 
whether members of a household will participate in manual labour, so that ‘in some cases 
even very small and impoverished landholders will not take to the plough because they 
belong to upper castes’ (Thomer, 1982:1995). Thus Lenin and Mao’s stipulation that ‘rich 
peasants’ must participate in manual labour may not be appropriate in the Indian context. 
As such cases demonstrate, caste and class are no longer synonymous. However, 
economic contradictions are still frequently expressed and understood through caste 
identities. Further, the ideology of caste supremacy plays an important role in maintaining 
the power of the dominant classes in many regions, while in others, newly emerging classes 
have explicitly challenged this ideology on the basis of an assertion of their own caste 
identities. The question of the complex interconnections between caste and class, as they 
can be observed in rural Central Bihar, is explored further in this study.
Many of the Indian studies of rural class structure carried out in the 1960s and 1970s, 
based as they were in particular regions (often only a few districts) identified a range of 
farm size whch corresponded to each of the agrarian classes, or even used farm size as a 
proxy for economic class as defined by a household’s position within the relations of 
production. However, some writers did attempt to evolve specific criteria for assessing 
economic class in Indian conditions.
One of the most systematic of these attempts was Patnaik’s ‘labour exploitation criterion’
(Patnaik, 1976, 1987), which looks at the extent of use of outside labour, or conversely
the extent of labour working for others, (whether as wage labourers or as tenants) relative
to self-employment. This method of assessment was contrasted with that based on upon
farm size, which, as had been pointed out earlier, fails to take account of either differences
in land resource endowment (irrigation levels, cropping patterns, size of the family), or the
differential degrees of present investment of capital on similar physical areas. This is a vital
indicator of economic class defined in terms of the relations of production: ‘agricultural
production of peasant farming households depends not only on the investment of capital
per unit of area and the associated level of technology. The potential for investment of
capital in turn is a function of the extent of surplus generated per unit of area. Whether
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surplus is retained by the household for potential investment, or parted with, depends 
entirely on the specific position within the relations of production, namely the class 
position of the household which is a function of the per capita real resource endowment, 
or the property structure’ (Patnaik, 1987:303-304).
As Patnaik herself later pointed out, ‘the criteria discussed in the Marxist literature are in 
fact multiple, though associated: namely (1) the resource endowment, that is, possession of 
means of production; (2) the nature of labour use, that is, whether exploiting, whether 
self-employed, or whether exploited; and (3) the production of a retained surplus above 
subsistence needs as compared to breaking even or a deficit situation which entails 
borrowing’(op cit.:305). However on the basis that the extent of exploitation/being 
exploited relative to self-employment is ‘the single most accurate index of class status 
within the peasantry which subsumes other criteria’(op cit.:483), the second of the three 
criteria was chosen and formally expressed in the ‘Labour exploitation ratio’.
The ‘Labour-exploitation ratio’ was defined as :
E = (H i - Ho)/F where
Hi = Labour-days hired in
Ho = Family labour-days hired out
F = Family labour-days in self-employment
By calculating the surplus labour-days represented by rent paid for leased land and interest 
paid on loans, as well as hired labour, this formula was extended to include exploitation 
through leasing out and moneylending 1 . Following Lenin and Mao, Patnaik defines both 
rich and middle peasants as net employers of others’ labour, ‘the former to a substantial 
extent and the latter to a minor extent’ (op cit.: 59). Specifically, ‘if labour days employed
1 The labour-exploitation criterion then becomes for a given household:
E = Net surplus labour appropriated through hiring, leasing, and loan interest/surplus labour in 
self-employment 
= s(Hi- Ho) + is(L0- Li) + (wiMi - mMb)/F.s 
=  (Hi -  Ho) +  (Lo- Li) +  -  /»2M ,)1 /s]/F
Where L0 = Total labour-days on land leased out 
L = Total labour-days on land leased in 
Mi = Labour-days of household to which money is lent by A 
Mb = Labour days of household A which borrows money
mi = Interest received by A as proportion of output of household to which money is lent 
m2 = Interest paid by A as proportion of its output (Patnaik, 1987: 55-59).
27
exceed or are at least as high as labour-days in self-employment, the household is rich 
peasant. This is the same as saying that, if at least half the total labour-days worked in a 
holding are from outside labour, then it is rich peasant: if the percentage is less than half 
the household is middle peasant’ (op cit.:59).
By contrast, Athreya, Djurfeldt and Lindberg (1990) have suggested a ‘surplus criterion’ 
for the identification of agrarian classes, in which the extent to which a household 
produces a ‘surplus over the needs of family and farm reproduction’ (op cit.: 182) - or 
falls short of meeting these needs - is central. They thus argue that middle peasants should 
be distinguished from rich peasants on the basis of the source of the surplus they produce: 
that of the rich peasant ‘primarily derives from the exploitation of hired labour’ whereas 
the middle peasant may also be hiring in labour but can only produce a surplus through 
continuing to exploit family labour (op cit.: 197). However, while this approach may 
generate data with important implications for patterns of accumulation, it appears to 
partially shift the focus away from the location of different classes within the relations of 
production - and therefore in relation to eachother - which are central in Patnaik’s work. 
These relationships are of vital importance if one is seeking to understand (as were Lenin 
and Mao) the process of class formation and, in particular, potential class consciousness.
Bharadwaj (1974a, 1974b, 1979, 1985) has analysed the differential nature of exchange
and market involvement for different classes of rural households, providing a cogent
critique of neo-classical assumptions about the functioning of markets. She identifies ‘three
types of market involvement that may emerge, depending upon the economic position of
the partipant and his bargaining strength’. Firstly there is that of the ‘big landlord in the
land (lease) market or the moneylender in the credit market’ who can ‘exploit the market
from a position of vantage, and more importantly, shape the market relations through
contracts which interlock markets.’ Secondly, there is the position of the landless
agricultural labourers, small owners, or tenants who are compulsorily involved in market
operations through hiring out labour and hiring in land. ‘Not having enough circulating
capital to produce even their subsistence they have to rely on credit...this element of
compulsive involvement of the poorest farmers is reflected in their cropping pattern, their
land and labour utilisation as well as the higher degree of monetisation of inputs and
outputs under conditions of distress’. The third, ‘middle farmer’, group ‘can make
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provision for more or less adequate circulating capital (and) possess bullocks or 
implements of their own. A part of them (whom we call ‘small’ farmers) still want to 
protect themselves from the market, playing a defensive role. Another part may 
be...playing the market game with some advantage’(Bharadwaj, 1974a: A12).
4. The ‘New Technology’ and Class Formation
By the early 1980s, changes in patterns of agricultural production, at least in certain 
regions, were marked and widespread enough to allow observers to go beyond identifying 
the characteristics of individual farmers and to analyse the broad contours of these 
changes. In particular, it was now possible to assess the impact of the ‘new technology’ 
which had first been introduced in the mid-1960s. A number of studies had established 
that, in practice, biochemical innovations (which had initially been portrayed as 
‘scale-neutral’) were almost inseparable from mechanical ones (which clearly were not). In 
particular the increased advantages of tubewell irrigation when the new seeds and 
fertilisers were used, and the more ‘time-bound’ nature of agricultural operations, which 
intensified seasonal peaks of demand for labour, thus increasing the labourers’ bargaining 
power, were two features which set up strong pressures towards mechanisation (for a 
discussion of this evidence and its sources, see Byres, 1981).
The extent and impact of mechanisation - and of tubewell irrigation in particular - in the 
fieldwork area is an important theme of the present study. The class nature of these 
technological developments and their implications for relationships between different 
categories of cultivators as well as between employers and labourers are key questions for 
exploring the overall process of agrarian change which has occurred in the area.
Mechanisation is generally perceived as inextricably linked to the processes of
differentiation, land concentration and proletarianisation. A number of studies in this
period suggested that while the land market remained largely a tenancy market, land
concentration was occurring through leasing in by large farmers. This allowed them to
circumvent land ceiling laws which applied only to owned land (Jodha, 1981; Omvedt,
1981). This factor also explained the fact that despite an apparent decline in landlessness
between 1953-54 and 1971-72 (Omvedt, 1981) and more specifically between 1961 and
29
1971 (Bardhan, 1977), there was a large rise in the proportion of rural households not 
cultivating any land. Increasing numbers of small owners were compelled to lease out their 
land because their access to additional leased-in land, which would make their total 
landholding viable, was reduced by growing competition; because the economies of scale 
of the ‘new technology’ had intensified their resource disadvantages making 
self-cultivation unviable; or because of reduced access to wage labour as demand 
increased.
While these trends appeared to point to a clear process of differentiation of the peasantry, 
the extent to which a rural proletariat, ‘free’ of any property of its own, and ‘free’ to sell 
its labour power, was emerging, remained a source of debate.
Proletarianisation and ‘Unfreedom ’
Were ‘the 65 per cent of rural families who together operate 9 per cent or less of the total 
assets...essentially a proletarianised, or proletarianising, section’ (Omvedt, 1981: A151)? 
Was the persistence of tiny landholdings among the rural exploited groups a permanent 
feature of capitalist wage labour in ‘third world’ countries (op cit.: A153-154)? Or did it 
indicate ‘partial proletarianisation’, a process whose ‘most significant contribution has 
been to throw into increasing wage employment large numbers of poor peasants who 
continue to own some land, and to bring some sharecroppers near to the state of pure 
wage labour’ (Byres, 1981:432)?
Equally significantly, how were the terms under which wage labour was employed in 
agriculture changing? Was technological change associated with the emergence of a ‘free’ 
labour force? Or were forms of control over labour implying ‘unfreedom’(Brass, 1995) 
proving to be compatible with, or even necessary to, capitalist development in the 
conditions under which it was occurring in Indian agriculture?
. As early as 1976, a study of Haryana revealed that employers were using ‘new forms of
debt’ to tie labourers in ‘model Green Revolution’ districts of the State (Bhalla, 1976).
Formal contracts for labourers lasting unprecedentedly long periods of up to five years,
and various forms of interlocking, including three-way credit arrangements between
labourer, shopkeeper and employer (which compelled the labourer to purchase
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consumption goods only from one shop) were among what Bhalla describes as ‘threads in 
the redesigned fabric of conservative rural power’(op cit.:A-27). Subsequently further 
evidence has emerged suggesting that, firstly, forms of labour previously regarded as 
‘pre-capitalist’ have persisted or been reinforced in a wide variety of regions witnessing 
technological change and expanded reproduction in agriculture; and secondly, that 
employers in these regions were developing new strategies of control over labour (Rudra, 
1987, Srivastava, 1989a, Brass, 1990, Breman 1993). At the same time there has been a 
widely-observed shift away from permanent or long-term ‘tying’ of labour at the all-India 
level since the mid-1970s(Sen, 1997)
In the context of Haryana a detailed debate has taken place more recently on the 
significance of ‘attachment’ of labour through debt. Brass argues that attachment acts to 
limit the commodification of labour power (proletarianisation) and the growth of 
proletarian consciousness by preventing the labourer from re-entering the labour market 
(Brass, 1990). Jodhka(1994, 1996) suggests that the attached labour system is on the 
decline in Haryana due to the erosion of the power of the dominant class, new employment 
opportunities outside the village for local labour, and greater assertiveness among 
labourers themselves. But according to Brass, this is ‘precisely the situation in which 
resort to the debt mechanism as a method of labour discipline/control is intensified’: 
attachment is thus a response by capital to struggles waged by labourers, amounting to 
‘deproletarianisation’ (Brass, 1995). Brass also extends the definition of ‘attached’ (and, 
according to his definition, therefore ‘unfree’) labour beyond the traditional one of debt 
bonded permanent labourers, and includes the increasingly prevalent practice of ‘seasonal’ 
debt bondage - often of migrant labour - during months of peak demand for labour. His 
observations therefore do not contradict the wider trend towards a decline in permanent 
attached labour.
The question of the strategies adopted by employers in response to increased assertiveness 
by agricultural labourers is one which is particularly relevant to Bihar, where organising by 
labourers has been especially marked in areas which have undergone technological change 
in agriculture, and will be examined further in this study. However caution should be 
exercised in applying the concept of ‘deproletarianisation’ which implies that the process 
o f‘proletarianisation’ has already taken place.
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On a more theoretical level, further discussion has centred around the notion of 
‘unfreedom5 in the context of agrarian class relations. Singh (1995) argues that if the 
arrangement is entered into ‘voluntarily5, ‘over-exploitation of labour through debt-binding 
does not amount to a change in the character of fundamental relations of production5: 
economic compulsion is consistent with capitalism, unlike the juridical, social or political 
‘unfreedom5 of pre-capitalist social formations. Similarly, Mohan Rao (1999) argues that ‘ 
exit5 from such an arrangement is also ‘voluntary5 as long as the labourer can end it by 
paying off the debt (i.e. there is no non-economic coercion involved); ‘unfreedom5 
therefore, only exists where debt is inherited and thus not voluntarily acquired by the 
debtor.
However, this clear-cut division between capitalist ‘economic compulsion5 on the one 
hand and pre-capitalist ‘politico-juridical coercion5(Mohan Rao, 1999) proves difficult to 
sustain in the context of the reality of agrarian economies in transition. For example, as in 
Bhaduri5s model (Bhaduri, 1973), interest on a debt may be set at deliberately unrealisable 
rates, or it may be calculated by the lender in a way which is fraudulent or not 
comprehensible to the labourer, as was commonplace in Bihar until not long ago. More 
recently, acute violence and the threat of violence by dominant landowners has become 
endemic in parts of Bihar and other States which have witnessed at least some elements of 
a transition to capitalism. Today, this violence does not have the explicit social or juridical 
sanction which punitive violence enjoyed in semi-feudal society (see for example Guha, 
1989): it is backed rather by economic power. But, as we will see, it is an institutionalised 
reality which impinges upon any interaction between the economically powerful and the 
economically weak making it anything but ‘voluntary5. On a more general level, the idea of 
‘free5 participation in labour, credit and other markets in the context of the acute inequality 
and poverty which continues to characterise most of rural India has been repeatedly 
challenged using concepts such as ‘compulsive involvement5 (Bharadwaj, 1979) and 
‘forced commerce5 (Bhaduri, 1983, 1986).
‘Class - for -itself action by rich peasants
While the debate around proletarianisation and ‘unfreedom5 had significant implications for
the question of ‘class-for-itself action among the exploited, the increasing political
assertion by forces articulating the interests of rich peasants and emergent capitalist
farmers also generated considerable analysis and debate among Marxists. The late 1970s
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and 1980s saw the growing militancy of ‘kisan’ (peasant) or ‘farmers” movements which 
claimed to represent the entire peasantry in a contradiction between town and countryside, 
‘urban, industrial India and rural Bharat’(Byres, 1988). In terms of the significance of 
these movements for the process of agrarian transition, two key points emerged. Firstly, in 
the regions where they were strong, they were effective in ensuring the implementation of 
policies which could facilitate the completion of the process of transformation of rich 
peasants into capitalist farmers. Secondly, while the ideology of these movements was 
based on the myth of an idealised homogeneous ‘peasantry’, they actually represented the 
interests of rich and to a lesser extent middle peasants at the expense of all other sections 
of the rural population (Byres, 1988, Patnaik and Hasan, 1995).
But these movements also had wider implications for the Indian economy. While they 
demanded improvements in the rural infrastructure, checking price rises on agricultural 
inputs and effective supply of these inputs, their key demand was for ‘remunerative prices’ 
for their output (Gill and Singhal, 1984; Patnaik and Hasan, 1995). In the discourse of 
these movements, agricultural prices were portrayed as a medium through which the 
surplus produced by the ‘peasantry’ was being siphoned off to the industrial sector. But 
changes in the terms of trade between the two sectors suggested that agricultural price 
policies in India in the 1960s, 70s and 80s actually tended to favour agriculture2. Thus 
relations between the agricultural and industrial sectors, and by implication the whole 
process of capitalist development in the economy as a whole, came into focus for 
observers of agrarian change.
In the debate on the intersectoral terms of trade between industry and agriculture which 
had taken place in the Soviet Union in the 1920s, Preobrazhensky had argued that 
manipulation of the intersectoral terms of trade in favour of industry has a dual role in the 
process of industrialisation. On the one hand, with agricultural prices kept relatively low, 
the availability of cheap food and raw material allows the rate of profit to rise. On the 
other hand it is a means of mobilising financial resources, since the marginal rate of surplus
2 According to Mitra (1977), the ‘Green Revolution’ period beginning in 1965-66 saw a shift in the Net 
Barter Terms of Trade (price index of exports/price index of imports) between industrial and agricultural 
sectors of nearly 50 per cent in favour of agriculture. And while a reversal of this trend seems to have 
begun in the mid-1970s, it was clearly not of the same magnitude, with a shift against agriculture of only 
17 per cent (Thamarajakshi, 1985). It also appears that this shift may have peaked in 1984-85.
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is generally higher in industry than in agriculture. However, there may be a danger of a fall 
in the marketed surplus if prices for agricultural output are set too low (Mitra, 1977).
It was suggested by several writers that the failure of the Indian state to mobilise resources 
from the agricultural sector (either through taxation, or the manipulation of the 
inter-sectoral terms of trade) in the face of sustained resistance by dominant landowning 
groups had led to a ‘crisis of accumulation’ and forced the state to turn to external Aid and 
the forcible reduction of the living standards of the urban proletariat as alternative sources 
of resource mobilisation (see for example Byres, 1982; Patnaik, 1984).
The class implications of demands for higher agricultural prices have also been analysed 
(see for example Mitra, 1977, Krishnaji, 1985). As has been noted, poor peasants have no 
choice but to sell their produce immediately after the harvest, often to rich peasants and 
landlords from whom they may be forced to repurchase later at higher prices. And a large 
part of their income may be used to pay off loans and interest in kind, whose valuation 
‘may have nothing to do with the prevailing market price’ (Vittal, 1986). Furthermore, 
since along with agricultural labourers poor peasants depend on the market for a large 
proportion of their consumption needs, agricultural price rises are likely to actually reduce 
their real income. Meanwhile every rise in prices strengthens the economic position of the 
surplus producing peasants and thus enhances their ability to hold stocks, enabling them to 
bid for even higher prices in the next season.
However, the strength of the ‘farmers’ movements’ as a political force, particularly in
Western and North-Western India, clearly necessitated a practical response from the left,
and this resulted in further debate around their significance, this time centred upon political
strategy. For example, in a series of articles published between September 1987 and
September 1988, Balagopal (1987a, 1987b, 1988) argued that the farmers’ movements
essentially represented the interests of the ‘provincial propertied classes’ at the expense of
the rural poor, while Omvedt and Gala asserted that this view ‘seems to disdain the
involvement of the masses’ in such movements (Omvedt and Gala, 1987), which they
regarded as primarily representing the interests of petty commodity producers, whose
dependence on the market for sales and inputs renders them subject to ‘primitive
accumulation’ by the state and by the multinational companies which produce agricultural
inputs such as fertilisers (Omvedt and Gala, 1988). Dev Nathan further argued that the left
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should support the demand for 'remunerative' prices for output, as these would actually 
create more favourable conditions for the struggles of agricultural labourers for higher 
wages (DN, 1988). The question of different ‘paths’ of capitalist development once again 
came to the fore, with a struggle for dominance between ‘landlord’ capitalism (capitalism 
from above) and ‘peasant’ capitalism (capitalism from below) being postulated and the 
latter being regarded as progressive. However, as a rationale for support for movements 
demanding higher agricultural prices, this was clearly problematic: in those regions where 
such movements emerged, peasant-based capitalist development was fairly advanced and 
‘non-landlord’ classes had already come to dominate the countryside; they found 
themselves in conflict not with a ‘semi-feudal’ landlord class, but, as we have seen, with 
the urban bourgeoisie on the one hand, and with the rural exploited classes on the other. In 
other regions which appeared to be witnessing much weaker trends towards peasant 
capitalism, this type of ‘class-for itself action by rich peasants, aimed at increasing the 
profitability of agricultural production, was marked by its absence, with ‘unproductive’ 
investment remaining significant or even rising. It is the nature of class formation and class 
action in one such region in Bihar which is explored in the present study.
5. Gender, Production and Agrarian Change
The late 1980s and 1990s have seen patriarchy and gender relations being more widely 
recognised as an important aspect of the political economy of agrarian change in India. 
The assumption that categories such as ‘the household’ and ‘family labour’represent 
homogeneous units have been challenged and the significance of unequal relationships 
within rural households emphasised, although many writers have continued to use these 
terms uncritically. Once again, academic work has been influenced by developments in the 
political arena, with the emergence of the women’s movement in India in the early 1980s.
In fact, the relationship between Marxism and feminism has historically been a complex
though productive one. Socialist feminists have sought to address the question of women’s
oppression within a political economy framework, using the basic Marxist concept of
human nature as something created historically through the dialectical interrelation
between human biology, human society and physical environment, mediated by human
labour or praxis. Central to a socialist feminist approach is the recognition of ‘procreation’
or reproduction as economic activity (Jaggar, 1988 ). Marx and Engels had stated
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explicitly that there are two aspects to the ‘production of life - both of one’s own in labour 
and of fresh life in procreation’ (op cit.: 134), and had warned against an ahistorical 
approach to procreation. But in their later writing, socialist feminists argue, they began to 
make assumptions about the ‘natural’ determination of reproductive activity which failed 
to apply their own concept o f‘human nature’ to the question of gender (op cit. .129).
In ‘The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State’, Engels argued that ‘the first 
class opposition that appears in history coincides with the development of the antagonism 
between man and woman in monogamous marriage, and the first class oppression 
coincides with that of the female sex by the male’(Engels, 1972:129). He traced women’s 
oppression to the production of surplus and the accumulation of wealth: with the 
development of cultivation and the domestication of animals, human societies began to 
produce a surplus. Men’s control over this surplus and the accumulation of wealth which 
was to be passed on to identifiable heirs led to the establishment of monogamous marriage, 
patrilineal inheritance, and private property, all of which necessitated and reinforced 
women’s subjugation, and the appropriation of their reproductive labour. However, ‘an 
opposition is often evident in Engels’ analysis between the production of things, which 
depends on the organisation of labour, and the production of people, which depends on the 
organization of the family....By equating human labour with the production of objects, and 
more narrowly, of objects with exchange value, women’s bodies and women’s labour in 
maintaining bodily existence are assigned to the domain of nature’ (Kabeer, 1994: 45-46).
A second and related issue which has been highlighted by socialist feminists and is of 
particular relevance to the political economy of agrarian change is that of the opposition 
between the ‘public’ and ‘private’ spheres. The development of capitalism as it was 
observed by Marx in ‘Capital’ involved a shift from petty commodity production, in which 
production took place in the home, to generalised commodity production, in which ‘the 
formal exchange of capital and labour power becomes general’(Marx, 1976:951) and takes 
place in the ‘public’ sphere of the marketplace, while the reproduction of human life and 
labour continues to take place within the household, which is now designated the ‘private’ 
sphere. However, many Marxist writers in their neglect of women’s labour in the home 
appear to have implicitly accepted this division between the ‘public’ and the ‘private’
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sphere rather than recognising it as an ideological construction specific to the capitalist 
mode of production.
This is clearly particularly problematic when dealing with agrarian societies in transition 
from pre-capitalist to capitalist modes. Here the peasant household remains the primary 
unit of production, and women’s labour, not only in the fields but also within the confines 
of the home, is vital to the direct production process as well as to reproduction. In fact, the 
extent to which, in the dominant ideology of a given agrarian society, the home is being 
redefined as a ‘private’ sphere distinct from production, and women in surplus-producing 
households are being confined to this sphere, is often an important marker of the 
development of capitalist relations of production in agriculture. The class (and caste) 
specific social practices surrounding marriage - for example those relating to dowry, 
child-marriage and widow remarriage - also reflect the value assigned to the (productive 
and reproductive) labour performed by women of different classes, and is thus linked to 
the prevailing relations of production and patterns of accumulation.
Conversely, some writers in attempting to redress this neglect by focussing upon women’s 
experiences have also fallen into the trap of accepting the ‘public’/ ‘private’ dichotomy. 
One example of this in the context of an agrarian society in India is the Stree Shakti 
Sanghatana group’s influential work on women in the Communist-led Telengana peasant 
uprising of 1948-51 ‘We Were Making History’. They highlight the distinction between 
‘the private world of the family, domestic labour and reproduction, and the public world 
of production, politics and war’(Stree Shakti Sanghatana, 1989:259), and consciously 
emphasise the former. Before they joined the movement, it is argued, women were 
relegated to the ‘private’ sphere, and once in the movement it was the ‘hidden’ struggles 
of this sphere which ‘absorbed women’s efforts and their attention’(op cit.: 30).
This approach not only appears to be inadequate to comprehend the complexities of a 
struggle for social and political change occurring in an agrarian society in transition, but, as 
the authors themselves partially acknowledge, the rigid distinction between ‘public’ and 
‘private’ spheres effectively excludes the experience of women from poor peasant and 
agricultural labourer households. In Telengana (as in contemporary rural Bihar) these 
women were not confined to their homes: they had no choice but to work in the landlords’
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fields and houses. Relations of exploitation and oppression outside the family were as 
central to their lives as those inside it.
The mechanisms through which unequal gender relations within the household actually 
facilitate the intensification of the exploitation of women’s wage labour in agriculture has 
been a focus of more recent writing, which has analysed how women’s experiences of the 
diverse processes of agrarian change in India have differed from those of men in the same 
or similar households (for example, Agarwal,1994; Kapadia, 1996) . Studies have looked 
at ‘women labourers’ increasing responsibility for household income, the increase in female 
headed households, the ways in which caste norms prohibited some women’s entry into 
better-paid ‘outside’ work, the growing work participation rate of labouring women, 
women’s greater contribution to the household, and gender differentiated participation in 
strikes and resistance’ (Kapadia and Lerche, 1999:5).
Considerable evidence has been presented that the period between 1961 and 1991 saw the 
‘feminisation’ of agriculture in general and agricultural wage labour in particular at the 
all-India level (Bennett, 1992; Chadha, 1997). This is discussed in more detail elsewhere in 
this study. Several writers working within a framework which appears to broadly conform 
to the ‘socialist feminist’ one we have outlined have examined this phenomenon in 
regionally specific contexts (Kapadia, 1992, 1996; Chowdhry, 1993; da Corta and 
Venkateshwarlu, 1999). They suggest that given a growing gender- based divergence of 
experience, women labourers should actually be considered as belonging to a ‘different 
class’ from male members of the households they belong to, who do not participate in, or 
have withdrawn from, agricultural wage labour. However in the context of the debates 
indicated above, it is worth noting that this approach unwittingly negates the importance of 
gender as a theoretical tool, implying that the phenomenon of ‘feminisation’ cannot be 
understood in terms of the ways in which the particular form taken by the capital-labour 
relationship is shaped by unequal gender relations.
This study attempts to maintain a consistent critical awareness of gender-based 
contradictions in all the questions it addresses. In particular, it discusses the 
gender-specific implications of changes in the relations of production, organisation by 
agricultural labourers, technological change and patterns of accumulation.
38
6. Regional Differentiation
The 1980s also saw a greater focus on the nature and dynamics of uneven regional 
development in India, an area of research which had previously been neglected. A 
phenomenon which gave a particular impetus to this work was the rapid growth of 
regionally based movements demanding autonomy of a greater or lesser degree from the 
Indian state. The relationship between a centralised industrial bourgeoisie and regionally 
based agrarian capitalists played a key role in the growth of these movements 
(Sathyamurthy, 1985). This was perhaps most striking in the case of Punjab, where the 
blocking of investment opportunities beyond the agricultural sector for capitalist farmers, 
together with the lack of local employment opportunities outside agriculture, even as small 
farms became unviable and the expectations of educated youth rose, have been identified 
as crucial factors which fuelled the demand for an independent ‘Khalistan’ in the 1980s 
(Gill, 1988, 1995).
Studies of uneven regional development emphasised the historical determinants of 
differential patterns of growth and transformation, including systems of land tenure under 
colonialism; the extent and nature of agriculture-industry linkages; and patterns of 
post-Independence state intervention(see for example Bharadwaj, 1982; Bhattacharya and 
Mitra, 1983; Baneijee and Ghosh, 1988; Prasad, 1988; Srivastava, 1989c). The role of 
ecological factors in regional differentiation has also been highlighted (see for example 
Sengupta, 1980; Athreya et al.,1990)
The increasing awareness of the importance of regional differentiation is however reflected
not only in these writings but in an increase in comparative studies using data from more
than one region, and, more generally, in the regional specificity of more recent work on
agrarian change in India. These studies do not draw automatic conclusions about all-India
level trends but place their findings within the context of the particular conditions
prevailing in the region concerned. This is not to suggest that such findings do not have
implications for India’s political economy as a whole: not only are patterns of development
likely to be reproduced in other regions given comparable conditions, but regional
differentiation itself can be regarded as playing an integral role in perpetuating the power
of a heterogeneous alliance of ruling classes and indeed the Indian state itself in its current
form. It is in this context that this study of one particular region in Bihar should be viewed
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7. Agrarian Movements, Political Power and the State
The relationship between economic power and social and political power is a central 
concern of Marxist theory, and clearly, processes of change in agriculture cannot be 
understood in isolation from social formations to which agricultural sectors belong, nor 
from the state. Linkages between agricultural and industrial sectors, the relationship 
between the state and the various agrarian classes, social and cultural practices relating to 
gender or caste which may be retained from earlier modes of production or adapted to new 
conditions - these are just a few examples of the wider factors affecting, and being affected 
by, the nature and pace of agrarian transformation. They are particularly important for an 
understanding of the political and social movements which are often the agents of such 
transformation. As we have seen, much of the early Marxist work on agrarian change was 
explicitly political and concerned the formulation of strategy in the shape of ‘agrarian 
programmes’. Thus the wider political and economic context was inscribed in these 
analyses.
As far as Marxist scholarship on Indian agriculture during the last four decades is 
concerned, its scope and breadth of vision has varied considerably in this respect. The 
complex inter-relationship between agrarian movements representing different classes, 
groups of classes or sections of classes, the state at various different levels, and the 
process of agrarian change have been touched upon by a number of writers. Notably, 
questions relating to political mobilisation and state power have been addressed by 
political economists in the context of land reforms, so-called ‘farmers’ movements’, and, 
to a lesser extent, the struggles of rural labour. In the context of Bihar, as we will see, 
several writers have referred to the processes by which state institutions themselves have 
become sources of accumulation for those with access to them. However, this is an area in 
which much work remains to be done.
Both the state as well as a movement for social, economic and political transformation are
incorporated into the framework of the present study. Processes of agrarian change
occurring in Central Bihar are examined in the context of the emergence and development
of a left-led movement of agricultural labourers and poor peasants which poses a threat to
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the very basis of power in the region. At the same time the role of the state is considered, 
not only in terms of policy and legislation, but in terms of the actual operation of local 
state structures. In particular, the question of the relationship between these structures, 
social and political power, and patterns of accumulation in the fieldwork area is a key 
theme.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this chapter has identified a number of themes in the existing literature on 
the political economy of agrarian change which this study hopes to address in the context 
of Central Bihar. Discussion of the ‘agrarian question’ among nineteenth century Marxists 
culminated in Lenin’s ‘The Development of Capitalism in Russia’, which provided the first 
detailed analysis of the dynamic of the process of differentiation of the peasantry. It also 
highlighted two further questions of particular relevance to the present study: the 
possibility of two distinct ‘paths’ to capitalist development - ‘capitalism from above’ and 
‘capitalism from below’ - and the role of survivals from earlier modes in the complex 
processes of transition.
In India, the political economy of agriculture has been a central concern for Marxists, and 
academic debates have been linked, although to a varying degree - to questions of 
political strategy for the left. India’s Mode of Production Debate involved an in-depth 
discussion of not only the extent to which Indian agriculture was witnessing the 
development of capitalism, but the methods through which capitalist production could be 
distinguished from its predecessors. The process of expanded reproduction was identified 
as a key criterion for capitalist production, and is one which we will make use of in this 
study. Other participants in the debate formulated the ‘semi-feudal’ thesis, in which the 
existence of interlocked modes of exploitation or ‘interlinked markets’ played an 
important role in stifling potential change. Related to this is the central question of 
accumulation: of alternative avenues of investment of agrarian surpluses, productive and 
unproductive, the balance of forces which determines this, and the implications for 
agrarian transformation. Meanwhile the debate surrounding the ‘inverse relationship’ 
between landholding size and the productivity of land focussed attention on the economic 
implications of the conditions of acute poverty and dependence faced by marginal 
cultivators.
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Indian Marxists have also addressed the question of the identification of agrarian classes, 
building upon the work of Lenin and Mao. Patnaik’s ‘Labour Exploitation Criterion’ is one 
of the most systematic and detailed attempts to deal with this problem. The class 
categories used in the present study are based on the same principles and are discussed 
further in Chapter 3.
As the impact of the New Technology deepened, further debate was generated on the 
issues of class formation and class-for-itself action in agriculture. Questions relating to the 
extent of ‘proletarianisation’, and the nature of ‘unfreedom’ among agricultural labourers 
were examined in the context of the implications of technological change and the potential 
for organising by labourers. At the same time the nature of political assertion by landed 
classes also became a focus of debate as the left attempted to assess the significance of 
‘farmers’ movements’. The role of political assertion by rich peasants in securing the state 
policies required to complete the transition to capitalist farming, as well as the implications 
of such assertion for the economy as a whole, were discussed in this context.
In the wake of the emergence of the contemporary women’s movement in India, the 
importance of gender and patriarchal relations for an understanding of the political 
economy of agrarian change was highlighted. Questions relating to marriage, sexuality and 
familial relationships were recognised as falling within the scope of political economy. The 
assumption that concepts like ‘the household’ and ‘the family’ could be treated as 
internally undifferentiated were challenged, as was the failure to recognise women’s labour 
in its various forms, and the problematic use of the ‘public’/ ‘private’ dichotomy.
There was also an increased awareness of the question of uneven regional development, 
which is reflected both in studies of the phenomenon itself and the increase in 
region-specific case studies and the use of the comparative method.
Finally, the relationship between economic power and social and political power is a 
central concern of Marxist theory. However, in the context of the political economy of 
agrarian change in contemporary India it is an area which has not yet been fully explored. 
It is hoped that the present study will make a contribution towards extending this 
exploration a little further.
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CHAPTER 2: PROFILE OF THE FIELDWORK AREA AND
CENTRAL HYPOTHESES
1. Bihar in the all-India context: 1970s to 1990s
Bihar has frequently been characterised as one of the ‘most backward’ States of India. This 
is borne out, on the one hand, by aggregate quantitative measures of economic growth 
and poverty such as per capita income, per capita State Domestic Product, and the 
percentage of the population below the poverty line, and on the other, by qualitative and 
structural features which reflect the nature of production relations. However, this 
characterisation also masks the substantial changes which have occurred in the State.
Some Macro-level Indicators
In 1970-71, per capita income in Bihar was lower than that in any other State, and 
approximately two-thirds of India's average per capita income (Prasad 1988:1690); it 
declined to less than half by the late 1980s (Mathur, 1994).
Per capita net State Domestic Product (SDP) at current prices during 1991-92 (Rs/year) 
was Rs. 2,904 in the State, only 52 per cent of per capita Net Domestic Product for India 
as a whole. The growth rate of per capita SDP during 1980-90 was 1.8 per cent in 
Bihar. Although this was an improvement upon growth rates during the 1970s, it was still 
far below the national average of 3.1 per cent (Sharma 1996).
Bihar has remained the State with the highest percentage of its population below the 
poverty line. While the Planning Commissions's Modified Expert Group Methodology put 
the level of rural poverty in Bihar at 58.2% in 1993-94, estimates using ‘state specific’ 
poverty lines based on state-specific middle range consumer price indices put the figure 
considerably higher at 65.5 per cent. As a recent study points out, Bihar's share in the 
all-India rural poor population has actually increased in the decade 1983-1993 from 16.6% 
to 19.6% (Chelliah and Sudarshan,1998:14).
Underlying this is an employment structure characterised by continuing dependence on the
agricultural sector. The 1991 Census showed that Bihar had the highest proportion of main
workers engaged in agriculture of any State, with more than 80 per cent directly
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dependent on the land. Not only has there been a marked absence of a shift of workers 
from agriculture to manufacturing, but during the decade 1981-91 the dependence of the 
workforce on agriculture has actually marginally increased while that on manufacturing has 
declined (Sharma 1996). Taken together with growing employment in services, this implies 
an overall increase in low-paid employment in the unorganised sector in both rural and 
urban areas. As Table 1 suggests, although the pattern of sector-wise GDP growth in 
Bihar in this period was comparable to the all-India pattern, the pattern of employment 
growth differed markedly, implying negative employment elasticities in the Manufacturing, 
Mining and Quarrying, Construction, and Transport sectors in the State.
Bihar also has a low percentage of rural workers engaged in non-farm activities. In India 
as a whole, rural non-farm employment increased significantly during the 1970s and 1980s. 
Bihar is one of the few States where this expansion did not occur: between 1983 and 
1987-88, there was hardly any growth in non-farm employment (Chadha, 1993)3.
Table 1 Sectorwise employment growth.GDP growth at constant prices, and 
employment elasticities in Bihar and India.1981-91
Sector Bihar India
GDP 
Growth 
(1980-81 to 
1990-91)
Employmen 
t Growth 
(1981-1991 
)
Employmen
t
Elasticities
GDP 
Growth 
(1980-81 to 
1990-91)
Employmen 
t Growth 
(1981- 
1991)
Employmen
t
Elasticities
Agriculture 2.33 2.28 0.98 3.58 2.06 0.58
Mining and 
Quarrying
6.71 -0.45 -0.07 7.78 3.02 0.39
Manufacturing 7.87 -2.5 -0.32 7.51 1.3 0.17
Construction 6.65 -0.36 -0.05 4.31 4 0.93
Transport 4.96 -1.48 -0.3 6.93 2.59 0.37
Trade 5.5 1.83 0.33 5.75 4.07 0.71
Services 5.53 5.94 1.07 6.5 4.22 0.65
All Sectors 4.75 2.13 0.45 5.53 2.37 0.43
Source: Exercises carried out by the LEM Division, Planning Commission, cited in Sharma, 1996
In the 1990s, the dependence of Bihar’s workers on the agricultural sector has been 
intensified sharply by all-India level developments. After the introduction of the New 
Economic Policies in 1991, 'rural areas have borne the brunt of the workforce
3 Some writers have argued that the process of uneven regional development has been reinforced by the 
policies pursued by the State at an all-India level. For example, Prasad (1988) suggests that instruments of 
resource mobilisation and public investment have been used in such a way as to intensify regional 
inequalities.
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restructuring process, with agriculture in particular reverting to its traditional role as the 
residual sector for rural bom workers who have not been able to find more productive 
non-farm jobs, either in rural areas, or in the cities' (Bhalla, 1997:222). Bhalla notes that 
‘after 1991, not only the rural secondary sector, but all of non-agriculture, suffered a 
rout....The number of persons who settled for work in agriculture...is roughly four times 
the number who obtained work in the non-farm sectors from 1987-88 to 1993-94. This 
compares decidedly unfavourably with the numbers for the preceding quinquennium. From 
1983 to 1987-88, roughly three times as many fresh jobs had been generated in 
non-agriculture as were generated within the farm sector.' (op cit.:219).
Further, with a high proportion of Bihar’s rural poor migrating to other States in search of 
employment (almost 42% of total interstate migrants in search of work originated in Bihar 
and U.P. in 1981 [Jha, 1997: 31]), the decline in secondary sector employment at an 
all-India level has inevitably hit the workers of these States particularly hard.
Meanwhile in Bihar itself, the growth rate in manufacturing has declined from the level 
of 1980s. The annual growth in the State Domestic Product in the manufacturing sector 
was 3.36 per cent during 1992-94: 2.78 per cent in the registered sector and 4.32 per 
cent in the unregistered sector (Sharma, 1996 ).
Agrarian Structure
If, as Marxist economists have argued, the growth of the secondary sector and the 
associated transition in the sectoral structure of employment requires a large scale 
mobilisation of resources from agriculture itself (see for example Mitra, 1977, Byres, 1982, 
Bharadwaj,1982), then the absence of effective reform of the agrarian structure is clearly a 
key factor responsible for Bihar’s overall economic stasis.
Immediately after Independence in August 1947, Bihar became the first State to attempt to 
introduce legislation abolishing the rights of intermediaries in land (the Bihar State 
Abolition of Zamindari Bill).4 But as has been amply documented, the subsequent record 
of implentation of land reforms in the State has been a dismal one (Jannuzi 1974; Sengupta 
1982; Land Reforms Unit 1990; Das 1992). Of the three major planks of land reform -
4 After much litigation by zamindar interests, the Bihar Land Reforms Act of 1950 was finally upheld by 
the Supreme Court in 1952. Thus ‘five years had been purchased’ by those who opposed the legislation 
(Jannuzi, 1974:13).
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zamindari abolition, ceilings on land ownership, and tenancy rights, only the first has 
become a tangible reality in Bihar. The class of rich peasant ‘Occupancy Tenants’ who had 
played a dominant role in the pre-Independence struggles for zamindari abolition now 
became the owners of the land in substantial parts of the State. In caste terms, this 
generally meant ‘the replacement of the landed power of most Kayasthas and many 
Rajputs with Bhumihars, Yadavs, Kurmis’(Das, 1992:36).
The big landowners’ strategy of retaining quantities of land far above the legal ceilings 
through falsification of records and transactions among family members was particularly 
blatantly and effectively pursued in Bihar. Even where ceiling surplus land has been 
identified for redistribution, each stage of its acquisition and redistribution has been 
interminably delayed through litigation, corruption, and the inertia of state apparatuses 
dominated by landed classes.
But perhaps the most lasting failure has been that of tenancy legislation. Large scale 
evictions of small tenants in the period immediately after the introduction of the Zamindari 
Abolition Bill in 1947, affecting up to seven million people, led to the creation of a class of 
unprotected sharecroppers. By 1958, two-thirds of these households held an average of 
only 0.04 acres and were dependent upon agricultural wage labour for subsistence (Mitra 
and Vijayendra, 1982:99).
Thus Bihar’s agrarian economy is today marked by extreme inequalities in access to and 
control over land and other resources; by a high proportion of agricultural labourers 
among main workers (37.21 per cent of main workers in Bihar are classified as agricultural 
labourers according to the 1991 Census, as compared to 26.15 per cent at an All-India 
level - only in Andhra Pradesh is the figure higher); by the proliferation of marginal 
landholdings; and by a high incidence of tenancy, particularly sharecropping tenancy, with 
land almost exclusively leased-in by poor or landless households (Government of India 
1996). Much of tenancy is completely unrecorded. (For a detailed discussion of changes in 
land distribution and tenancy see Chapter 5, ‘Changing Patterns of Land Ownership and 
Access to Land in the Fieldwork Area’).
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Agricultural Production: elements of change
However, if the phenomena cited above suggest that little more than the successive 
pauperisation of the productive classes has been occurring in Bihar since Independence, 
other changes which have occurred in the agrarian economy, particularly since the early 
1970s, are indicative of a more complex scenario.
Bihar’s post-independence experience until the early 1970s did little to change the overall 
picture of a state with a stagnant and unproductive agricultural sector. During the period 
1962-65 to 1975-78 triennia, all Bihar districts recorded low (2% or less) growth in 
overall yields (Mahendra Dev, 1988:A-111). In terms of foodgrains output, the overall 
compound growth rate in Bihar between 1962-65 and 1970-73 was only 1.74%, with no 
district showing high growth rates (Bhalla and Alagh, 1979:29-30).
Figures suggest that during the period between the triennia ended 1970-71 and 1983-84 
this meagre growth rate actually declined further to only 1% per annum (CMIE, 1995). 
However, a wide-ranging study conducted in 1981/2 and 1982/3 by the A.N Sinha 
Institute of Social Studies (ANSISS) in conjunction with the ILO (Prasad, Rodgers et al., 
1988), while confirming much of this picture, did identify certain trends which suggested 
that potentially transformative changes might be occurring among a specific group and in 
specific regions of the state.
This group were ‘backward’ caste - predominantly Kurmi - peasants employing a 
combination of wage and family (including female) labour, cultivating anything between
0.5 and 10 acres and using tubewell irrigation. Areas where this group is dominant are 
concentrated in the Central Bihar districts, particularly Patna and Nalanda (where two of 
the twelve villages in the study were located).
In summary, the study found that this group of households were at the forefront in the
installation of tubewells which were the major source of assured irrigation, and in the
adoption of High Yield Varieties and the use of fertilisers. While overall it was found that
'the extent of innovation which was witnessed in the area of biological technology has yet
to unfold in the realm of mechanisation'(op cit.:549), the larger landholders among this
group also had the highest value of machinery, productive assets, and capital investment in
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agriculture, and obtained more and larger 'modem' (institutional) loans than others. Kurmi 
peasants were characterised by relatively high values of marketed output per acre, and 
these values were substantially higher for larger landholdings.
The nature of the patterns of accumulation subsequently adopted by this group is one of 
the main questions addressed in this thesis. This is of particular significance in the light of 
other recent studies which suggest that the pattern which occurred in parts of Central 
Bihar in the 1970s and early 1980s was to some extent replicated in other parts of the 
State in a later period (see for example Shah and Ballabh, 1997; Jha, 1997). In the 1980s 
these changes appear to have been widespread enough to be reflected in aggregate 
statistics. Thus at the all-Bihar level, foodgrain production between 1979-82 and 1989-91 
increased at the annual compound rate of 3.30 per cent, while foodgrain yields increased 
by 3.5 per cent per annum (Sharma, 1996).
Once again however, there is considerable inter-regional variation. A recent district-level 
study (Bhalla and Singh, 1998) finds that while the number of ‘low productivity and low 
growth’ districts across the country has declined from 73 in the period between 1962-65 
and 1980-83 to only 24 between 1980-83 and 1990-93, seven of these 'hardcore problem 
districts' are located in Bihar (op cit.: 119). Equally significantly, the overall growth in 
foodgrains production which occurred in the 1980s does not appear to have been sustained 
in the post-reforms period of the early 1990s. Foodgrains production averaged 12.04 
million tonnes during 1989-90 and 1990-91 but fell to 10.64 million tonnes in 1991-92 
and further to 9.17 million tonnes in 1992-93 while food prices rose sharply (Sharma, 
1996).
New Political Forces
Inseparable from the emergence of new patterns of accumulation, as well as the 
perpetuation of existing ones, is the complex process of class formation and the 
development of class contradictions. Different regions of Bihar have historically witnessed 
a series o f ‘agrarian movements’ which have expressed these contradictions in a variety of 
ways.Two phenomena which have emerged since the early 1970s are of particular 
relevance to this study.
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Firstly, this period has seen the completion of the process of political consolidation of a 
class of rich peasants from the Backward Castes, challenging historical upper caste 
dominance, a process which had been underway since before Independence. This has been 
increasingly reflected in the political arena, culminating in the electoral victory of Laloo 
Prasad Yadav’s Janata Dal in 1990. Laloo Yadav’s rhetoric of ‘social justice’ for the poor 
and against caste-based inequality reflects an ideological continuity with earlier Backward 
Caste movements such as that waged by the Triveni Sangh in the 1930s (Mukheijee and 
Yadav, 1980) as well as with the ‘Socialist’ political trend epitomised in the 1970s in Bihar 
by the ‘Total Revolution’ movement led by Jaya Prakash Narayan. But, as has become 
increasingly evident during the period in which Bihar has been ruled by the Janata Dal 
(subsequently the Rashtriya Janata Dal), it is the Party’s character as the organic 
expression of the interests of sections of the ‘new’ rural rich in Bihar which determines its 
actions. While it has been able to retain the allegiance of some middle peasants 
(particularly of the Yadav castes), the contradiction with agricultural labourers has 
continued to intensify. In fact the Janata Dal has even been prepared to align itself with 
upper caste landowners in attempting to crush organised assertion by this class. Currently 
the Kurmi rich peasants of Patna and Nalanda districts are represented politically by the 
Samata Party, which was formed in 1995 in response to perceived Yadav dominance 
within the Janata Dal. In this case, the adjustment with upper caste landed interests takes 
an explicit shape in the electoral arena in the alliance between the Samata Party and the 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which has emerged as the most effective representative of 
these interests in Bihar.
Secondly, Bihar has been the centre of the revolutionary left movement in India for the
last two decades. The earlier historical role of the Communist Party of India in the
pre-Independence agrarian movements waged by the Kisan Sabha has been well
documented (see for example Das, 1983; Hauser, 1994), as have the sharecroppers
struggles the Party initiated in North Bihar in the 1950s (see for example Sinha, 1991).
The late 1960s saw the emergence of a new, more radical strand within the Indian
communist movement, which grew out of the peasant uprising which had taken place in
Naxalbari in northern West Bengal in 1967. By the early 1970s, the wave of ‘Naxalite’
agrarian uprisings elsewhere in the country had been crushed and the Communist Party of
India (Marxist-Leninist), formed in 1969, had itself fragmented and virtually collapsed in
the face of intense state repression (Baneijee, 1984). But it was at this point that struggles
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by labourers and poor peasants for land, living wages and an end to caste-based oppression 
by the landed classes took off in Bhojpur and Patna districts of Bihar under the leadership 
of CPI(ML)(Mukheijee and Yadav, 1980;Mishra, 1999).
The turning point for the movement in Bihar came in 1978 when the CPI(ML)(Liberation)5 
launched a ‘rectification campaign’ aimed at reversing some of the mistakes of the earlier 
period. In terms of agrarian struggles, this involved building democratic structures from 
the village level upwards and the establishment of mass organisations which functioned 
openly, while the Party itself remained underground until 1992. By the mid-1980s, the 
movement had a strong base in large parts of Patna, Nalanda, Gaya, Bhojpur and 
Aurangabad Districts of Central Bihar - the same areas which had witnessed some ‘peasant 
capitalist’ development in the 1970s - as well as pockets spread across 21 other Districts 
of the State (CPI(ML) 1986: 62). Elections were fought for the first time in 1985 under 
the banner of the Indian People’s Front, a mass political organisation linked to the Party. 
After 1992 the CPI(ML) itself contested elections in the areas where it was involved in 
leading struggles. By the mid-1990s, its area of influence had spread to include several 
districts of North Bihar as well as parts of Jharkhand.
2. The Fieldwork Area: a Block in Central Bihar
Bihar is marked by considerable regional variation and uneven development. The State is 
conventionally described as consisting of three distinct regions: ‘North Bihar’, the plains 
north of the River Ganga; ‘Central Bihar’ the plains south of the River Ganga (also 
sometimes called South Bihar); and the forested, mineral-rich ‘Chhotanagpur’ plateau, a 
geographically as well as economically and culturally distinct area which is currently 
witnessing a powerful movement demanding the creation of a separate State, Jharkhand.
North Bihar is a fertile but flood-prone region watered by several large rivers, with high 
population density. The proportion of agricultural labourers among main workers is over 
fifty
5 The CPI(ML)(Liberation) has emerged as the strongest of the groups which were formed with the 
fragmentation of the original CPI(ML), and is the only one which operates as an all-India level political 
party. It is also the only one which is active in the fieldwork area, where it is generally referred to as the 
‘Ma-Le ’ (i.e.the M-L). References to the CPI(ML) in the following chapters are to this group.
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per cent in many districts. The region is also characterised by the survival of a number of 
very large landowners and the prevalence of sharecropping tenancy.
Central Bihar, which constitutes approximately 21 per cent of the total area of Bihar, was 
until recently comprised of ten districts: Rohtas, Bhojpur, Aurangabad, Jehanabad, Gaya, 
Patna, Nalanda, Nawada, Munger and Bhagalpur. In the 1990s, Rohtas has been divided 
to form two new districts, Bhabua and Sasaram, while Buxar and Jamui districts have been 
carved out of Bhojpur and Munger respectively6 (Figure 1).
In comparison to North Bihar, Central Bihar has relatively few very big landlords: the 
pre-Independence anti-zamindari movement was strongest in these areas and as a result the 
process by which rich peasants, engaging in various combinations of leasing out and 
self-cultivation, came to dominate the countryside was most effective here. The 
proportion of agricultural labourers among main workers, though slightly lower than in 
North Bihar, is still approximately forty per cent or more in most of the region. The rural 
infrastructure is somewhat more developed than that of North Bihar, and the irrigation 
ratio is considerably higher, with the proportion of gross cropped area irrigated falling 
between 60 and 80 per cent in all the districts(CMIE 1993). As suggested above, it was in 
Central Bihar that changes thought to indicate a potential for capitalist development in 
agriculture were first identified in the early 1980s (Prasad, Rodgers et al.: 1988); these 
areas also saw the emergence of strong movements of labourers and poor peasants in the 
same period.
However, these regions themselves are economically heterogeneous, a fact that is 
underlined by the cluster analysis carried out as part of the ANSISS/JLO study (Prasad, 
Rodgers et al. 1988). The analysis, which was restricted to north and central Bihar 
districts, used population growth and density, urbanisation, tenancy, cropping intensity, 
use of HYV paddy, and tubewell irrigation as variables to categorise districts, and 
concluded that 'these clusters did not correspond to the traditional North Bihar-South 
Bihar division...the more advanced-more backward axis was West to East rather than 
South to North' (op cit.:46)
6 The reasons for the extraordinary proliferation of districts in Bihar are described in Chapter 7, ‘Patterns 
of Accumulation in the Fieldwork Area’
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Fieldwork for this study was carried out in Hilsa Community Development Block in 
Nalanda District. As Table 2 shows, more than 83 per cent of main workers in Nalanda 
District are dependent on agriculture. The District is characterised by high values of 
proportion of net sown
Table 2 : Nalanda District: Selected Indicators
Nalanda Bihar All India
1 Percentage of main 
workers in agriculture
83.32 80.62 64.9
2 Persons per sq.km. 844 496 273
3 Average size of 
operational holding 
(hectares)
0.61 0.87 1.69
4 Net Sown Area as % 
of Reporting Area
76.21 44.43 46.3
5 Gross Irrigated Area 
as % of Gross Cropped 
Area
76.16 36.31 30.72
6 Fertiliser consumption 
per hectare (kgs)
133 58 72
7 Value of output of 
major crops(Rs) 
per hectare 
per capita
4034
566
3017
368
3576
758
8 % of Cultivating 
Households Leasing in 
Land
16.5 19.73 15.85
9 % of Tenancies 
Sharecropped
45.7 61.94 38.74
Sources
Row 1: Census of India 1991
Rows 2-7: Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) Profiles ofDistricts, November 1993 
Rows 8 and 9: Column 1 - Census of India 1981, Columns 2 and 3 - National Sample Survey 37th Round, 
1981-82 (Note: NSS figures refer to operational holdings, Census figures refer to cultivating households)
area to reporting area, irrigation ratio, fertilizer consumption per hectare and output of 
major
crops per hectare, in relation to both the all-Bihar and the all-India figures. Given a high 
population density in Nalanda, per capita output of major crops, while well above the State 
average, is however considerably lower than the national average. The incidence of 
tenancy - and more markedly of sharecropping tenancy - is low in relation to Bihar as a 
whole, although above average for India.
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The major crops grown in Nalanda are rice (accounting for 55 per cent of net sown area); 
wheat (33.35 per cent); gram (4.33 per cent); maize (2.31 per cent) and potatoes (2.09 per 
cent) (CMIE 1993).
While, as has been noted, the dominant landowners in Nalanda District and elsewhere in 
Central Bihar do not generally own the vast amounts of land still controlled by landlords in 
many North Bihar districts, Nalanda is noted for the existence of a number of large tracts 
owned by ‘maths’ (religious trusts) and controlled by priests known as ‘mahants’.
Struggles which have been waged over such land in Hilsa Block are described in Chapter
6 .
According to the 1991 Census, the community-wise distribution of the population of 
Nalanda is as follows: ‘Scheduled Castes’ - primarily consisting of Dusadh, Chamar and 
Musahar castes, are the largest single group forming 20 per cent of the population. Yadavs 
account for another 13 per cent, Kurmis 11 per cent, Muslims 10 per cent, Bhumihars and 
Kahars around 6 per cent each and Rajputs and Koeris around 5 per cent each. Brahmans 
and Telis are also present in significant numbers.
Hilsa Block, comprising 102 inhabited villages, was originally in Patna District, and when 
Nalanda District was carved out from Patna District in 1972, Hilsa became the 
north-western tip of Nalanda, adjoining Patna and Jehanabad districts. It thus lies in the 
heart of Central Bihar (Fig. 1). It falls within a belt which has been relatively well-irrigated 
since the mid-1960s: according to the 1971 Census, ‘the area under irrigation is over 60 
per cent in a compact tract comprising the districts of Patna, Gaya and Shahabad’7. Hilsa 
was originally irrigated by the system of reservoirs and channels known as ‘ahar-pyne’ 
which covered much of the Patna-Gaya region in the zamindari era (Mitra, 1985:207). 
Subsequently, groundwater became the most important source of irrigation, although some 
areas are partially irrigated by a small river, the Lokayan.
3. Chandkura : a Profile
Chandkura village was one of twelve villages included in the study carried out by the 
AN.Sinha Institute of Social Studies and the ILO in 1981-83. I carried out fieldwork in
7 Shahabad district was subsequently bifurcated to form Rohtas and Bhojpur districts.
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the village during 1995 and 1996. This fieldwork and the comparisons it generated with 
the earlier period form the core of the empirical material used in this study.
Chandkura is situated approximately five kilometres from the market town of Hilsa, the 
Block and Sub-Divisional headquarters. From the village, a mud road winds through the 
fields for about one kilometre before joining the main road which runs between Fatuha, a 
market town and railway junction in the adjoining Patna district, and Hilsa.
Chandkura is a village of 236 households, of whom almost half belong to the 'scheduled' 
Chamar and Dusadh castes. More than 90 per cent of this group of households are 
primarily dependent on earnings from agricultural wage labour in the same village. None 
own more than 2 acres or operate more than 2.7 acres of land.
Kurmi Mahatos, classified as an 'Other Backward Caste' (OBC), in Bihar constitute the 
most numerous single caste in the village, accounting for 65 households. These are 
predominantly landowning households with cultivation as their main source of income, and 
both men and women working in the fields. However there is considerable variation both 
in the size of owned and operated holdings, and in the combination of wage and family 
labour employed. Much smaller numbers of ‘OBC’ Yadav and Koeri households are 
similarly distributed among the poor, middle and rich peasants of the village. Those 
belonging to service castes such as Beldar(potter), Barhi(carpenter) and Nai(barber) 
account for another 42 households relying on a combination of traditional ‘jajmani’ 
occupations, agricultural and other manual labour and the cultivation of very small 
landholdings. Although not all classified as ‘Scheduled Castes’, these groups have a very 
low caste status in the region. Among upper castes, there are three Rajput households, all 
primarily dependent on urban white-collar employment, and one Brahman household, 
which combines performing ceremonies with auto-rickshaw driving and cultivating a 
marginal landholding.
50 per cent of households in Chandkura are completely landless, and a further 21 per cent
own less than one acre. At the other end of the spectrum, nine households own and
operate more than ten acres. Despite the absence of any landholdings greater than 25 acres
in the village, this leads to a very skewed distribution of both land owned and land
operated. 70 per cent of households own only 7.5 per cent of the total land cultivated,
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compared to 64 per cent owned by the top 10 ten per cent of households. In terms of land 
operated, 70 per cent of households operate 13 per cent of the land, with the top 10 
percent of households operating 53 per cent of the land.
Only 19 per cent of households lease in land, with the vast majority of tenants owning less 
than one acre, and leasing in small amounts of land averaging 1.2 acres from the biggest 
landowners in their own and neighbouring villages. Nearly all these landowners retain most 
of their land for self-cultivation. There are no instances of leasing in by rich peasants, or by 
those owning more than 5 acres. Except for one household sharecropping one acre 
belonging to a Brahman family living in another village, all leases are today on a fixed rent 
basis.
The major dividing line according to which the majority of inhabitants of Chandkura and 
other villages in Hilsa define themselves is that between ‘kisans’ (literally peasants) and 
‘mazdoors’ (labourers). This is partly an expression of the fact that the area is dominated 
by landowners of the Kurmi Mahato caste, traditionally a peasant caste. It also reflects 
contemporary reality in which the central class contradiction is between landless or 
near-landless agricultural labourers, and employers who themselves engage in cultivation, 
with very few non-cultivating landlords.
However, it also underlines the complex relationship between caste and class in the area. 
While the vast majority of Scheduled Caste households hire out agricultural labour, and 
include virtually no ‘middle’ or ‘rich’ peasants, Kurmis and other ‘intermediate’ castes are 
widely distributed among different peasant classes and there are even a handful of 
households among them who hire out agricultural labour. In this situation the ‘kisan’ 
identity plays a vital role in unifying the intermediate caste peasantry under the hegemony 
of the small number of rich peasants who are the major employers, sources of credit and 
leasers of land in each village. This becomes particularly significant in periods when class 
conflict between rich peasants and labourers intensifies: the ‘kisan’ identity combines 
elements of caste and class, but is primarily defined by its distinction from the ‘mazdoors’, 
those who depend on selling their labour power for survival, and who, by definition, 
belong to lower castes.
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4. Central Hypotheses
The central hypotheses to be tested in this study are as follows:
i) that during the decade from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, those areas of central 
Bihar dominated by medium sized cultivating landowners of the ‘backward’ castes saw the 
growing prosperity of this group, who cultivated using both hired-in and family labour, 
increasingly adopted new technology, and had a tendency towards higher rates of capital 
investment in agriculture, and accumulation, than the classes which dominated other areas. 
This development, which was associated in particular with the spread of private tubewells 
facilitated by electrification, can be regarded as consistent with the idea of a potential 
‘peasant capitalist’ transition.
ii) that this development has essentially stalled during the period from the mid-1980s to 
the present. In cases where substantial accumulation is still occurring, it is being diverted 
into unproductive channels. These phenomena are related to the overall class nature of the 
state in Bihar which leads to the continual appropriation of development resources through 
institutionalised corruption, and to a social formation which perpetuates unproductive 
economic activities at the expense of investment in production.
iii) that the changes which took place in agricultural production in the 70s and early 80s 
were the catalyst for the emergence of movements of the most exploited sections within 
agrarian society in central Bihar, of which the central element was class-for-itself action by 
agricultural labourers. This movement continues to grow in strength and in the context of 
the slowing down or stalling of a transition to capitalism appears to be currently the most 
significant force for change. It is responsible for various changes in production relations in 
the last decade, which nearly all represent either an acceptance of the demands of the 
movement or a defensive reaction to these demands.
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CHAPTER 3: FIELDWORK METHODOLOGY
1. Design of Fieldwork
The field study was designed as follows:
a) Household Survey, Chandkura Village, Hilsa Development Block, Nalanda District, 
Bihar
i) ‘Census’ survey of households in Chandkura village, where a survey had previously 
taken place as part of the ANSISS/ILO study (Prasad, Rodgers et al.:1988) in 1981/82 
and 1982/83. This would use a general questionnaire (see Appendix 1) to ascertain basic 
information such as amount of land owned and operated by the household, size of 
household, hiring in and out of labour and use of family labour, extent of irrigation, 
ownership and hiring in of traditional and modem technology and of livestock, and 
involvement in credit relationships. The questionnaire also included general questions 
about perceived changes during the previous fifteen years.
ii) The results of this survey would be used to carry out a broad class categorisation. In 
order to make valid comparisons, the class categories used for the ANSISS/ILO study 
would be adopted, although some modifications were made to address certain 
methodological problems with these definitions (see below).
iii) A stratified sample of about 20 per cent of the original households would then be 
selected for in-depth interviews. Separate questionnaires were prepared for agricultural 
labourers, self-cultivating landowners, tenants and landlords relating to cultivation 
(cropping patterns, inputs, technology, yields etc), terms and conditions of agricultural 
employment and tenancy, other occupations/sources of income etc (Appendices 2-5). 
Respondents would be interviewed using one or more of these questionnaires as 
appropriate, and would also all be interviewed using a single questionnaire about 
expenditure and assets (including indebtedness) (Appendix 6).
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b) Village Surveys, Hilsa Development Block, Nalanda District
This involved general surveys of twelve villages in this block, which were purposively 
selected on the basis that conflicts over agricultural wages and/or land redistribution had 
taken place there. These would be carried out through group discussions and individual 
discussions with agricultural labourers and different classes of cultivators, as well as others 
in the village such as schoolteachers, village-level activists and others. The discussions 
covered areas including landownership patterns, caste composition, forms of agricultural 
labour and tenancy present, extent and nature of irrigation, cropping patterns, biological 
and mechanical inputs and yields, terms and conditions for agricultural labourers and forms 
of organisation and agitation by them (if any), sources and terms of credit, prices, 
outmigration from the village, amenities in the village, practices relating to marriage and 
dowry, and perceived changes in all of these during the previous ten years.
c) Survey o f Contractors
This would consist of in-depth interviews with individuals currently resident in, and 
originating from, Central Bihar districts, who had received contracts to carry out various 
kinds of work from the Bihar State government between 1984 and 1994. A questionnaire 
was prepared which covered individual and family patterns of accumulation, with a 
particular focus on land resource endowment, land and labour use, relations of production 
in agriculture, the relative importance of different sources of income, and the way in which 
agricultural surpluses are used 
(Appendix 7).
d) Further Interviews and Fieldwork
Discussions with officials, academics, activists, journalists and other individuals; and 
further village visits in Central Bihar. Video as well as audio cassettes would be also used 
in some cases to record interviews, group discussions, events such as rallies and 
demonstrations, and songs and poems of the area.
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2. Class Categorisation Used in Fieldwork
Given the central themes of class formation and patterns of accumulation, an appropriate 
and consistent system of categorisation to determine the economic class of the respondents 
was clearly necessary to effectively analyse the fieldwork material and use it to test the 
hypotheses. The question of the identification of agrarian classes in Marxist analysis has 
been discussed in Chapter 1 ‘The Political Economy of Agrarian Change in India’. As we 
have seen, perhaps the most detailed and rigorous attempt to construct a Marxist model 
for the identification of peasant classes is that of Utsa Patnaik, which, building upon Lenin 
and Mao’s approaches, is based primarily upon the ‘labour exploitation criterion’ i.e. the 
extent to which a household is exploited or exploits others relative to self-employment 
(Patnaik, 1987).
While we have attempted to incorporate aspects of Patnaik’s approach in this study, we 
are also constrained by the need to generate data which is comparable with that collected 
as part of the ANSISS/ILO study in 1981-83. The latter used a class categorisation 
designed by P.H. Prasad (Prasad, Rodgers et al., 1988), which as we will see, also 
prioritises the ‘labour exploitation criterion’ while taking account of some of the 
specificities of the patterns of class formation observed in rural Bihar. But there are also 
several methodological problems with these categories. We have therefore used a modified 
version of Prasad’s categories, as explained below. Where direct comparisons are being 
made between the two periods in terms of classes, these modifications are noted and their 
quantitative impact indicated.
Prasad’s class categorisation involves seven basic classes of household:
1. Agricultural Wage Labour
This includes all those households hiring out wage labour, regardless of other activities.
2. Poor-Middle Peasants
This includes cultivating households who neither hire in nor hire out agricultural wage 
labour, and do not lease out land.
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3. Middle Peasants
This includes cultivating households who hire in, and do not hire out, agricultural wage 
labour, and do not lease out land, and in which both male and female household members 
work in cultivation.
4. Big Peasants
This includes cultivating households who hire in, and do not hire out, agricultural wage 
labour, and do not lease out land, and in which only male household members work in 
cultivation
5. Gentleman Fanners
This includes cultivating households who hire in, and do not hire out, agricultural wage 
labour, and do not lease out land, and and in which household members carry out only 
supervisory work in cultivation.
6. Landlords
This includes all households leasing out land, regardless of other activities
7. Non-Agricultural
This refers to households not engaged in agricultural labour, cultivation or leasing Out of 
land.
A number of points arise from this.
Agricultural Wage Labour
Since this category includes all households who hire out wage labour, it is inevitably 
heterogeneous. However since it brings together all those who at some point share the 
experience of selling their labour power, it is a useful category for analysis of class identity 
and the potential for class-for-itself action. Both Lenin, for whom this group were defined 
as the proletariat and semi-proletariat (Lenin, 1965), and Mao, for whom they were 
workers and poor peasants, (Mao Tse-Tung, 1975) emphasised this aspect. In the Bihar 
context, the association between participating in agricultural wage labour and caste status 
reinforces the significance of Prasad’s definition. In my fieldwork area - though this is not
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the case throughout Bihar - there were very few non-dalit households falling into the 
‘Agricultural Wage Labour’ category.
In theory the category could include households which hire in more wage labour than they 
hire out and are net ‘exploiters’. However, given the pattern of resource distribution, wage 
levels, attitudes to wage labour and other conditions in the fieldwork area, such 
households would be expected to be rare, and I did not identify any in 1995-96.
But the breadth of this category also means that there are contradictions within it, which 
will be overlooked if it is assumed to be homogeneous. For example, distinctions between 
those wage labour households who also cultivate and those who do not has been found to 
be significant in terms of conditions of employment as well as class consciousness in 
several regions (Byres 1981; Bhalla 1976). While Prasad’s original category was further 
subdivided in order to identify landowning and leasing-in households as well as the nature 
of wage labour (attached or casual), the data available for 1981-83 specifies only the latter. 
However, these questions are examined in relation to the 1995-96 data.
Prasad’s categorisation also effectively excludes cultivators who participate in wage labour 
(Mao’s ‘poor peasants’) from the ranks of the peasantry. When dealing specifically with 
issues affecting poor cultivating households we have therefore used the category o f ‘small 
and marginal cultivators’ based upon size of landholding, in parallel with Prasad’s 
categories (see Chapter 5, ‘Changing Patterns of Land Ownership and Access to Land in 
the Fieldwork Area’ for a discussion of the relationship between landholding size and 
‘scale’ of operation).
Poor-Middle Peasants
This group is defined as those neither hiring in nor hiring out labour - but poor cultivators
may be compelled to hire in wage labour at certain points if there is a shortage of family
labour. This is a phenomenon we would expect to increase if the new technology, with its
increasingly timebound labour requirements, is spreading to poor cultivators. In this
situation, the question of whether or not a household is producing a surplus becomes
particularly important. Significantly, Lenin distinguished ‘small’ from ‘middle’ peasants on
the basis that middle peasants can produce ‘not only a meagre subsistence’ but ‘a certain
surplus which may... be converted into capital’; middle peasants also ‘frequently’ (but not
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invariably) employed hired labour (Lenin, 1965: 374). We have thus referred to surplus 
and non-surplus producing households in some contexts (see ‘Agriculture, Technology and 
Class’ for a discussion of what constitutes a surplus). However, as with the Wage Labour 
category, the question of buying and selling labour power, which Prasad’s distinction 
between Poor-Middle and Middle Peasants reflects, is a key one for an assessment of class 
identity and potential class action.
Big Peasants
One of the most problematic aspects of Prasad’s categorisation is that ‘middle’ and ‘big’ 
peasants are distinguished only on the basis of women’s participation in family cultivation. 
In Bihar, women’s participation in cultivation is as much an indicator of caste as of class. 
While households from lower castes may in some cases withdraw women from field labour 
as their economic position improves, the converse has not been observed : even if their 
economic status declines to that of poor peasants, upper caste households do not bring 
women out to engage in work of this kind. Thus, Prasad’s definition effectively brings a 
caste element into the definitions of ‘middle’ and ‘big’ peasants.
In our study of Chandkura village, which was and continues to be dominated by 
landowners of the intermediate Kurmi caste, in which women traditionally do cany out 
field labour, there were very few ‘big’ peasants according to this definition. We also found 
that several households who were recorded in our initial census survey as having only male 
members cultivating, were found in more detailed interviews to have both women and men 
working in the fields. This was hardly suprising given that women’s non-participation in 
field labour is considered an important marker of status, and there is also tendency for 
women’s labour in general to be underestimated by male respondents. Where these 
households met Lenin and Mao’s criteria of possessing ‘abundant means of production 
and liquid capital’ and relying on exploitation ‘for a part or the major part of their income’ 
(Mao Tse-Tung, 1975) we continued to classify them as ‘big’ or ‘rich’ peasants. It should 
be noted that had we used only Prasad’s definition, the decline in the number and 
proportion of rich peasants, which is an important element in the argument we present in 
this study, would have been even more pronounced.
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Gentleman Farmers
This category refers to cultivating households in which household members engage only in 
supervisory work and not in manual labour. The term ‘gentleman farmer’ itself is 
borrowed from eighteenth and nineteenth century England and in the post-Independence 
Indian context was originally used to refer to the small group of salaried professionals 
(notably ex-Army officers) who in the initial period of the ‘Green Revolution’were 
observed to be taking up cultivation using the new technology (see for example Rudra et 
al., 1969). It thus has specific implications which are not appropriate to the context in 
which it is used here.
However, in terms of production relations, there is clearly a need to distinguish those 
cultivators who perform manual labour from those who do not. According to Lenin’s 
categories, all peasants, including ‘big’ peasants, by definition perform manual labour. 
However, once again, in the Bihar context the issue of caste arises. Even small and 
impoverished cultivators of the upper castes may not be prepared to engage in manual 
labour. One therefore has to be wary of drawing any conclusions about a transition to 
capitalism solely on the basis of the existence of landowners who only supervise 
cultivation. In practice, no households were found in this category in Chandkura village in 
the 1981-83 study. During the 1995-96 study, only one such household was found and 
given the specific circumstances, this household was categorised as rich peasant.
Landlords
All households which lease out land are categorised as ‘landlord’ households. This fails to 
take account of the possibility that there is leasing out by poorer to richer peasants of land 
which on its own is unviable, or which the owners do not have the resources to cultivate 
effectively, a phenomenon which often occurs as part of the process of capitalist 
concentration of land. However this possibility is explored in the thesis and this type of 
leasing is found to be non-existent in the fieldwork area in both periods under discussion.
More significantly for this study, in a transitional agrarian economy rich peasants who
cultivate part of their land using wage labour (and often engaging in manual labour
themselves) may also lease out some land. In fact in Chandkura, the majority of
leasing-out households fell into this category. Unlike agricultural wage labour, in which
any participation has implications which are social as well as economic, leasing out land
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was not a defining activity for households in the fieldwork area. In other words, there had 
not been a ‘landlord class’ as such since the departure of the feudal zamindars with 
Zamindari Abolition. On the other hand, tenancy was a significant element within the 
relations of production, and needed to be looked at in terms of the extent of rental 
exploitation, interlocked relationships, the access of poor households to land and a number 
of other questions. The category was therefore useful as one of the measures of change in 
the extent of leasing. But we have avoided drawing conclusions on the basis of the 
existence of households falling into this category without further investigation.
Finally, as the above discussion suggests, concrete conditions are generally too complex to 
be fully captured by a classification of households according to class categories. In reality, 
single households may engage in activities associated with more than one class; and these 
activities may be determined by a range of factors (notably caste, gender of household 
members, and household size), whose relationship with class is itself a matter for 
investigation. Criteria which are based on quantitative data and can yield continuous 
measures as well as discrete categories, may prove to be more sensitive in this context.
Despite these limitations, a broad class categorisation remains an important tool of 
analysis, particularly if class is understood in Marxist terms, as a political as well as an 
economic concept. Membership of a particular class increasingly becomes a conscious 
collective identity as contradictions between classes deepen and struggles intensify. In 
addition, such a categorisation is particularly useful in identifying broad patterns of change 
across time, as we aim to do in this study.
We have therefore, as described above, used a basic categorisation which allows us to 
make comparisons with the data available from the earlier period, but have taken note of 
its limitations and inconsistencies whenever they arise, and supplemented it where 
necessary with other continuous and discrete measures which help to locate households 
within the relations of production in the fieldwork area.
3. Account of Fieldwork
I first visited Hilsa Block in August 1992, when I travelled there from Patna to meet
activists of the then underground CPI(ML) and talk to people in the villages where
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struggles between the rural poor and powerful landowners were most intense. During the 
next five years, I made a series of visits to this area, as well as to other parts of rural 
Central Bihar, in order to learn more about conditions there from the various different 
perspectives of its inhabitants. I was therefore quite familiar with the area as well as with 
many of the key issues facing those who lived there, when I began the fieldwork for this 
study in January, 1995.
a) Establishing Contacts and Pilot Study
I spent January and February 1995 gathering secondaiy data and establishing a network of 
contacts who would be able to help me in my fieldwork. In particular, scholars at the A.N. 
Sinha Institute of Social Studies and the Asian Development Research Institute (both in 
Patna), Bihar-based journalists, administrators and ex-administrators in various 
departments, activists of the CPI(ML) at State, District and Block level, activists of several 
women’s organisations and friends and acquaintainces from previous visits to Bihar helped 
me with information and introductions. I also looked for someone who could accompany 
me on my field trips and interpret for me if neccessary. This proved remarkably difficult. 
However eventually I was introduced to Mohammed Khurram, then a first-year student at 
Patna University, who accompanied me on nearly all my field trips subsequently. During 
this period I also made several village visits in Sahar and Sandesh Blocks of Bhojpur 
District, during which I carried out a pilot study for the sample survey of households. On 
the basis of this pilot study I later finalised the questionnaires used in the Chandkura 
survey.
b) Survey o f Contractors
I worked on this survey between February and April 1995.1 used a number of sources to
identify individuals who had been granted contracts for construction and other tenders by
the administration. These included the Public Works Department Offices in Patna and Ara,
the Public Works Department State Secretariat, the Irrigation Department Offices (Patna)
as well as personal contacts. I met and interviewed contractors in Patna, Ara, and
Jehanabad Town. However, tracing these individuals proved problematic, partly because
the lists provided by government departments were invariably outdated. In some cases
where the respondent was involved in large scale illegal activities (for example smuggling),
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and was suspicious of the nature of the interview, considerable effort and time went into 
setting up an interview. The Bihar Assembly Elections in April 1995 also made travel 
extremely difficult as buses were requisitioned by the State Government. Ultimately it was 
not possible to complete the survey before I had to leave Bihar, and only 15 contractors 
from various Central Bihar Districts could be interviewed. And by the time of my next field 
trip the emphasis of my study had shifted, so that the Hilsa survey was the main priority. 
However, a number of interesting trends appeared to be emerging from the contractors’ 
survey which have some relevance to my hypotheses.
c) Household Survey, Chandkura
This survey was carried out in November and December, 1995, and March and April, 
1996.
On first arriving in Chandkura I began by having several sustained discussions with groups 
of residents in different parts of the village (Chandkura is quite segmented spatially along 
caste lines). This allowed me to get a picture of the broad landholding and caste 
composition patterns in the village, while at the same time explaining the nature of my 
research.
I then began the ‘census’ survey by visiting each house in turn, beginning with the 
‘Chamar’ huts on the fringe of the village nearest the road, and working my way through 
the Dusadh, Beldar, Yadav and other caste areas into the heart of the village where most 
of the two storey whitewashed homes of the larger Kurmi landowners were located. 
Although some of these initial interviews also took place in the fields themselves where 
people were taking a break from work, the majority took place in or in front of homes. I 
decided to interview any member of the household who was prepared to talk to me, and 
did not have obvious problems in answering my questions. The result was that for each 
class, caste or landholding size-group, a variety of perspectives were recorded depending 
on the gender, age and position within the household of the respondent. This had 
particular significance for the questions relating to perceived changes, and for the wider 
discussion which often accompanied the formal interviews.
In practice, the interview often took place collectively with several household members.
When discussions took place sitting outside houses or on verandahs, it was inevitable that
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many others also joined in. However, while this often led to livelier and more revealing 
discussions, I realised that the presence of others might also inhibit the respondent, 
depending on their class and relationship to him or her. For this reason, all the labourers’ 
interviews took place in their own homes or in those areas of the village which their 
employers hardly ever entered, and never in the employers’ fields or homes. But other 
factors emerged during the survey. For example, those who lent money or foodgrains were 
often unwilling to discuss this in the presence of others. Many younger women were 
unwilling to sit down or to talk freely in the presence of older male relatives and 
neighbours. In this situation it was better to arrange to return later to complete the 
interview.
On the other hand, there were some issues concerning which the larger landowners were 
wary of giving information to someone from outside the village. The most significant of 
these were the amount of land owned, and, in particular, the amount of land leased out. 
The reasons for this are discussed in Chapter 5. In this context, it was always necessary to 
cross-check information with other people in the village, and the presence of members of 
other households actually made it more difficult for the respondent to give incorrect 
information.
The ‘census’ survey took much longer to complete than I had originally anticipated. The 
main reason for this was the agricultural season when I began the survey - the kharif 
harvest. This period is one when conflicts and tensions between labourers and employers 
come to a head, and thus from the point of view of my study, it was an important time to 
be in the village. I witnessed arguments taking place over for example the size of the 
bundles which labourers took home after a day’s work harvesting, or the hours they 
worked. With several agricultural processes in full swing, there was also an opportunity to 
see these processes for myself, and this inevitably triggered further discussion about 
technological changes, costs, labour relations and much else. However it is a time when 
nearly everyone is busy in their own or other's fields. Formal interviews could therefore 
only take place either early in the morning or in the evening.
In order to be in the village at times when people were free to talk, it was necessary to stay 
in the village itself. This, I felt, was also vital if I was to gain insight into other aspects of 
life in the village. As in the majority of Bihar villages, staying in the village meant staying
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in someone’s home. This was made possible by the hospitality of Ghauli Devi, her husband 
Gulabchand Das, and their seven year-old daughter, Maya, who not only put us up but 
looked after us in many other ways. Given the highly segmented and hierarchical social 
structures in the village and the existing tensions, as well as the subject of my research, it 
was perhaps inevitable that staying in the ‘chamar tola’ was seen by some respondents 
among higher caste rich peasants as an indication of my loyalities. However in general I 
was able to overcome these suspicions and convince them to talk openly with me.
After categorising the households according to class, I identified a small stratified sample 
reflecting the class composition of the original survey. Because of time constraints 
respondents from only twenty households could be interviewed in detail at this stage. In 
addition, several respondents to the ‘census’ survey who could not be interviewed during 
the second stage because of prolonged absence from the village had given detailed 
information during discussions accompanying the census questionnaire.
The only major problem I faced in carrying out the sample survey related to the 
questionnaire on assets and expenditure. Several respondents were reluctant to give 
detailed information about savings and about the lending they were involved in. As a 
result, although all the respondents were asked these questions, they did not generate 
useful data. Instead, I approached these issues from other angles (see Chapter 7, ‘Patterns 
of Accumulation in the Fieldwork Area’ ).
d) Village Surveys
I visited twelve other villages in Hilsa Block in three separate field trips lasting a total of 
two and a half weeks, during November 1995, December 1995, and April 1996. The 
following villages were surveyed: Baradih, Sirinagar (November 1995); Bhokila, Murarpur 
(December 1995); Pakhanpur, Masarhi, Fatehpur, Kamarthu, Pakri, Fatehpur, Bariganj, 
Makrauta (April, 1996). I also visited two more villages - Indaut and Paindapur, and 
collected some data, although it was not possible to carry out a full survey of these 
villages.
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All these villages were purposively selected on the basis that some conflict over issues 
relating to wages and/or land had occurred there. I identified them through discussions 
with a number of local people, in particular activists of the CPI(ML) in Hilsa.
Group discussions proved to be a productive method of generating an overall picture of 
the village. I was able to gather information on the key themes of landownership patterns 
in the village; caste composition of the village; forms of agricultural labour and tenancy; 
extent and nature of irrigation, cropping patterns, biological and mechanical inputs and 
yields; terms and conditions for agricultural labourers and forms of organisation and 
agitation by them (if any); outmigration from the village, amenities in the village; major 
problems faced; and perceived changes in all of these during the previous ten years. But 
many other areas were often covered in the discussions. However, a number of issues had 
to be borne in mind. Firstly, all the villages were spatially segmented along caste lines. It 
was therefore necessary to hold such discussions in at least two separate locations within 
each village to ensure that people belonging to the various classes and castes present in the 
village could talk openly about class and caste tensions and conflicts. Secondly, as I have 
noted in the case of Chandkura, the agricultural season and the time of day affected the 
extent to which those engaged in agricultural activities could participate in the discussion. 
Whenever possible I therefore arranged to spend the night in the village. Thirdly, there is a 
gender aspect to the timing of discussions: men were generally free to talk at the end of the 
day’s work in the fields, in the earlier part of the evening before the evening meal; or early 
in the morning before breakfast; whereas women were usually busy preparing food at these 
times, and could only talk at leisure late at night. In any case, women were much more 
outspoken in discussions where the men were not present and I therefore tried to hold 
such discussions whenever possible. Fourthly, there were questions relating to security - in 
areas where tensions were high at the time of my visit, and armed exchanges had taken 
place in the recent past it was necessary to be sensitive to issues of safety for the people 
who talked to us and for ourselves. This was particularly the case when we met with 
members of an armed squad belonging to the CPI(ML).
e) Further Interviews
Extensive interviews and discussions with a wide range of people in Bihar contributed 
greatly to my understanding of the themes of this study. They included academics,
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activists, administrators, politicians, journalists and many others. Other experiences were 
also useful in deepening my insight into the questions addressed here: of particular note 
were the 1995 Assembly Elections, when I interviewed a number of candidates from 
different parties and observed their campaigns - I also witnessed the phenomenon of 
‘booth-capturing’ taking place at first hand in Jehanabad constituency; my visit to Belaur 
village, where conflicts between landowners and agricultural labourers had just led to the 
formation of the Ranvir Sena (see Chapter 7); and the ‘Adhikar Rally’ organised by the 
CPI(ML) in Delhi in March 1996, when I travelled with agricultural labourer and poor 
peasant families from their villages in Hilsa Block to the Capital.
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CHAPTER 4: AGRICULTURE. TECHNOLOGY AND CLASS
IN THE FIELDWORK AREA 
Introduction
This chapter will look at the technological changes which have occurred in Chandkura and 
elsewhere in Hilsa, firstly from the period when tubewell irrigation was first introduced 
after 1965/66 until Chandkura was surveyed in 1981/82, and secondly during the 1980s 
and early 1990s until my own survey was carried out in 1995/96.
One of its conclusions is that while the first period saw a process of accumulation among 
larger cultivators, with the extension and improvement in irrigation being accompanied by 
a change in the cropping pattern and the pattern of input use as well as some initial 
mechanisation, the second period did not see further development along the same lines. 
While irrigated area and per hectare fertiliser use continued to increase, in the second 
phase this increase represented primarily the adoption of these inputs by small and 
marginal cultivators cultivating less than 2.5 acres.
Irrigation has largely been extended through larger cultivators hiring out diesel pumpsets 
to smaller cultivators. With the electricity supplies cut off from the early 1980s onwards, 
irrigation costs have increased steeply, with much of the burden of the increase being 
borne by those who hire in irrigation facilities. Fertiliser costs have risen steeply in the 
1990s with subsidies withdrawn. All this has made poor and middle peasants more 
dependent on the rich peasants for loans to cover consumption and input costs, which are 
provided at very high rates of interest. In any case, the limited supply of fertiliser, seeds 
and diesel at the block level is frequently cornered by rich peasants linked to the 
bureaucracy, who resell it at prices higher than they pay. Thus small cultivators' 
dependence may have actually increased as a result of their adoption of new technology, 
and their integration into a number of markets.
Meanwhile it appears that the rich peasants who were identified as potential 'capitalist
farmers' in the early 1980s have not continued to invest their surpluses in agricultural
production. While using their existing assets (tractors, threshers, diesel pumpsets) largely
to appropriate surpluses produced by smaller cultivators through rent, they are involved in
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moneylending and other non-productive activities, while there has been little further 
technological change.
The underlying question raised here is whether the conditions exist, or have existed in the 
past, for the emergence of capitalist farming to establish itself not simply as an observable 
phenomenon, but as a dominant trend, and what, in fact, these conditions might be.
1. Irrigation: the ‘leading input’
According to the report of the ANSISS/ILO study, 'the most important factor explaining 
the differences in the level of development (between villages) is the availability of the 
crucial input of irrigation.' (Prasad, Rodgers et al, 1988:116) Two key technological 
variables, the value of chemical fertiliser used per unit of land and the percentage of 
cultivated area under High Yielding Variety seed, were both found to be correlated with 
the percentage of cultivated area irrigated (op tit.: 151).
The central importance given to irrigation in the report echoes much of the literature 
relating to the introduction of the 'new technology' (see Byres, 1972 for an early review of 
the literature on India).
a) The Ishikawa Hypothesis
Ishikawa (1967) analysed production conditions in a number of Asian countries in which 
paddy rice was the main crop. He argued that basic investment in the ‘control of water’ 
could substantially increase yields. The control of water ‘implies both the supply (here 
defined as irrigation) and the elimination (flood control or drainage) of water in such a way 
as to maintain it in the crop field at the appropriate time and at an adequate level...Only 
when water is controlled in such a way, it becomes possible, though gradually, to 
emancipate agricultural production from the vagaries of nature and to place its entire 
process under human control’ (Ishikawa, 1967:73).
Three successive roles for irrigation were identified in the technological transition from a
less to a more productive 'stage' of agricultural production. Firstly, it stabilises harvest
fluctuations arising from deficient or untimely rainfall. Secondly, it allows a second crop to
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be introduced. Thirdly, it makes possible increased applications of fertiliser and the use of 
improved varieties and techniques. Tshikawa noted further that 'when the second and the 
third roles are to come into play, it seems that the quality of the existing irrigation facilities 
must often be improved' (op cit.:90-92).
Tshikawa defined irrigation as the ‘leading input’ on the basis that ‘irrigation acts as an 
intermediary for making possible a shift in crop cultivation from one input-output 
combination to another with a higher productivity’. The ‘productivity-increasing effect’ of 
fertiliser, higher yielding varieties and improved techniques could, he argued, only be 
significant once improvements in irrigation had created the necessary conditions (op 
cit.:92). In a subsequent stage, fertiliser, new varieties and improved techniques can 
combine to become the new ‘leading input’, but even after this, as productivity increases, 
the leading input ‘alternates between these two categories’(op cit.: 181).
Ishikawa presented empirical evidence to confirm this hypothesis in two steps: firstly 
establishing the existence of complementarity between irrigation and fertiliser use, and 
secondly comparing correlations between irrigation and crop yields with correlations 
between fertiliser use and crop yields (op cit.: 185-214). The existence of a stronger 
correlation between irrigation and crop yields, at least until yields have increased 
significantly, was taken to indicate the primary importance of irrigation.
b) The Boyce Modification o f the Tshikawa Hypothesis
Boyce has attempted to test the validity of the Ishikawa hypothesis in his analysis of 
inter-district variations in agricultural performance in West Bengal and Bangladesh 
(Boyce, 1987). He observes that in this region, irrigation has played the three roles 
identified by Ishikawa simultaneously, rather than successively. On the basis of an 
inter-district comparison of cropping patterns, he also identifies a ‘modified’ version of the 
second role, in which irrigation contributes not to the introduction of a second crop, but to 
a change in the composition of dry season crops (Boyce, 1987:199). But he confirms 
Ishikawa’s essential point: that nothing like the full yield increase potential inherent in 
HYVs and increased fertiliser applications can be secured in the absence of water control.
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However Boyce argues that, 'given strong complementarity (and incomplete irrigation 
development)' Ishikawa's correlations are on the one hand not 'sufficient' to establish which 
is the 'leading input', since multicollinearity obscures the individual roles of the variables. 
On the other hand, they are not 'necessary' either because there are 'a priori reasons for 
viewing irrigation as taking precedence over the complementary inputs, fertilizer and 
HYVs' (op cit.: 186).
According to Boyce, 'a cultivator with irrigation can obtain HYVs and fertilisers fairly 
easily, but the reverse is not true'. Irrigation requires fixed investment in water storage 
facilities, distribution channels, and for pumping equipment, whereas fertilisers and HYVs 
can be purchased in the current period of production, without prior investment. In 
addition, irrigation frequently involves indivisibilities necessitating joint use of the fixed 
asset by a number of producers, whereas fertilisers and HYVs are 'almost perfectly 
divisible'(Boyce 1987:186-187).
c) Economies o f Scale, the Role o f Consolidation, and Water Markets
The ‘indivisibility’ identified by Boyce effectively creates economies of scale for irrigation. 
Furthermore, since the correct timing and quantity of irrigation takes on a decisive role in 
determining final yields when high yielding varieties and chemical fertilisers are used, the 
introduction of these biochemical inputs sets up immediate pressures towards the 
mechanisation of irrigation. In fact, an understanding of this process has been the key to 
debunking the 'myth' of the scale-neutrality of the biochemical part of the new technology 
'package'. Byres (1981:411) argues that biochemical and mechanical innovations are 
inextricably interlinked, noting that 'a considerable stimulus has been given to private, 
power-driven tubewell irrigation - where of course there is an adequate endowment with 
ground water. Tubewell irrigation gives to the cultivator who can afford it far greater 
control over the supply of water than does canal irrigation. The spread of tubewell 
irrigation long precedes the advent of the “new technology”. There can be no doubt, 
however, that the new seeds (along with fertilisers)...have provided an especially potent 
impetus to that spread.'
Economies of scale are particularly striking in the case of private tubewells, and pumpsets
used with open wells, the main sources of irrigation in Nalanda District. The 1976 National
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Commission on Agriculture noted that 'installation of a pump is economical only if the area 
to be irrigated is not too small' and cites a minimum area of 1 hectare (Government of 
India, 1976a: 19). Dhawan (1977:A102) points out that this 'threshold farm size' will vary 
regionally according to factors like the degree of fragmentation and the level of interest 
rates. For shallow tubewells, he suggests that the figure rises steadily from North-west to 
North-east Tndia, from 1.4 acres in Punjab and Haryana to 19.4 acres in West Bengal.
As this implies, the effectiveness with which measures for land consolidation are 
implemented also has a powerful impact on irrigation: according to the National 
Commission on Agriculture, 'in village after village in Uttar Pradesh, Haryana and Punjab, 
tubewells multiplied tenfold after consolidation'.(Govemment of India, 1976b:204-205)
The question of economies of scale may be partially resolved by the hiring out of irrigation 
facilities to other cultivators by those who own or control them, or the provision of 
irrigation water in return for payment. However, as we will see, in a highly differentiated 
agrarian economy, the 'water market' like other markets, may be shaped by monopoly 
control over resources, especially in the context of increased and time-specific demand for 
tightly controlled irrigation.
d) Timing and Quantity and the Importance o f Power Supply
As we have noted, it is not simply quantity but timing and quality of irrigation which are of 
vital importance in securing a substantial increase in yields through the use of biochemical 
inputs. In tubewell and pumpset irrigated areas, this means that adequate power supply 
becomes a key factor. The cultivators' dependence on the infrastructure provided by the 
state is thus significantly increased.
This in itself suggests that the trajectory mapped out by Ishikawa, with successive phases 
of improvements in the quality of irrigation alternating with the introduction of improved 
farming techniques (Tshikawa 1967:121) may not be a smooth one. Improvements in the 
quality of irrigation may be rapidly reversed in a situation where the availability of 
electricity deteriorates sharply or wholesale 'de-electrification' of previously electrified 
areas occurs.
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Diesel operated pumpsets are frequently used with private tubewells and open borings in 
the absence of adequate electricity. However this substantially increases the costs of 
irrigation. The National Commission on Agriculture noted as early as 1976 that 'nearly a 
third of private tubewells are diesel operated notwithstanding the fact that electric pumps 
are cheaper both in capital and operating cost. This situation has arisen because of 
inadequate and unsatisfactory supply of power. The persisting shortage of power in most 
parts of the country, particularly in North India where groundwater resources are 
abundant, has hampered the rapid growth of electrically operated tubewells and farmers 
keen on having their own source of irrigation have turned to the more expensive diesel 
pumpsets....'(Government of India 1976a:21).
e) Mechanisation
As we have argued above, the introduction of biochemical inputs - high yielding varieties 
and fertilisers - and the resulting importance of the correct timing and quantity of irrigation 
gives a direct impetus to the mechanisation of irrigation.
There is a further, indirect effect of the use of these inputs which encourages the 
mechanisation of other tasks such as ploughing, threshing and harvesting. Increases in 
cropping intensity and yields have meant increased demand for labour and have intensified 
seasonal peaks in this demand. Dasgupta refers to the ‘bottlenecks’ created because 
harvesting must be completed quickly in order to leave time for preparing the land for the 
following crop, and ‘land preparation itself should be completed in a shorter time’ 
(Dasgupta, 1977.:51). This itself has been an incentive for employers to introduce 
agricultural machinery, in particular tractors and threshers, in areas which have witnessed 
the development of capitalism in agriculture (see for example Frankel 1971; Bardhan, 
1977b; Dasgupta, 1977).
While mechanical threshers clearly contribute to the release of the time constraints implicit 
in the use of the new technology (Byres, 1981:412), in the case of tractors there has been 
considerable debate concerning their overall effectiveness in this regard1. However, as has
1 For example, Agarwal concludes that for HYV wheat cultivation, ‘the “timeliness” advantage of a 
tractor may be slight, when the crop prior to wheat is one whch can be harvested and threshed sufficiently 
in advance, and the land can be freed for timely wheat ploughing and sowing even on bullock plots’ 
(Agarwal, 1978:221).
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been pointed out, the decision to adopt tractors for particular operations, like other 
production decisions, is partly dependent on the nature of class relations. Where labourers 
are able to organise to demand higher wages in response to the increased demand for 
labour, for example, labour-displacing mechanisation may be particularly attractive to 
employers. Thus, ‘the analysis cannot be abstracted from considerations of class 
relationships and class action’ (Byres, 1981:413).
The impact of different types of mechanisation on overall labour use, and on the 
composition of demand for labour - the proportions of family labour, casual wage labour 
and permanent wage labour used - is discussed in Chapter 6, ‘Agricultural Labour in the 
Fieldwork Area’.
Of particular concern to us in this chapter, however, is the question of economies of scale 
as it relates to mechanisation. For tractors, on which by far the largest volume of 
discussion has taken place, there are significant biases towards large holdings. On the one 
hand, their capital cost is high, so that ‘only the largest size farms utilise them at efficient 
unit costs’ (Ellis, 1993: 238). On the other, very small plots actually make it difficult for 
‘large, four wheel tractors to operate effectively’ (Binswanger and Donovan, 1987).
The potential for tractorisation is thus inextricably linked to the process of concentration 
of land into larger holdings. As we will see in the following chapter ‘Land Ownership and 
Access to Land in the Fieldwork Area’, a reverse process of dispersion of landholdings has 
been underway in Bihar. Equally important is the consolidation of such holdings, where 
they are fragmented, into large contiguous plots. This is discussed further below.
A distinct but closely related problem which applies to all forms of mechanisation is the 
question of resource constraints. Poorer peasants face not only a shortage of capital but 
may be effectively denied access to institutional credit for the purchase of agricultural 
machinery. Access to mechanical inputs is thus inextricably related to the class of the 
cultivator, which is partially - though not wholly - determined by size of landholding.
A situation in which small and marginal holdings were proliferating without a
corresponding increase in larger holdings would therefore be expected to present a serious
bamer to the spread of mechanisation, and in the long term, to the process of expanded
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reproduction in agriculture2. But there are further issues relating to the role of 
mechanisation in the context of relations of dependence between different classes of 
cultivators. These are explored in detail below.
In the following section we will consider the aggregate changes which have taken place in 
cropping intensity and cropping patterns, input use, and yields in Chandkura both in the 
period when irrigation was introduced on a large scale, and subsequently. We will then 
look at Chandkura's experience of technological change in the context of the aspects of the 
problem briefly referred to above, all of which relate to the nature of agrarian transition 
which may be occuring: economies of scale, differential access to irrigation and other 
inputs, both biological and mechanical, and increased dependence of cultivators on the 
infrastructure.
2. AN OVERVIEW OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN THE STUDY AREA
a) The Spread o f Tubewell Irrigation
When explaining how agriculture has changed, older inhabitants of Chandkura and other 
villages in Hilsa still frequently cite the drought of 1965-1966 as the most significant 
turning point. Until then, agriculture was essentially rainfed. As crops failed repeatedly, 
cultivators in Hilsa began to adopt the new varieties of wheat being promoted as part of 
the Green Revolution package. This set up immediate pressures towards the mechanisation 
of irrigation and private tubewells began to spread rapidly among larger landowners in the 
latter half of the 1960s.
Nalanda district was formed in 1972 from the subdivision of Biharsharif in the south of the 
old Patna district. By 1977, the new district as a whole was proving a 'notable exception' 
to the comparatively low levels of private tubewell irrigation in the eastern Gangetic plains 
(Dhawan 1977:A103). By the early 1980s the ANSISS/ILO study confirmed that 
'tubewells have been adopted in a big way by the Kurmis, most of them situated 
in...Nalanda District. There is no canal in Nalanda District. In fact Nalanda is one of the 
few districts where the so-called "Green Revolution" has succeeded significantly' (Prasad,
2 As Patnaik (1971) notes, this process is manifested in the growth of outlay on both constant and variable 
capital with respect to a given land area, and, over time, a tendency towards a higher than average organic 
composition of capital, leading to higher productivityof land and labour.
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Rodgers et al., 1988:537). According to the 1981 District Census, 62.4 per cent of 
cultivated area in Hilsa block as a whole was irrigated. In Chandkura itself, ’more than 50 
per cent' of net sown area was irrigated at least once, and 99 per cent of irrigation was 
from private tubewells. (Prasad, Rodgers et al., 1988)
As Table 3 shows, by 1995-96, the percentage of Chandkura's cultivated area irrigated at 
least once had increased to approximately 73 per cent, close to the block average of 71.5 
per
Table 3: Some indicators of technological change in Chandkura between 1981/83 
and 1995/96
1981/83 1995/96
Area irrigated once or more 
as percentage of net sown 
area
62 73
Area under wheat as 
percentage of net sown 
area
18 36
Yield (kgs per 
hectare): wheat
1,186 2,209
Yield (kgs per heCtare):rice 1,977 2,723
Kilograms of fertiliser 
applied per hectare gross 
cropped area
82 185
Number of tractors owned 
in the village (including 
power tillers)
3 8
Sources
1981/83 data: ANSISS/ILO study; 1995/96 data: Fieldwork
Note: The figure for area irrigated in 1981/83 refers to 1981 Census data for Hilsa Block as a whole as 
data for the village is not available
cent for Hilsa as a whole recorded in the 1991 District Census. This appears to mirror, 
albeit in an exaggerated form, State-wide trends in the extension of irrigation: area 
irrigated as a percentage of net cropped area in Bihar rose from 28.8 per cent in 1971-72 
to 38.2 per cent in 1981-82 and further to 43.5 per cent in 1991-92 (Table 4).
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Table 4: Extent of irrigation and use of fertiliser in Bihar. 1970s and 1980s
1971-72 1981-82 1991-92
Area irrigated as 
percentage of net cropped 
area
28.8 38.2 43.5
1970-72 1980-82 1988-90
Fertiliser use per hectare 
gross cropped area(kgs)
10 20 57
Sources
Irrigation: CMIE, 1995; Fertilisers: Sharma, 1996
b) The Power Crisis and the Spread o f Diesel Pumpsets
However, the 1980s also saw a qualitative change in the technology used for irrigation. By 
1981-82, the extension of irrigation through tubewells in Chandkura had more or less 
come to a standstill. According to the ANSISS/ILO study, the total area improved by 
private tubewell irrigation in the five years preceding the study period had been only 3 per 
cent of the total cultivated area. In fact the spread of tubewell irrigation coincided with the 
advent of electricity in the early 1970s and as the study noted, by the early 1980s, the 
electricity supply was already sporadic. By 1983/84 it was cut off completely. And from 
the late 1970s onwards, there was a switch to diesel powered pumpsets as a result of the 
absence of electricity. In 1995-96, excluding a very marginal amount of river irrigated 
land, diesel pumpsets used with open borings were the sole method of irrigation in use in 
the village. This pattern of a shift from electric to diesel powered irrigation in the late 
1970s or early 1980s is replicated throughout Hilsa. Only in one village in my survey was 
electricity still sporadically supplied, and in this case it was not usually available at the 
times of year it was needed for irrigation.
The power crisis in Bihar has clearly deepened during the last two decades. Mozoomdar 
(1990:28) points out that inadequate investment in power in Bihar (excluding the industrial 
and coalfield regions) has led to slow growth in electricity consumption. In 1965-66, per 
capita electricity consumption in Central Bihar was approximately half the figure for the 
country as a whole; by 1984-85 it was little more than a quarter of the all-India figure
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(Table 5). According to Sharma, 'on a conservative basis, the State was deficient in power 
in relation to total requirement to the extent of at least 40 per cent in 1993-94. Most parts 
of the rural area of the State go without power for days together. Overwhelming majority 
of State and private tubewells are idle for lack of electricity. The farmers have largely 
changed over to diesel pumps which are costly in terms of maintenance and operating 
charges. The acute power crisis has affected not only the level of agricultural production 
but also a whole range of rural activities - processing of grains, storage, production in 
small rural industries etc.' (Sharma 1996:16).
Table 5: Per Capita Electricity Consumption (kwh). Central Bihar and India. 
1965-1985
1965-66 1977-78 1984-85
Central Bihar 30.73 41.23 44.09
India 61.33 120.73 154
Source: Mozoomdar, 1990
c) Cropping Patterns: The Boyce Effect
Irrigation in Nalanda was mechanised from the outset; its experience has something in 
common with that described by Boyce(op cit.) for West Bengal and Bangladesh in that the 
effects of stabilising harvest fluctuations, changing crop composition and allowing 
increased use of fertiliser and improved varieties were simultaneous rather than successive.
In Chandkura, the rabi crop changed significantly, both in composition and area sown, 
with the area under wheat increasing from negligible levels in the mid-1960s to 18 per cent 
of net sown area by 1981-82, partially at the expense of unirrigated crops like khesari, 
chana (gram) and masoor. High Yielding Varieties of rice requiring substantial applications 
of fertilisers were also introduced. Another significant development was the increased 
cultivation of onions from 1975 onwards. These require intensive application of irrigation
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and other capital inputs as well as labour, and by 1981 'continual power failures' were 
already affecting yields. The main crops cultivated in the village were 'bhadai and aghani 
paddy, wheat, maize (rabi, garma and bhadai) khesari, potato, onion, gram and masoor' 
(Prasad, Rodgers et al, 1988:87). Yields of rice had also increased substantially: average 
yields in the village in 1981-82 were 1,977 kg per hectare, almost double the district 
average in 1970-71 (Table 3).
In terms of cropping patterns, there have been a number of further changes during the last 
fifteen years. Wheat cultivation has expanded further to approximately 36 per cent of net 
sown area at the expense of other rabi crops, notably khesari, and is now the major rabi 
crop, although almost all landholders continue to cultivate a small amount of khesari, 
chana and masoor. Onion cultivation has also increased significantly across landholding 
sizes: most cultivators only devote a small proportion of their land to onion growing, 
(which occupies less than 8 per cent of net sown area in total) but these take up a large 
proportion of total capital investment, with irrigation, fertiliser and labour costs per acre 
highest. But these cropping patterns, as we discuss later, vary considerably across 
landholding sizes.
However there is now only one paddy crop in the village - the aghani(kharif) crop. The 
cultivation of bhadai paddy and maize, which were mainly rainfed, stopped in the early 
1980s as a result of a climatic shift: whereas previously the pre-monsoon rains came in 
June, they now don't begin until the second week of July. And the cumulative effect of the 
use of tubewells and pumpsets has been that in the weeks preceding the rains, the water 
table goes down far lower than it used to.
Yields of wheat have increased steadily and in 1995-96, average yields were 2,209 kg per 
hectare, almost double their 1981-82 levels of 1,186 kg per hectare. Rice yields have also 
increased, but less dramatically, to an average of 2,723 kg per hectare (Table 3).
d) Fertiliser Consumption
Bihar's state-wide consumption of chemical fertilisers increased by 494,000 tonnes
between 1971-72 and 1987-88. This increase was the fifth highest state-wise, after U.P.
Punjab, AP and Maharashtra. (CMTE 1989). Whereas the spread of irrigation occurred
mainly in the 1970s, the bulk of this increase in fertiliser consumption took place in the
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1980s, with fertiliser use per hectare gross cropped area increasing from 10kg in 1970-72 
to 20kg in 1980-82 and then to 57kg in 1988-90 (Table 4).
The use of fertiliser in Nalanda district was already well above the state average at 31.1 kg 
per hectare gross cropped area in 1979-80. But by 1987-88 there had been a dramatic 
increase to 133 kg per hectare gross cropped area (CMIE 1993).
Calculations based on the ANSISS/ILO study data for 1981-82 give a figure of 
approximately 82 kg per hectare gross cropped area in Chandkura. At the time of my 
study in 1995-96, it was more than double this level, at 185kg per hectare gross cropped 
area (Table 3).
Fertiliser costs have increased significantly since 1990-91. Wholesale fertiliser prices went 
up by nearly 50 per cent between 1990 and 1992 alone after remaining virtually unchanged 
throughout the 1980s (Government of India 1992). This was mirrored in the prices paid by 
cultivators in Bihar which are shown in Table 6.
In terms of actual costs to the cultivator, cost of cultivation studies for Bihar show that 
fertiliser costs adjusted against the farm harvest price index remained almost constant 
between 1972-72 and 1983-84 (Government of India 1991, 1996b; Jha, 1997). By 
1995-96 however, I found that cultivators in Hilsa were paying approximately Rs 10 per 
kg nutrients (NPK), as compared to the rates of between Rs 5 and Rs 6 which prevailed 
during the entire period from 1980-81 to 1988-89 (Table 6). In real terms, the post-1991 
increase meant that in Hilsa, a maund (40kg) of rice was now the equivalent of only one 
50kg sack of urea where previously it had been worth two sacks3. Prices of fertiliser on the 
black market, on which small and marginal cultivators without connections with the 
administration are the most dependent, are substantially higher.
3 It has also been observed that at an India-wide level, the policy of retaining part of the subsidy on 
nitrogenous fertilisers but removing them altogether on phosphatic and potassic fertilisers has created 
imbalances in the composition of fertiliser use, reducing their effectiveness (Bhaduri and Nayyar, 
1996:108).
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Table 6: Fertiliser Prices in Bihar. 1980-1994
Year Retail price of fertiliser in Rs/Kg NPK (current prices)
1980 5.98
1981 5.98
1982 5.57
1983 5.57
1984 5.57
1985 5.98
1986 5.98
1987 5.98
1988 5.98
1989 5.98
1990 8.63
1991 8.39
1992 8.39
1993 8.64
1994 8.64
Source: data compiled by the Indian Council o f Agricultural Research
At a statewide level, Sharma notes that ‘in the post reforms period fertilizer consumption 
shows a marginal declining trend. The fertilizer consumption which was nearly six lakh 
tonnes in 1991-92 fell to 5.95 lakh tonnes in 1992-93 and further to 5.85 lakh tonnes in 
1993-94. While the decline during 1992-93 can be partly attributed to drought conditions 
in that year, the role of fertilizer price hike cannot be discounted. It is worth noting that 
fertilizer consumption further declined in 1993-94 despite normal weather conditions’ 
(Sharma: 1996:14).
In the absence of time series data, it is not possible to confirm whether fertilizer use 
declined in Chandkura during the 1990s. Levels in 1995/96 - at 185kg per hectare gross 
cropped area - were considerably higher than the district-wide levels of 133 kg per hectare 
recorded in 1987-88. Discussions with a cross section of cultivators in Chandkura and 
other villages in Hilsa suggested that rather than reducing fertilizer use, farmers have 
increased expenditure in order to maintain the input package they have adopted. For larger 
cultivators, this has meant a fall in surpluses accumulated, while for small and marginal 
cultivators (whose adoption of biological inputs has accounted for a substantial proportion
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of the increase in fertiliser use since the early 1980s), it has reinforced indebtedness and 
dependency, a phenomenon which is discussed later in this chapter.
e) Fragmentation and Consolidation
As we have noted, the consolidation of land held in numerous scattered plots into 
contiguous holdings plays an important role in facilitating the technological changes 
associated with a transition to capitalism in agriculture. A number of observers have 
emphasised the impact of consolidation in those parts of the country where it has been 
carried out most effectively - notably Punjab, Haryana and Western U.P. (see for example 
Government of India, 1976a and b, Agarwal, 1971, Byres, 1988).
The extent of fragmentation of landholdings in Chandkura is striking. The average number 
of plots per operated holding in 1995-96 was extremely high at 6.6, compared to an 
all-Bihar figure of 2.8 and an all-India figure of 2.7 acres in 1991-92 (Government of 
India, 1996: A19) The average size of plots was highest among those operating 5 acres 
and above, but even this group operate plots of an average size of only 1.3 acres. In 
addition plots are frequently irregular in shape. There may be a number of reasons for this 
phenomenon. In particular, population density - and the dependence of the population on 
agriculture - is high, while the quality of the land is variable. This means that inheritance 
usually involves not only division of holdings but fragmentation into smaller and smaller 
plots to ensure that each heir receives a comparable share of lands of different quality and 
type. At the same time, tenancy in this area involves the leasing out by the larger 
landowners of small plots to tenants of whom the majority are small landowners 
themselves, and tiny plots are also leased out as partial payment to attached labourers, 
leading to further fragmentation of operated holdings.
Land consolidation has been a stated goal of agricultural policy at both the all-India and
the state-level since before Independence, and an Act for compulsory land consolidation
had been passed in Bihar in 1956. However the National Commission on Agriculture noted
in 1976 that twenty years later only 3 per cent of the total cultivable area of the State was
reported to have been consolidated. (Government of India, 1976b). There have been no
state-sponsored attempts at land consolidation in Hilsa development block. In fact, Bihar’s
Land Consolidation Department has now been formally abolished (Jha 1997: 108).
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Jannuzi argues that such policies were in any case modelled on conditions in Punjab and 
inappropriate to Eastern India where ’to have diverse holdings was favoured by many, in 
circumstances where the quality of land was not homogeneous, as a way of ensuring, for 
example, that it would be possible to plant different crops in different seasons...This was a 
rational means by which cultivators could seek to maximise their economic 
security.'(Jannuzi 1996:12).
But the persistence of this pattern is clearly an obstacle to the emergence of capitalist 
farming, in which rich peasants seek to maximise profits rather than security. As Byres 
(1988:184) notes, Tor rich peasants, who may be proto-capitalists, fragmentation is likely 
to constitute a significant barrier to accumulation. Development of the productive forces 
faces a powerful constraint: whether that development takes a purely bio-chemical or a 
mechanised form (that is, on the one hand, for example, new seeds, the application of 
non-organic fertilisers, new forms of non-mechanised irrigation; on the other, tractors, 
tube-wells, etc.) Fragmentation poses especially difficult problems for mechanisation.’
And under the conditions prevailing today, cultivators of different sizes in Chandkura and 
elsewhere in Hilsa consider having one's land in one place a definite advantage - for 
example, Rajaram Mahto, a Kurmi rich peasant of Chandkura who was particularly proud 
of his skills as a farmer told me that while he was not the largest landowner in Chandkura, 
he was the only one to have so much land in one place - all his twelve acres were in one 
plot - and that this was something he had achieved in his lifetime through judicious buying 
and selling of land. Other cultivators in the village also commented on this as something 
both remarkable and desirable.
In fact, there are a few instances of groups of landowners elsewhere in Hilsa - big and
middle peasants - attempting consolidation themselves - but these were reported to have
failed because of the uneven quality of land and the economic inequalities between those
exchanging land. Overall it seems that without state intervention, awareness among
landholders of the disadvantages associated with fragmentation has not in itself been a
powerful enough force to overcome the barriers to consolidation and the impulses to
further sub-division of holdings. But if the state itself to a large extent reflects the nature
and interests of the dominant classes within the region, this lack of intervention by the state
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also reflects the fact that a strong rich peasantry with capitalist tendencies, capable of 
acting as a 'class-for-itself and pushing through policies which would facilitate its own 
development, has failed to emerge in Bihar, despite the initial indicators noted in the early 
1980s4
3. CLASS AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
a) Irrigation
As we have noted, there has been a substantial extension of irrigated area in Chandkura 
since the early 1980s. In 1995-96, 83.3 per cent of those households cultivating any land in 
the village used irrigation facilities. By this time, excluding a very marginal amount of river 
irrigated land, diesel pumpsets used with open borings had completely superceded 
tubewells and were the sole method of irrigation in use in the village. 48 per cent of those 
irrigating the land they operated owned their own pumpsets, while an equal proportion 
hired pumpsets in from other cultivators, and the remainder borrowed them.
Diesel pumpsets are the most widely distributed of mechanical inputs, with four of the 64 
sets in Chandkura being owned by households who hire out casual labour and also own 
small amounts of land. Despite this however, the classwise distribution of pumpset owners 
is a skewed one. There were none among attached labourers (all attached labourers were 
categorised as cultivating households for this purpose, since their contracts include a small 
plot of land to cultivate). 21 per cent of casual labourers who also cultivate owned 
pumpsets, compared to 41 per cent of poor middle peasants, 62 per cent of middle 
peasants, 75 per cent of big peasants and all self-cultivating 'landlord' households.
As Table 7 shows, diesel pumpsets are also unevenly distributed among landholding size 
groups. 29 per cent of those cultivating less than 2.5 acres, and 33.8 per cent of those 
cultivating less than 5 acres, own diesel pumpsets. By contrast all households cultivating 
five acres or more own their own pumpsets.
4 The existence of such a class was vital to the effective implementation on consolidation in Punjab, 
Haryana and western U.P. For example Byres (1988) has analysed the role of Charan Singh as an 
'"organic'1 intellectual of the rich and middle peasantry1 who as such was instrumental in bringing about a 
number of key reforms, including land consolidation, in Uttar Pradesh.
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This implies that different classes in the village have substantially differential access to 
irrigation. On the one hand, financial constraints prevented casual labour and poor middle 
peasant households from investing in pumpsets. On the other hand, with a strong 
correlation between class and size of operated landholdings, economies of scale in many 
cases made it unviable for smaller cultivators to purchase their own pumpsets, while even 
those with relatively larger holdings found that their pumpsets were not being fully utilised.
Significantly, the acquisition of pumpsets in Chandkura, which began in the mid-70s, had 
tapered off by the mid-1980s: 75 per cent had been bought in or before 1985, and none 
after 1992.
The problem of small cultivators’ lack of access to irrigation as well as that of economies 
of scale appears to have been partially resolved by those who own pumpsets hiring them 
out to those who do not. The fact that in Chandkura diesel pumpsets are used not with 
tubewells but with fairly densely scattered open borings allows them to be moved from 
plot to plot. But this is a resolution which involves the extraction of a surplus from the 
smaller cultivators by the larger cultivators.
This extension of irrigation through hiring out to small and marginal holdings is in fact the 
major factor accounting for the further increase since 1981-82 in cultivated area irrigated 
at least once, to approximately 73 per cent in 1995-96.Those hiring in pumpsets are 
overwhelmingly small and marginal cultivators: they cultivate an average of 1.35 acres, (as 
compared to an average of 3.89 acres cultivated by pumpset owners), and 74 per cent 
cultivate less than 2.5 acres.
With owners charging Rs 10-20 per hour excluding diesel, the irrigation 'market' in 
Chandkura involves a significant transfer of surpluses produced by small and marginal 
cultivators to pumpset owners. Shah and Ballabh (1997: Al 86) calculate that the average 
full cost of one hour's pumping with a 5hp diesel set in 1995-96 (including diesel and 
lubricant cost, repair and maintenance, wear and tear and interest on capital) varied 
between Rs 14.82 and Rs 16.82. Excluding the cost of diesel, which in Chandkura is 
purchased separately by the 'buyer1, this comes to approximately Rs7.00. Thus pumpset
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Table 7 : Distribution of cultivating households in Chandkura by diesel pumpset use
and landholding size group (acresi
Land
Cultivated
Pumpset not 
used
Pumpset
owned
Pumpset 
hired in
Pumpset 
lent by 
employer
Pumpset
borrowed
TOTAL
less than 0.5 
acres
24(51.1) 1(2.1) 16(34) 5(10.6) 1(2.1) 47(100)
0.5-0.99
acres
2(6.9) 10(34.5) 17(58.6) 0 0 29(100)
1-2.49 acres 0 20(60.6) 13(39.4) 0 0 33(100)
2.5-4.99
acres
0 16(50) 16(50) 0 0 32(100)
5 acres and 
above
0 17(100) 0 0 0 17(100)
All
landholding
sizes
26(16.5) 64(40.5) 62(39.2) 5(3.2) 1(0.63) 158(100)
Source: Fieldwork
Note: Figures in brackets indicate percentage of landholding size group by category of diesel pumpset use
owners are charging rates of between 1.4 and 2.9 times the full cost of pumping; even 
though, as Shah and Ballabh point out, where most owners invest in pumpsets primarily to 
meet their own irrigation needs, any price higher than the incremental pumping cost should 
be regarded as profitable.
Table 8 shows approximate annual costs of cultivation for a typical household cultivating 
2.5 acres in Chandkura in 1995-96. It can be observed that charges for hire of agricultural 
machinery (diesel pumpset and threshers) represent more than 40 per cent of total input 
costs (excluding wage labour) for such households, and more than three times the meagre 
surplus which they are left with.
As Table 8 indicates, such households purchase biochemical inputs (chemical fertiliser and 
pesticides) and hire in mechanical inputs, but operate at the margin of subsistence. Rental 
charges for diesel pumpsets along with other input costs make it impossible for small and 
marginal cultivators to accumulate any significant surpluses as a result of increases in 
yields.
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Table 8: Annual costs of cultivation in 1995/96 for a typical household cultivating 2.5 
acres (approx. 1 hectare) in Chandkura (1995/96 prices^
1 Irrigation: diesel pumpset hire 
diesel
Rs900
Rs350
2 Fertiliser Rs 1,650
3 Pesticide Rs50
4 Thresher hire: rice Rs300
wheat Rs250
5 Total input costs excluding hired 
labour
Rs3,500
6 Hired Labour costs Rs2,000
7 Total input costs including hired 
labour
Rs5,500
8 Value of gross output Rs20,400
9 Net crop income(if all land owned) Rs 14,900
10 Subsistence income Rs 14,500
11 Surplus of net crop income over 
subsistence level
Rs400
Source: Fieldwork 
Note:
Row 6: There is considerable variation in hired labour costs between households. This partly depends on 
the number of male and female household members engaging in cultivation. The figure given here is 
calculated on the basis o f two male and two female household members cultivating which was the average 
for this landsize group. The value o f labour and other inputs as well as output also depends on the 
technology used: the figures for gross output and labour costs cited here refer to a household using a 
hired diesel pumpset and threshers.
Row 9: The value of net crop income has been calculated by subtracting total input costs (i.e actual 
outgoings) from gross output. This figure would be much lower were imputed costs (e.g. of owned land 
and family labour) taken into account as in the Ministry o f Agriculture ’s Cost o f Cultivation Studies 
(Government o f India, various years).
Row 10: The level of subsistence income for 1995-96 is based on that calculated by Haque (1996) for 
1990-91, adjusted for inflation (see Parikhjed. ], 1997) in the intervening years.
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Other classes of cultivators in Chandkura and elsewhere in Hilsa also identify the increased 
costs of irrigation as one of the principal factors currently preventing them from 
accumulating agricultural surpluses on any significant scale. In the mid-1970s it was 
observed that the per unit cost of irrigation with a diesel tubewell was approximately twice 
that of irrigation with an electric tubewell, while the figures for mobile diesel pumpsets 
were even higher (Dhawan, 1977: A98). Today this differential has increased further, with 
operating costs of diesel pumpsets now almost four times as high as that of electric 
tubewells. Frequent shortages of diesel also force pumpset users to buy diesel on the black 
market, pushing costs up even further.
However, the disappearance of electricity itself cannot account for the slowing down of 
any process of capitalist development which may have been occurring. Rich peasants in 
other regions which have experienced similar problems have not responded in the same 
way. In a study of the ‘farmers' movement’ in U.P., Patnaik and Hasan note that western 
U.P, the centre of 'growth of capitalist production', 'lagged surprisingly in the number of 
electrified villages...with only 30 per cent of villages having access to electricity, close to 
the state average. Evidently, machinery is to a large extent powered by other fuel sources.' 
(Patnaik and Hasan, 1995:285). In fact, along with remunerative prices, a reliable power 
supply and the waiving of electricity bills were key demands of the ‘farmers' movement’ in 
U.P (op cit.:290-292). This political expression, primarily by rich peasants, of their 
demands as capitalist farmers, which can be observed in different forms in Punjab, U.P. 
and Haryana can be contrasted with the absence of any such movement in Bihar and 
underlines the difference in the extent to which capitalist farmers have developed as a 
class. The fact that rich peasants in central Bihar have now reverted to non-productive 
forms of accumulation suggests that the relatively more favourable price and 
infrastructural conditions of the 1970s may have played a key role in generating short-term 
development, which, however, the underlying structure of the agrarian economy and 
society could not sustain.
If electrification in the early 1970s was one of the factors which led to the development of 
surplus accumulating, investment oriented rich peasants in Hilsa, de-electrification and the 
switch to diesel pumpsets has been a key factor in the emergence of a class of poor 
peasants whose adoption of capital intensive techology ties them into both wider input and
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produce markets and highly localised credit markets. This phenomenon is discussed further 
below.
b) High Yielding Varieties and Fertilisers
The situation in Chandkura underlines Rao's observation that biochemical inputs, while 
they may be technically scale-neutral, are 'not resource-neutral' (Rao 1975:44). As Boyce 
argues, fertilisers and High Yielding Varieties (HYVs) are, unlike irrigation, 'divisible', But 
Boyce's further argument that access to irrigation is resource-(or class-) determined 
(Boyce 1987) appears to apply equally if not more so to fertilisers and HYVs in 
Chandkura.
A study of Nalanda district carried out in the early 1980s noted that 'in paddy, almost all 
the old varieties have been replaced by new ones' (Kumar: 1986:264). More recent data 
suggests that only high yield varieties of wheat were cultivated in Bihar by the early 1990s 
(Sharma, 1998).
As one would expect, therefore, few if any cultivators in Chandkura grow the indigenous 
varieties of paddy and wheat which were prevalent before the introduction of the first 
HYVs in the late 1960s. However, since the late 1960s, new 'improved' varieties have 
continued to be introduced at regular intervals, and supplies of these reach the Hilsa Block 
offices from time to time. But high prices, exacerbated by Block-level corruption, place 
barriers to the adoption of these new higher yielding seeds by small and marginal 
cultivators.
In 1981-82, 24.6 per cent of cultivating households in Chandkura asserted that the HYV 
seeds they obtained were 'inadequate'(Prasad, Rodgers et al. 1988: 574). In 1995-96, this 
figure had increased to nearly 75 per cent. In fact in Chandkura and all the other villages 
surveyed, cultivators identified the lack of availability and high prices of fertiliser, seeds 
and diesel as a major problem. They complained that seeds and chemical fertilisers were 
sold by the 'block' (Block Development Officer's office) to wholesalers, who charged them 
black market rates and often adulterated them. Even when seeds were available from the 
'block', they were often considered too expensive for smaller cultivators at Rs8/kg for 
wheat seed (the prevailing price of wheat is Rs4/kg).
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As a result, less than 25 per cent of small and marginal cultivators cultivate more recently 
introduced varieties. The differences in yield as well as quality between ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
high yield varieties are marked. For example, the yield of ‘Lai Bahadur’ wheat (i.e Lai 
Bahadur Shastri, one of the early HYVs) grown by most small and marginal cultivators 
was only a quarter of that of the ‘Upiya’ (U.P. 302) variety which some richer cultivators 
had acquired from the Block and begun cultivating during the last three years. The yield of 
the more prevalent HYV rice Mansoori was only 60 per cent of that of higher yielding 
varieties cultivated in the village, such as ‘Bauna’ rice.
However chemical fertilisers were considered a neccessity by all cultivators and were 
almost universally used in rice as well as some rabi crops and vegetables. The lowest dose 
of chemical fertiliser applied to rice crops observed in the village was still more than 70kg 
per hectare. This was despite a sharp increase in prices in the 1990s and problems of 
availability which often compelled cultivators, especially smaller cultivators, to pay black 
market rates. In fact, as in the case of irrigation, the increase in fertiliser use in Chandkura 
since the early 1980s is linked to its adoption by smaller cultivators. My study does not 
reveal any significant positive or negative correlation between landholding size and 
fertiliser use.
This pattern of heavy use of chemical fertilisers with recycled seed which is prevalent 
among small and marginal cultivators might be expected to lead to diminishing returns to 
capital invested. I carried out a small sample of 14 rice cultivators in Chandkura, which 
does show a higher correlation between the use of'new' high yield variety seeds and yields 
than between fertiliser use and yields. But our data does not enable us to confirm this 
hypothesis. What is clear is that, in a situation of almost universal adoption of biochemical 
inputs, the difference in yields between the HYVs used by poorer cultivators, and those to 
which richer cultivators have access reinforces a pattern of inter-class disparities in the net 
cost of cultivation.
c) Mechanisation
The ANSISS/ILO study found significantly higher levels of investment in ’modem
agricultural capital goods' among the dominant landowners in Chandkura when compared
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to other groups across Central and North Bihar. Excluding irrigation, this referred to 
threshers, power tillers and tractors. According to Census data on tractor ownership, in 
1971 there were no tractors owned in Chandkura itself and only five in Hilsa block as a 
whole, while in 1981 there were three tractors in the village and twenty in the block 
(District Census Handbook, Patna 1971, Nalanda, 1981). Altogether in 1995-96, there 
were eighteen threshers, three power tillers and five tractors owned in Chandkura. Nearly 
all of these had been bought in the late 1970s or early 1980s.
However, two points should be noted in this context. Firstly, in comparison to areas which 
have already witnessed agrarian transformation on the lines predicted for Chandkura in 
1981-82, the incidence of use of these machines was and has remained low. For example, 
Agarwal (1983:36) cites Cost of Cultivation Studies carried out in Punjab in 1971-72, 
which found that 41.24per cent of cultivators of HYV wheat used tractors or a 
combination of bullock ploughs and tractors for ploughing. For threshing, 71.71 per cent 
used mechanical threshers. In Chandkura in 1995-96, only 15.2per cent of cultivators of 
HYV wheat used tractors or a combination of bullock ploughs and tractors for ploughing, 
while 29.27per cent used mechanical threshers (Table 9). Both sets of data refer to both 
owned and hired implements.5
Table 9: Percentage of HYV wheat cultivating households using tractors and 
mechanical threshers - Punjab 1971-72 and Chandkura 1995-96
Punjab 1971-72 Chandkura 1995-96
Percentage of households using tractors 41.24 15.2
Percentage of households using 
threshers
71.71 29.27
Sources
Punjab: Agarwal, 1983; Chandkura: my fieldwork
5 Landholding size and distribution is clearly a key issue here - while Chandkura, and the district as a 
whole, has a relatively high ratio of tractors to operated area, the actual incidence of access to tractors for 
cultivators is determined by both the relatively small average size of holdings and the uneven distribution 
of resource endowments among cultivators, and can thus be better assessed by looking at the number of 
households using them.
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Secondly, while tractors are by far the most expensive of the items categorised as ’modern 
agricultural capital goods’, their presence should not necessarily be seen as indicative of 
changes in the process of agricultural production. Significantly, the only tractor bought in 
the last ten years had been purchased (along with a trailer) by one of the biggest 
landowners in the village exclusively for the purpose of hiring out for construction and 
transport work in the surrounding villages. The use of tractors primarily for 
non-agricultural purposes by landowners owning 10 acres and above is now a common 
phenomenon in Hilsa, and in fact throughout Central Bihar.
During the decade from the early 1970s to the early 1980s, it was these landowners who 
had access to a large proportion of the institutional credit available for the purchase of 
agricultural machinery. Policies relating to such credit (as well as to agricultural prices) are 
themselves determined by class action - in this case by political assertion by rich peasant, 
'proto-capitalist' farmers in certain regions of India (Byres 1981:416). But as we have 
suggested, rich peasant-based development Central Bihar never reached the point where 
capitalist farmers became a genuine 'class for itselfcapable of such action to further its 
interests as capitalists. Essentially they were passive beneficiaries of such national level 
policies. They frequently took loans for one or more tractors. In the same period, 
construction of houses in villages, district towns and in Patna emerged as a major avenue 
for investment of the surpluses being generated by the spurt in productivity in agriculture. 
Thus it was possible to realise substantial returns to an investment in a tractor by hiring it 
out for transporting building materials. In addition, the poor condition of most roads and 
the inadequacy of public transport in the region means that tractors can also be profitably 
hired out for transporting produce from villages to local markets, as well as for carrying 
passengers. Drivers are employed by the owners - in Hilsa, they are usually from other 
villages, and belong to the same Kurmi caste as the owners. (This is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 6, ‘Agricultural Labour in the Fieldwork Area’).
On the other hand, tractors are not completely absent from agriculture in Chandkura. They
are hired out by their owners to other cultivators in this and neighbouring villages for
ploughing. The use of tractors - by 15per cent of cultivating households in 1995-96 - was
spread across landholding sizes and surprisingly, if the biggest size group cultivating 10
acres or more (and including all the tractor owners) is excluded, the use of tractors is
highest in the size group 0.51 - 0.99 acres (Table 10). The reason for this is that it is those
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cultivators who cannot afford to keep bullocks and do not own ploughs who resort to 
hiring in tractors for ploughing, at a rate of Rs 300 per acre during peak seasons, despite 
the fact that the size and shape of their fields makes them difficult to plough effectively 
using a tractor. With the increased use of HYVs, the period within which ploughing must 
take place has become shorter. As a result ploughs and bullocks are not available for hire 
in this period. In some cases larger landowners continued to use ploughs even when 
owning tractors.
Cultivators point out that power tillers, which are smaller, are in fact more suited to 
conditions in Chandkura.6. But relatively few were available for hire. Although market 
prices of power tillers (at Rs 80,000 in 1995) are only a fraction of those of four-wheel 
tractors (Rs 215,000 in 1995), and running costs are not significantly higher, they are hired 
out at higher rates of Rs 400 per acre.
All this suggests that given the pattern of small landholdings and the extent of 
fragmentation, the role which tractors can play in the transformation of Chandkura’s 
agriculture is limited. They are clearly not displacing wage labour on any significant scale 
(small cultivators do their own ploughing). Rather their owners - the large landowners 
who were given loans to buy them in the 1970s and early 1980s - are now using them to 
extract surpluses from marginal and small cultivators by renting them out...........................
4. ‘RENTAL MARKETS’ FOR TECHNOLOGY
Neo-classical literature on the mechanisation of agriculture has assigned a significant role 
to rental markets in overcoming the constraints to the mechanisation of smaller 
farms.(Binswanger,1984; Binswanger and Donovan, 1988). For these markets to emerge, 
it is suggested, *the technically optimal farm size for machine ownership must exceed the 
sizes of numerous small farms' (Binswanger, 1984:12). However, ‘within small regions 
rental markets for time-bound and synchronic operations are harder to establish because of 
sharp conflicts about timing among potential users'(op cit.:14).
6 According to Binswanger and Donovan(1987:17) 'power tillers (two-wheel or garden tractors) have their 
greatest cost advantage in the wetland paddy cultivation of smallholders. The small plots make it difficult 
for large four-wheel tractors to operate effectively, and the tillage implement of the power tiller, the rotary 
cultivator, is ideal for puddling, the preparation of a fine seedbed out of a soil drenched in water.'
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Table 10 : Distribution of cultivating households in Chandkura bv tractor use and
landholding size group (acres). 1995/96
Landholding size 
group
Tractor neither 
used in cultivation 
nor owned
Tractor owned Tractor hired in TOTAL
less than 0.5 acres 43(91.5) 0 4(8.5) 47(100)
0.5-0.99 acres 23(79.3) 0 6(20.7) 29(100)
1-2.49 acres 29(87.9) 0 4(12.1) 33(100)
2.5-4.99 acres 30(93.7) 0 2(6.3) 32(100)
5-9.99 acres 9(81.8) 0 2(18.2) 11(100)
10 acres and 
above
0 5(83.3) 1(16.7) 6 (100)
All landholding 
sizes
134(84.8) 5(3.2) 19(12) 158(100)
Source: Fieldwork
Note: Figures in brackets indicate percentage o f landholding size group by category of tractor use
The reality which this statement appears designed to gloss over is that it is precisely for 
such time-bound operations - such as seed-bed preparation and irrigation in HYV 
cultivation - that small cultivators are most dependent on renting in machinery, and where, 
in consequence, machine owners can extract high monopoly rents. And consistent with the 
neo-classical approach, these writers do not take account of the way the operation of 
rental markets is shaped by regionally specific patterns of unequal distribution of 
resources, and underlying this, the differential relations to the means of production of 
'sellers' and 'buyers' of technology. In practice, evidence suggests, rental markets may be 
most likely to be 'established' not under conditions of perfect competition, but where there 
is a potential for exploitation through the appropriation of surpluses produced by the 
technology buyers' by the 'sellers.'
Other observers of agrarian change however have focussed on this exploitative aspect of 
rental markets for the means of production in agriculture. Particularly relevant in this 
context is the work of the so-called Agrarian Marxists carried out in the Soviet Union 
during the TSIEP' phase of the 1920s. Their research was carried out in a period where 
land had already been redistributed and could no longer be bought or sold. The leading
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figure of this school, L.N. Kritsman argued that, despite this, 'a process of expropriation of 
the agricultural surplus was taking place between peasant farms in a systematic way* (Cox, 
1984:57) based on ownership of scarce working animals and farm stock which could be 
hired out by those with 'excess’ capacity to 'exploit weaker farms and...accumulate capital' 
(op cit.: 12-13).
An interesting aspect of the situation described by Kritsman was that the peasant hiring out 
working animals and stock actually worked himself on the land of the peasant hiring them 
in, so that 'the hidden capitalist appeared in the guise of a worker' (op cit.: 13); the peasant 
who owned the means of production, and performed the manual labour necessary to 
operate it, actually received the greater share of the crop sown and harvested by the owner 
of the land.
Kritsman's work is also of relevance to any study of a relatively homogeneous peasantry in 
the process of differentiation. His focus is upon relations between peasant households; he 
found that the majority of peasant households were engaging in transactions of the kind 
described - either exploiting others or being exploited - thus calling into question the 
existence of a category of self-sufficient 'middle peasants'. According to Cox (1984), the 
key to Kritsman's ideas is the concept of class relations which in themselves only imply 
tendencies towards class formation: on any one farm, one could find elements of exploiting 
others' labour alongside elements of being exploited by others.
While the question of peasant class differentiation has of course been an important focus
for observers of South Asian agrarian change, there has been relatively little discussion of
the specificities of rental markets for technology in the region. Some consideration has
however been given to the question of 'water markets' i.e. the hiring out of equipment for
irrigation purposes. For example Boyce (1987:242) observes that the spread of private
shallow tubewells in Bangladesh lias been accompanied by the emergence of a market for
irrigation water, with a variety of payment systems including fixed cash charges on a
per-acre basis and payment in shares of the crop, ranging from 22 to 33 per cent...The
monopoly positions of tubewell owners and the uncertainties of water demand and supply,
however, place limits upon the market's scope for resolving the indivisibility problem.'
Surplus appropriation may also occur indirectly through the operation of interlinked
markets - thus a recent study of diesel pumpset use in North Bihar found that water sale
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was enmeshed in a complex of power relations between buyers and sellers, and was seen 
among other things as 'an opportunity for leverage over another family in order to secure 
more land or labour at periods of peak demand' (Wood, 1994:83).
The wider literature on agrarian markets in South Asia as well as my own data suggests 
that Kritsman's approach is a useful one in so far as it focusses upon the question of 
exploitation in relations of exchange between peasant households. However, the existence 
of such exploitation based on monopoly rents is clearly not enough to indicate a transition 
to capitalism. It may equally imply the contrary. It is significant in this context that 
Kritsman specifies the need to identify farms who possess not only 'adequate' but 'excess' 
means of production in relation to land, and who are therefore in a position to hire out 
animals and stock, because the term 'excess' becomes a particularly ambiguous one in the 
context of changing technology.
On the one hand, economies of scale may mean that machinery only becomes viable if it is 
hired out for part of the time by its owner. On the other hand - and this appears to be the 
case with some tractor owners in our survey - owners may not actually be making full use 
of the machinery on their own land at all, and its main importance may be as a source of 
rent. The question thus arises as to whether the appropriation of surpluses through 
monopoly rents can be said to indicate nascent capitalist development in agriculture if the 
‘exploiter* is not oriented towards the investment of such surpluses in agricultural 
production. Further, as Wood's findings (op cit.) confirm, benefits to 'sellers' of technology 
may accrue largely from the interlocking of markets which is facilitated by the resilience of 
pre-capitalist relationships.
Against this background of differing approaches to the issue of rental markets for 
technology, we will briefly examine a recent study of the operation of water markets in 
Muzaflarpur District of North Bihar (Shah and Ballabh, 1997). Significant similarities with 
our fieldwork area as well as its uncritical acceptance of the neo-classical paradigm make 
this study worth discussing in some detail.
As in Hilsa block, irrigation in the six villages surveyed by Shah and Ballabh was based on
a system of diesel engine-operated pumps and borewells. The proportion of operated land
irrigated too was comparable to that in my study area at 75.8per cent (op cit.:A187). And,
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as in Chandkura, land was irrigated by almost exactly equal numbers of pump owners on 
the one hand, and 'water buyers' on the other, but with pump owners concentrated among 
larger landholders.
The authors set out to test the value-laden hypothesis that 'in regions with abundant and 
well-recharged aquifers, groundwater markets can transform a stagnant traditional 
agriculture into a modem, booming economy with powerful beneficial productivity and 
equity impacts'. And with an enthusiasm which echoes the optimism expressed about 
Central Bihar in the early 1980s, they conclude that 'pump irrigation markets have emerged 
as a robust and dominant irrigation institution serving as virtually the sole powerhouse 
energising north Bihar's new found agrarian dynamism' (op cit.:A183).
The evidence presented to support this is that water markets in all six villages had acquired 
a high level of both 'breadth' and 'depth', although the 'depth' varied considerably between 
villages. Here 'breadth' refers to extension to a large proportion of cultivators and 
cultivated land; 'depth' means buyers making 'intensive use of water1 through adopting 
'green revolution technologies' and cropping intensities and patterns 'consistent with high 
quality irrigation' (op cit.:A185).
The authors did however find 'inefficient' monopoly rents being charged by the water 
buyers. Observing that most pumpset owners in the six villages invested in pumpsets 
'not...for selling water but for their own irrigation needs', they argue that 'they should be 
willing to provide pump irrigation service at any price higher than their variable cost of 
fuel and some component of wear and tear cost which is significant for diesel pumps'. In 
reality, as in Chandkura, the price charged was much higher - over 1.25 to 1.8 times the 
level of the average full cost and 2.5 to 3 times the incremental pumping cost (op 
cit.:A186).
The impact of this is analysed in terms of two effects, which are treated separately: a 'pure
distributional' effect in which pumpset owners can claim a significant proportion of the
surplus produced by water buyers, and a 'pure productivity' effect in which buyers reduce
their use of irrigation facilities leading to reduced lower levels of output and income than
would be the case in a 'competetive' water market. There are several problems with this
approach. Firstly, the separation of the two conceptually is itself problematic, assuming as
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it does that distribution has no impact upon production. Clearly the appropriation of a 
large proportion of the surplus by the water owners - who in this case own an average of 
twice as much land as non-owners and are mainly 'high caste and affluent farmers, 
especially bhumihar and yadava communities' -has important implications for production 
patterns in the medium and long term, which can only be assessed by looking at the 
patterns of reinvestment of these surpluses.
Secondly, the ’productivity effect1 of monopoly pricing is argued to be negligible on the 
basis that 'if anything, water buyers have higher cropping intensities, grow more of their 
land with crops considered good, and in general achieve higher crop yields per acre'. This 
finding leads the authors to comment almost euphorically that 'the pump irrigation markets 
in north Bihar have got perfected and refined to a stage where it might be difficult to 
improve upon their impacts to any significant respect!' (op cit.:A188). However, as an 
extensive body of literature on farm size and productivity confirms, (e.g. Sen, 1962; Sen, 
1975; Bharadwaj, 1974b; Roy, 1981) higher cropping intensities and yields have long 
prevailed among small and marginal cultivators of the kind who make up the bulk of'water 
buyers' in the study. In fact, the introduction of'new' technology is likely to counteract this 
'inverse relationship' between farm size and output per acre considerably. What this 
relationship reflects is not 'dynamism' but a desperate attempt to survive, usually through 
the intensive exploitation of family labour* Further, as we argue below, for these 
cultivators, the more extensive cultivation of crops 'considered good' (i.e. high value cash 
crops) often reflects a 'compulsive involvement' in the market, which has only been 
reinforced by their dependence on inputs like irrigation supplied at high monopoly prices 
by larger landowners.
In the next section, we look in more detail at the implications of technological change for 
small cultivators in Chandkura and elsewhere in Hilsa.
5. SMALL PEASANTS AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
a) Subsistence production using the new technology
As we have seen, much of the spread of the ‘new’ technology which tok place in the 1980s
and early 1990s is accounted for by its adoption by those cultivating 2.5 acres or less.
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Today, a significant proportion of small and marginal cultivators in Chandkura are 
essentially subsistence peasants operating at a high technological level. The use of 
chemical fertilisers and pesticides, diesel pumpsets and threshers (usually hired in) and 
tractors (invariably hired in) is observed on landholdings where almost the entire product is 
consumed by the household. This is made possible because a large proportion of small and 
marginal cultivator households either hire out agricultural labour or have a non-agricultural 
source of income. Thus for example Brijnandan Prasad, who both owns and leases in 
marginal holdings of less than an acre, sells his produce only in order to meet the costs of 
next year’s lease. He pays for fertiliser and other inputs as well as non-crop consumer 
staples from income earned as a cart driver. Janadhari Paswan, an agricultural labourer 
who leases in less than half an acre sells only onions, which are invested in next year’s 
lease; the rest of the crops are entirely consumed by the household, though they are often 
insufficient to meet subsistence needs and foodgrains also have to be purchased.
b) The role o f fixed rent tenancy
This also raises questions relating to the nature of tenancy in the area, which will be 
examined in the following chapter. 22 per cent of small and marginal cultivators (those 
cultivating less than 2.5 acres) lease in all or part of the land they operate. Increased 
adoption of new technology among this group has led to a rapid increase in the level of 
fixed rents, which are established through bidding for one year contracts at the beginning 
of the agricultural year. At the same time, there is no direct incentive for landowners to 
provide any of the inputs, which are entirely provided by the tenant. Tenants point out that 
they can rarely lease in the same land for more than a year at a stretch and that this 
prevents them from making any improvements to the land. Cropping patterns and the use 
of inputs also varies from year to year depending on the quality of land leased in. With 
notable exceptions, these tenants are leasing in to produce for household subsistence needs 
- however the scale of rent payments further compels them to adopt technology which will 
ensure a marketable surplus to meet the costs of the following year's lease.
c) Credit, marketed surplus and cropping patterns
Another significant feature of small-scale cultivation in Chandkura is the role of traditional
credit: loans are frequently taken from larger landowners in the village to cover costs of
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fertilisers and other inputs. These loans are not distinguished from consumption loans, and 
rates of interest are high, ranging from four to ten percent per month (see Chapter 7 for a 
detailed discussion of credit relations). Small and marginal farmers are usually compelled 
to sell their produce immediately after the harvest when prices are lowest in order to pay 
off these debts and meet production costs. This suggests that a substantial part of the 
marketed surplus in Chandkura is in fact a 'distress surplus' marketed under duress. This 
has been contrasted with the genuine 'commercial surplus' marketed by profit-oriented 
producers: whereas a rise in price generates a growth in the latter, the 'distress surplus’ will 
decline as prices rise, since the demands in question can be met by a smaller volume of 
sales (Narain, 1988:79).
These compulsions are also reflected in variations in cropping patterns according to 
landholding size. These are mainly observed during the rabi season. As landholding size 
declines, the proportion of cultivated land allocated to higher value crops grown for sale 
such as wheat and onions increases. Small and marginal cultivators grow less khesari, gram 
and masoor and are more dependent on the market for these consumer staples. 
Interestingly, only small cultivators operating less than 2 acres were found growing green 
vegetables for sale in the village, although several larger cultivators operating 5 acres or 
more grew vegetables for household consumption and thus did not have to depend on the 
market.
d) Non-viability o f small and marginal holdings
A recent study of the 'sustainability of smallholder agriculture' (Haque, 1996) which 
collected farm-level data from villages in selected districts of Andhra Pradesh, Haryana, 
Rajasthan and Bihar in 1990-91 includes data from two villages in Patna district, where 
conditions are comparable to those in Hilsa block (which adjoins the Patna-Nalanda 
border)7. In Simra village, marginal cultivators (operating holdings averaging 0.32 
hectares) and small cultivators (operating holdings averaging 1.21 hectares) cultivated 
mainly rice in kharif and wheat in rabi. In Niyamatchak, the 'relatively less developed' 
village of the two, they cultivated rice in kharif and linseed, gram, and other pulses in rabi.
7 A cluster analysis carried out as part of the ANSISS/DLO study (Prasad, Rodgers et al., 1988) used 
population growth and density, urbanisation, tenancy, cropping intensity, use of high-yielding varieties of 
paddy and tubewell irrigation as variables to categorise Bihar districts. Patna, Nalanda and Beguserai 
districts formed one cluster (op cit. :45).
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The author offers two definitions of 'viability' of a farm: 1) where any crop or farm activity 
shows net positive returns; 2) where the farm generates sufficient income not only for 
meeting the consumption needs of an average household, but also for saving and 
investment in future development (Haque, 1996:73).
The study concludes that 'marginal farms could no where ...generate sufficient income 
from crop farming alone to stay above poverty line. Marginal farms were found to be 
non-viable according to both criterion-1 and criterion-2' (op cit.:74). In all the four villages 
of Bihar studied, the net crop income of both marginal as well as small farms was below 
the subsistence level calculated at Rs 11,000 p.a.(op cit.:57). It is further noted that 
'marginal and small farmers depended mainly on other sources of income for their 
subsistence'(op cit.: 132). However in the case of marginal farmers, even when this income 
was taken into account, the households were operating below the subsistence level in most 
of the villages, including those in Patna District.
In the following section, we will look at two studies which have attempted to reassess the 
impact of the 'new technology' and have questioned - with very different results - the 
conclusions about its impact which were drawn in the initial stages after its introduction. 
We will consider whether either of these have any relevance for the region under 
discussion here.
6. The *Income Diffusion' hypothesis
In a recent study of Uttar Pradesh, Sharma and Poleman (1994) set out to demonstrate 
that, contrary to the generally accepted view that the 'Green Revolution' technology has 
led to polarisation and growing inequality, 'small farmers exhibited a remarkable tendency 
to catch up with the big farmers', and income disparities have actually been reduced 
(Sharma and Poleman, 1994:19). The authors identify three major mechanisms of income 
diffusion' in operation in Meerut District in western U.P.: off-farm diversification, dairying, 
and the cultivation of labour-intensive, high-value crops (op cit.:21). Of these three 
phenomena, there is little evidence of the first two in Hilsa Block. However, as we have 
seen, there has been some increase in the cultivation of onions, a labour-intensive, 
high-value crop. Can this be regarded as a potential mechanism of income diffusion? Let us
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first compare conditions in Jamalpur village in Meerut, selected by Sharma and Poleman to 
demonstrate this effect, with those in Chandkura and other villages in Hilsa Block.
•
Firstly, while 'the economic diversification in evidence in the other villages (in the study) is 
not so apparent in Jamalpur1 (op cit.:212), 'off-farm income' still contributes nearly one 
fifth of total income of marginal households (defined as those operating less than 1 
hectare). This employment is not of the casual and seasonal type available in Hilsa, (see 
Chapter 6, ‘Agricultural Labour in the Fieldwork Area’) but includes permanent 
employment in industrial units in a nearby urban centre, Hapur. A source of regular 
monthly income allows marginal cultivators to purchase more of their food requirements 
from the market, freeing land for the cultivation of high value potatoes and vegetables for 
the market.
Secondly, although the average size of the marginal landholdings in Jamalpur is less than
0.5 hectare, effective land consolidation measures in the region mean that fragmentation of 
already insubstantial holdings into scattered tiny plots is less of a problem than in Hilsa.
Thirdly, power is generally available in Jamalpur, and irrigation is by electric tubewell. 
Costs of irrigation thus differ substantially from those in Hilsa, with slightly higher 
installation costs but much lower running costs in Jamalpur. This may be a key issue 
affecting the spread of onions, which require intensive watering. Landlords providing 
irrigation to tenants is widespread in Jamalpur but rare in Hilsa.
This suggests that several infrastructural factors may have created a more favourable 
environment for the cultivation of high-value crops by marginal cultivators in Jamalpur 
than that which exists in Hilsa today. But a more fundamental question relates to the 
extent of accumulation and the nature of market involvement among these cultivators.
Bharadwaj has linked the nature of exchange and market involvement with the rural
household's position within the relations of production. Of marginal cultivators, she writes
that 'Not having enough circulating capital to produce even their subsistence, they have to
rely on credit... this element of compulsive involvement of the poorest farmers is reflected
in their cropping pattern, their land and labour utilisation as well as the higher degree of
monetisation of inputs and outputs'. (Bharadwaj 1974a: A12)
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This situation is investigated further in Bharadwaj's study based on Farm Management 
Surveys of the 1950s, which is worth quoting at some length:
‘The “very small” cultivators possess very little land relative to the available family labour 
and depend on hiring out labour to supplement their income from land. The landless who 
lease-in a tiny piece of land in search of some secure income fall into this category as well. 
Very often they possess no bullocks and have to hire their services for payment or in 
exchange for labour... Also, if they have debt liabilities, the output or a part of it may have 
to be disposed of soon after harvest for debt repayments. Quite often, they are compelled 
to raise consumption loans or even loans to provide circulating capital on onerous terms of 
repayment - the own rate of interest on such loans turns out to be very high. The rates of 
hire, whether of bullock labour or equipment, work out, on an average, higher for the very 
small farmers....The explanation for the higher rate for both (bullock and human labour) 
could be that during peak seasons when the very small farmers hire in these services, the 
rates are higher than at other times. With regard to labour, another reason could be the 
somewhat specialised nature of the operations for which labour may have to be hired. 
Furthermore, there could be diseconomies of buying inputs in smaller quantities. ...We 
note that the dependence on cash expenditure is very high in their case. It declines for the 
holdings in the next highest size classes and picks up again on the large holdings. The 
higher index of monetisation of the large holdings is qualitatively a different phenomenon 
from that on the very small ones. While in the former case it reflects a high degree of 
commercialisation of production, in the latter it is more a reflection of the distress 
conditions under which production is carried out and market involvement assumes a 
compulsive character.’ (Bharadwaj, 1974b:62)
This description summarises many aspects of the conditions of small and marginal
cultivators in Hilsa forty years later, which we have referred to above. The question which
arises is whether the increased use of biochemical and mechanical inputs by these
cultivators has actually changed this basic pattern, or whether, as I would argue, it has
reinforced it. The adoption of these inputs is consistent with subsistence farmers' strategy
of maximising 'not the net returns but the gross yield' (Bharadwaj 1974:62), even though it
may tie them more inextricably into 'compulsive' market involvement. If anything, it is
increased income from wage employment which has alleviated this dependence slightly.
But as we will see, changes in agricultural wages have resulted from specific struggles
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while the non-agricultural employment available is not organically linked to sustained 
agricultural development, as in the small industrial units of western UP.
Bharadwaj's analysis also allows us to examine the question of the cultivation of labour 
intensive high-value crops by marginal cultivators both in Hilsa and in Sharma and 
Poleman's study from a different angle. She points out that 'given their resource base, 
(small farmers) are severely constrained by the need to raise cash resources even in order 
to keep the cycle of production going. This may explain why farmers in this group are seen 
to allocate a higher proportion of their area to more lucrative (i.e. yielding higher gross 
revenue per acre) although risky, cash crops, especially if the crops...require a high labour 
input per acre and do not require any specific investments in equipment etc. Also it is quite 
often possible to get credit more easily for cash crop production on the condition of 
repayment in kind. Land can be more easily leased in and circulating capital or a part of it 
borrowed from the landlord on a contract to raise a cash crop on the farm' (Bharadwaj 
1974:64).
This also raises the question of sharecropping tenancy. In Jamalpur, 'The cultivation of 
high-value crops is largely restricted to the big and medium landholders' but 'several 
marginal landholders have devised strategies to overcome the constraints of land, capital 
and assured irrigation and now produce the crops themselves.'(Sharma and Poleman 
1994:211). The most significant of these strategies turns out to be entering into 
sharecropping contracts with medium or large landholders in which the landlord provides 
the irrigation, and other inputs (excluding labour) are shared. Two points should be noted 
here.
Firstly, this kind of sharecropping, which has emerged in areas where the impact of the
'new1 technology has been most pronounced, has been analysed by other writers as a form
of labour exploitation by landowners rather than, as Sharma and Poleman suggest, a
source of accumulation for tenants. Srivastava describes the evolution of the
sharecropping system in Chaukra, another village in Western U.P., into one with a high
degree of control by the landlord over the production process. The landlord bears a high
proportion of the costs and receives a large share of output. These arrangements are again
mainly made for labour-intensive crops, and are confined to the kharif season when
non-agricultural employment is low. Net daily returns to sharecroppers are sometimes well
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below daily wages. The tenant is Virtually a piece-rated labourer and landlords can 
’sidestep the problem of downwardly rigid money wages'. (Srivastava 1989:381-382).
Secondly, in this context, it is significant that there is a very low incidence of 
sharecropping in Hilsa, despite the fact that the conditions for this form of labour 
exploitation appear to exist. In fact sharecropping has actually declined with landlords in 
Hilsa preferring the security of fixed rents paid at the beginning of the contract to investing 
in the production of high-value labour intensive crops through sharecropping contracts. As 
we will see, landowners in Hilsa have not been able to counter wage demands by 
introducing 'new* forms of labour exploitation via tenancy. The relationship between the 
nature of tenancy and labour relations is explored further in Chapter 6 below.
7. The ’Arrested Green Revolution' hypothesis
The second hypothesis emerges out of a brief but significant discussion of a village in 
Ludhiana district, the heart of the 'Green Revolution' in Punjab. The author had carried out 
a detailed study of the village in 1970 (Mamdani, 1972); on his return five years later he 
found that 'long heralded as the vanguard of a capitalist agrarian order, these peasants 
appear to be changing course in mid-stream. Parasitic, unproductive capital once again 
threatens to dominate and become a fetter on agricultural production in Manupur* (Special 
Correspondent, 1975:944).
According to Mamdani, as the market price of fertilisers and oil used in tubewells
increased, the 'least prosperous of the rich peasantry* was compelled to seek loans to meet
rising production costs. As a result, the 'upper section' of the rich peasants, who had
money-surpluses in mid-season, began to 'branch off into moneylending. As institutional
credit via the IADP dried up, interest rates on private long-term loans rose rapidly. These
loans, whose duration was usually two years, were 'taken to purchase land, fertilisers or
machinery'. Mamdani cites one such rich peasant-tumed-moneylender as explaining that an
acre of land cost Rs 20,000, and the gross yearly product on it would be Rs4-5,000. But
by loaning out Rs 20,000 he could make Rs 4,000 even at a relatively low rate of interest,
and with minimum effort. As a result, moneylending was 'a growing tendency in the
village'. Mamdani concludes that 'should this tendency continue to operate, and there
seems at the present no reason to believe it will not, the same class structure that existed in
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the forties will be reproduced at a slightly higher technical level of production’, (op 
cit.:945)
There are clearly several flaws in this analysis. Firstly, for demand for credit to remain at 
such high levels, one section of the peasantry must continue to require loans not only to 
cover fertiliser and irrigation costs but for expanding their operations through productive 
investments in land and machinery, implying a continuing dynamism within agriculture. 
However, if such investments are assumed to be profit-maximising, they could not 
continue if, as is suggested, profits from the land purchased would not be sufficient to pay 
off the loan.
By contrast, in Hilsa, as we have noted, production loans to poorer peasants from richer 
ones are generally to meet the costs of inputs like fertilisers, pesticides and diesel and are 
treatedin the same way as consumption loans. These loans are smaller and shorter-term, 
although interest rates are substantially higher than those in Mamdani’s study. In this case, 
even if the marginal product of one particular input, such as fertiliser, is lower than the 
interest rate, it is part of a package, which, as we have seen small cultivators are essentially 
compelled to adopt. With many of the creditors hiring out family labour as agricultural 
labourers, creditors may also benefit from interlocking markets and thus, unlike those in 
Mamdani's model, rich peasants do not have to be assumed to be maximising profits in the 
credit market alone.
More importantly, with hindsight it appears that the 'tendency' identified by Mamdani was 
not powerful enough to become a dominant 'trend' under the given conditions which were 
relatively favourable to the emergence of capitalism. The dominant form of accumulation 
in Punjab remained a productive one, facilitated by the acquisition of land - through leasing 
in as well as purchase - and machinery. Thus both land concentration and the organic 
composition of capital continued to increase8.
8 See for example Sucha Singh Gill (1988) who notes that between 1970-71 and 1980-81, the area under 
individudal operational holdings of 10 hectares and above increased by 87.8per cent, and that under 
holdings of 4-10 hectares increased by 45.9per cent, while the area under marginal holdings of less than a 
hectare fell by 32per cent. He confirms that 'a section of peasantry, having greater command over land and 
resources, has been transformed into capitalist farmers, further pointing out that this section 'own capital 
assets such as tractors, threshers, pumpsets etc' out of proportion to the share of land they control (Gill, 
S.S., 1988:2167) Interestingly however, a recent study suggests out that 'informal credit markets' have 
survived under these conditions, with 'commission agents' dealing solely in crops as collateral emerging as 
a major source of credit (Gill, A., 1996).
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In Central Bihar however, the situation is very different. As we have suggested, the 
combination of several related factors - the failure of land reforms, extreme inequality in 
the distribution of resources, the proliferation of small and marginal farmers, a class of 
poor peasants dependent on richer peasants for inputs and credit, and the virtual collapse 
of the state infrastructure, has reinforced the channeling of surpluses into unproductive 
avenues. Moneylending is today only one of a range of such avenues of accumulation for 
the richer peasants who were identified as emerging capitalist farmers in the early 1980s.
Uniquely favourable conditions in the 1970s clearly did generate capitalist tendencies 
among this group - our hypothesis is that what was a powerful 'trend1 in Punjab, was, to 
use Lenin’s term, simply a ’moment' in Central Bihar. However to test this further we need 
to look at patterns of land distribution in Bihar during the last 25 years.
I l l
CHAPTER 5: CHANGING PATTERNS OF LANDOWNERSHIP AND ACCESS
TO LAND IN THE FIELDWORK AREA
Introduction
More than 80 per cent of those defined as main workers1 are engaged in agriculture in 
Bihar, a state whose population density is, at 497 persons per square kilometre, almost 
twice the all-India average. Population density is much higher in the North and Central 
Bihar plains - Nalanda district, where my study was located, has 846 persons per square 
kilometre according to the 1991 Census. Combined with a 23.5 per cent growth in 
population between 1981 and 1991, these figures (see Table 11) are enough to confirm 
that the distribution and use of land is a key question for Bihar’s future. However, my 
thesis also aims to test a specific hypothesis to which changes in land distribution have a 
particular relevance: to what extent has the nascent peasant-based capitalism observed in 
parts of Central Bihar in the early 1980s come to a standstill in the intervening decade and 
a half?
This chapter looks briefly at how Marxists have analysed land concentration in the context 
of the development of capitalism in agriculture, and at debates relating to size of holdings, 
scale of operations and changes in land distribution over time in the Indian context (these 
have also been touched upon earlier, in Chapter 1). It goes on to examine changes in 
quantitative land distribution patterns, in the inequality of land distribution, and in the 
extent and nature of tenancy, both at a macro level and in the fieldwork area.
Table 11: Population density, population growth and dependence on land
Nalanda Bihar India
Population Density 
(persons per sq. 
km)1991
846 497 267
Population growth 
(percent) 1981-91
22.05 23.49 23.5
Percentage of main 
workers engaged in 
agriculture, 1991
83.32 80.62 74.9
Source: Census of India, 1991
1 Main workers are defined as those who have worked for at least six months or 183 days during the 
reference period of one year. This seems to have led to substantial underestimation of the 
worker-population ratio, and in particular of numbers of agricultural labourers (see Chapter 6 for a 
discussion of the reasons for this). The extent of dependence on agriculture is thus likely to be even higher 
than these figures suggest
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1. Capitalist development and the concentration of landholdings : 
the Marxist approach
Integral to Marxist analysis of the development of capitalism is the concentration of the 
means of production in the hands of the capitalists, a process which simultaneously leads 
to the emergence of a class of ’free' workers - free 'in the double sense that they neither 
form part of the means of production themselves, as would be the case with slaves, serfs 
etc., nor do they own the means of production, as would be the case with self-employed 
peasant proprietors.' (Marx, 1976:874).
This implies that the concentration of landholdings in the hands of the dominant class 
(whether this class is a newly emerging one, or a pre-capitalist dominant class transforming 
itself) is a key aspect of the development of any form of capitalism in the agricultural 
sector.
In 'The Development of Capitalism in Russia', Lenin identified the emergence of a 'peasant 
bourgeoisie', who 'concentrate in their hands the bulk of the purchased and the rented 
land'(Lenin, 1956:53). His study of the Russian peasantry written in 1896-99 revealed the 
presence of all those contradictions which are inherent in every commodity economy and 
every order of capitalism: competition, the struggle for economic independence, the 
grabbing of land (purchasable and rentable), the concentration of production in the hands 
of a minority, the forcing of the majority into the ranks of the proletariat, their exploitation 
by a minority through the medium of merchant's capital and the hiring of farm 
labourers'(op cit.:172). On the process of peasant class differentiation, he wrote 'the 
emergence of property inequality is the starting-point of the whole process, but the process 
is not at all confined to property "differentiation." The old peasantry..is being completely 
dissolved, it is ceasing to exist, it is being ousted by absolutely new types of rural 
inhabitants - types that are the basis of a society in which commodity economy and 
capitalist production prevail. These types are the rural bourgeoisie (chiefly petty 
bourgeoisie) and the rural proletariat - a class of commodity producers in agriculture and a 
class of agricultural wage-workers.'(op cit.:174)
As Lenin himself emphasised, a large number of factors affect the extent and speed of this
polarisation in any given case, and in fact determine the specific form or 'path' which
113
agrarian transition is to take. These include the nature of the pre-capitalist social 
formation; the rapidity with which changes in the productive forces are occurring and the 
means by which they are spread; the scarcity or otherwise of land in relation to population; 
the extent and direction of state intervention (and by implication, the relationship of the 
state with classes which may have contesting interests); and the relationship between 
agrarian transition and capitalist industrialisation.
Clearly however, if, Bihar in the 1980s witnessed the continued development of the 
nascent ‘peasant capitalism’ identified at the beginning of that decade, one would expect to 
see substantial changes in the pattern of control over land, reflecting increasing 
concentration of this control in the hands of the potential capitalists. This we will test in 
the present chapter.
2. Landholding size, scale and class in India
As the discussion above suggests, the processes of concentration of land and of class 
formation have been regarded as closely interlinked in Marxist analyses of agrarian change. 
But at any given point, the relationship between landholding size and class is often not a 
straightforward one.
Kritsman's work on the Soviet Union in the post-land redistribution phase, when land
could not be bought or sold, underlined the importance of inequalities in productive assets
other than land in the process of peasant class differentiation (Cox, 1984: Kritsman’s work
has been discussed above in Chapter 4 ‘Agriculture, Technology and Class in the
Fieldwork Area’). But Utsa Patnaik's was the first systematic critique in the Indian context
of the assumption that landholding size could be used as a proxy for class in the context of
the development of capitalism in agriculture (Patnaik, 1971, 1972, 1987). Patnaik argued
that 'only in a stagnant agriculture with uniform techniques can the size of holding be taken
as a proxy for scale of operation: as capital intensification by particular groups of
cultivators takes place, the identification of scale with size becomes more and more
unsatisfactory. Clearly, a small holding which is intensively cultivated with high levels of
inputs, output and labour productivity, may well represent a larger, more capitalist scale of
operation than a large, extensively cultivated low productivity holding; and this is true
even when gross sown rather than net sown areas are considered' (Patnaik, 1971: A128).
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She suggested that given this, 'much better indicators of scale of operation than size, are 
(a) the value of capital stock, and (b) the annual value of output' (op cit.:A128) and further 
argued that, notwithstanding 'some conceptual and empirical problems', it was not 'rate of 
profit per acre' but 'rate of profit on capital advanced' which could indicate the relative 
profitability of different farms and of agriculture vis-a-vis alternative avenues of investment 
such as industry, moneylending and trade, and thus whether any given farmer was acting as 
a profit-maximising capitalist (op cit.:A129)2.
In the context of Bihar, the findings of the ANSISS/ILO study carried out in 1981-83 also 
lent support to Patnaik's approach to size and scale. Using a class categorisation which 
'does not depend directly on land area owned or cultivated, but only on the way the 
household utilises labour and land' (Prasad, Rodgers et al., 1988:74) and has much in 
common with Patnaik's labour exploitation criteria, the authors found 'middle' and big' 
peasants in the sample to be considerably (although not randomly) scattered across 
landholding sizes.
Recent observers who have confirmed the relevance of Patnaik's critique include 
Parthasarathy who suggests that, at an all-India level, two decades on from the early 
indications of capitalist development and the introduction of'green revolution' technology, 
land as a measure of the share of large farms is inadequate in the context of growing 
capital intensification of farms'(Parthasarathy, 1991 :A70).
However, while bearing these conceptual points and empirical examples in mind, I would 
argue that landholding size remains a significant indicator of class position in the context 
of Central Bihar.
In Patnaik's own study of peasant class differentiation based on a survey of landholdings of 
below 15 acres in Haryana, she notes that 'for some variables, such as the possession of 
modern powered equipment, the area under high-yielding varieties and under high-value 
crops, a 'peakedness' is observed in an intermediate acreage class (5-10 acres). This cannot 
be explained in terms of farm size, but becomes explicable only in terms of the fact that the 
majority of middle and rich peasant holdings happen to fall in that particular acreage
2 As described in Chapter 1, Patnaik later elaborated a method of class categorisation based on the labour 
exploitation criterion which did not depend at all on landholding size (Patnaik 1987).
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range.'(Patnaik, 1987:205). While Patnaik, whose main purpose here is to establish the 
importance of other criteria than land, does not explore this coincidence further, it does 
give us a clue to a way that landholding patterns might be incorporated into an analysis of 
class in a transitional agrarian economy, while going beyond a simplistic equation of size 
with scale or class.
Firstly, ownership or other forms of control over land as the means of production was 
clearly one of the key determinants of class position in the various social formations which 
pre-dated the development of capitalism in agriculture in India. As Patnaik has pointed 
out, under conditions of relatively ‘uniform techniques', size is indeed closely related to 
scale of operations; further, a household's access to land crucially affects the extent to 
which its members can exploit others or are themselves exploited (whether via the direct 
exploitation of labour power, rent, or debt).
This relationship does not disappear in the early stages of capitalist development; in 
Central Bihar (as I argue) capitalist development has not been completely absent, but it has 
certainly not followed a linear path and thus the persistence and perpetuation of 
pre-capitalist relations and patterns - including the relationship between class and 
landholding size - can be expected to be especially marked. As Prasad, Rodgers et al. put 
it, land is the most important of all assets It is not only the most important source of 
economic power in the village economy, but confers tremendous social and political 
benefits. True for India as a whole, for the Bihar countryside it is even more true'(Prasad, 
Rodgers et al., 1988:457)
Secondly, it follows from this that landholding size can be expected to have remained
closely related to caste, which can be regarded, to use Kosambi's phrase, as 'class at a
primitive level of production (Kosambi 1970:50). And it may well relate to class not only
in the survival of pre-capitalist correlations, but in the process of the formation of new,
potentially capitalist classes. This is because, as Kosambi's definition implies, different
castes have historically had not only differing access to land and other productive
resources, but radically different approaches to production. For example 'intermediate'
castes such as Bihar's Kurmis, Koeris and Yadavs were essentially self-cultivating peasant
groups as distinct from the 'upper' castes (e.g. Brahmans, Bhumihars and Rajputs) who
extracted surpluses from the labour of tenants through leasing (or sub-leasing) out land,
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and/or through usury, and refrained from participating in manual labour. The former may 
thus for a whole complex of both economic and cultural reasons, be more oriented 
towards productive investment in agriculture, and specifically the adoption of new 
technology, when favourable conditions arise.
In this context, it is worth briefly reminding ourselves of the findings of the ANSISS/ILO 
1981-83 study of Bihar. For the survey as a whole, average land cultivated per household 
rose steadily with agrarian class; the only exception being that landlords' (defined as all 
households leasing out any land) cultivated marginally less on average than 'big peasants'. 
Caste was also closely correlated with landholding size (see Table 12).
The study identified one group in particular as having the potential to 'lead' a transition to 
capitalism in Bihar's agricultural sector. This group, concentrated in Central Bihar’s Patna 
and Nalanda districts, were intermediate caste - predominantly Kurmi - peasants employing 
a combination of wage and family (including female) labour, and using tubewell irrigation.
Table 12: Mean land cultivated per household by class and caste in the ANSISS/ILO 
study of twelve villages in Bihar. 1981-82
Class Mean land 
cultivated per 
household(acres)
Caste Mean land 
cultivated per 
household(acres)
Agricultural Labour, not tied 0.75 Scheduled Caste 0.66
Agricultural Labour, tied 0.88 Lower Backward 1.09
Poor middle peasant 1.25 Other Upper Backward 1.97
Middle peasant 2.61 Koeri n.a
Big peasant 4.53 Yadav 2.99
Landlord 4.3 Kurmi 3.69
Non-agricultural 0.05 Bhumihar and Rajput 4.37
All households 1.92 Brahmin and Kayasth 3.9
Muslims 1.43
All households 1.92
Source: Prasad, Rodgers et ai, 1988
In summary, the study found that this group of households were at the forefront in the 
installation of tubewells which were the major source of assured irrigation, and in the 
adoption of High Yield Varieties and the use of fertilisers. While this group cultivated 
anything between 0.5 and 10 acres, and overall it was found that 'the extent of innovation 
which was witnessed in the area of biological technology has yet to unfold in the realm of
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mechanisation'(Prasad, Rodgers et al, 1988:549), the larger landholders among the group 
also had the highest value of machinery, productive assets, and capital investment in 
agriculture, and obtained more and larger 'modem' (institutional) loans than any other 
group. Kurmi peasants were characterised by relatively high values of marketed output per 
acre, and these values were substantially higher for larger landholdings.
In fact, in an interesting parallel with Patnaik's data on Haryana referred to above, the 
authors found that 'the value of modem capital goods, an important indicator of 
accumulation, is the highest among the Kurmis...and in the land size category of 5 to 10 
acres (op cit.:546).
Thus while larger landholdings clearly cannot be equated with a more capitalist mode of 
operation, the likelihood of a relationship between the two variables, with more capitalist 
oriented farmers concentrated in a particular landholding size-group, (in this case an 
intermediate one), needs to be taken into account.
The above discussion refers to cross-sectional observations comparing landholdings of 
different sizes, but it also obviously has implications for the question of changes over time 
in land distribution between holdings, and its relationship with peasant class differentiation. 
Utsa Patnaik's approach is consistent with the process of concentration of land in the hands 
of capitalist farmers over time posited by Lenin. But the extent to which this has actually 
been occurring in the Indian context has also been a subject of debate.
For example, in the article cited earlier, Parthasarathy goes on to observe that '...recorded 
data at the all-India level does not suggest that advances in technology are associated with 
growing centralisation and consolidation of land in large farms' (Parthasarathy, 199T.A70).
A specific example is provided by da Corta and Venateshwarlu in a study of Andhra
Pradesh. They report that \vith the introduction of the new technologies in the early
1970s, the more entrepreneurial landowners...were more interested in developing existing
land than in acquiring additional land, by converting dry land near wells to wet land with
machine powered pumping sets and by intensifying their use of chemical fertilizers and
pesticides. Indeed, while some land was resumed for tenants for cultivation by hired-in
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labour, much more was sold to tenants, especially in the remote hamlets, in order to 
finance this land development'(da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1997:15).
Several points arise here. Firstly, it goes without saying that in India capitalist development 
in agriculture has remained extremely regionally uneven (see for example Bharadwaj, 
1982; Baneijee and Ghosh, 1988; Srivastava, 1989b). The absence of evidence of 
concentration in all-India level data cannot be taken to imply that such concentration is not 
occurring in areas (often confined to particular districts of particular states) where 
technological change is most dramatic. As we will see, the wide variety of processes at 
work (even within a single area) have meant that a number of all-India level indicators 
suggest that a process of dispersion rather than concentration of land is taking place. At 
the same time, certain phenomena associated with capitalist development such as leasing in 
by larger landholders have been powerful enough to make their mark even on the all-India 
level data, and are clearly in evidence in the dramatic growth of inequality in the 
distribution of operated land in certain states.
Secondly, if capitalist tendencies are developing among cultivators currently concentrated 
in an intermediate landholding size group, the initial phase of accumulation of land by this 
group will not necessarily manifest itself as overall land concentration. Srivastava for 
example argues that 'in regions where feasible opportunities exist...and where the dominant 
landholders are not production-oriented, the intermediate groups of cultivating peasantiy 
may show greater dynamism' (Srivastava 1989b:23). He further notes that for the period 
1972-1982, 'several states...show an unambiguous decline in inequality in asset 
ownership...these results are again consistent with the hypothesis of relatively more 
dynamic investment performance by lower/intermediate groups'(op cit.:24)3.
Thirdly, there are questions relating to the operation of markets in land (both lease and 
sale). In a fully developed capitalist market, concentration of land is inevitable in the 
context of development of the productive forces, because introduction of new technology 
sharply increases differences in productivity between different holdings. This is clearly the
3 While, as the above discussion suggests, other valuable assets such as agricultural machinery may be 
distributed differently from land, land remains the 'most important' component in total assets for 
landowning households (Patnaik, 1987:91). The ANSISS/ILO study found that the value of land as a 
percentage of total value of assets ranged from 36 to 75 per cent across the twelve Bihar villages surveyed 
(Prasad, Rodgers et al., 1988:488).
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effect of da Corta and Venkateshwarlu's 'entrepreneurial farmers' converting 'dry land' to 
'wet land' in Andhra Pradesh. While in the relatively short term, they may achieve this by 
investing the proceeds of land sales in machinery, the net effect in the long-term will be to 
push down the rate of profit on those holdings which do not have access to irrigation. If a 
capitalist market in land has developed, this will result in the gradual concentration of land 
in the hands of the technologically more advanced farmers, whether through purchase, or 
leasing-in4. The fact that, in reality, many areas have seen the persistence of small-scale 
holdings operating at a low technological level alongside capital-intensive large scale 
farming simply serves to underline the incomplete and distorted forms in which capitalist 
development has occurred in India.
It is also worth noting that in da Corta and Venkateshwarlu's example, land does appear to 
be changing hands on a significant scale. As we will see, in contrast to this, the 
ANSISS/ILO study revealed the almost complete absence of a land market in Bihar. The 
persistence of this pattern would clearly have significant implications for the fixture of 
capitalist development.
3. Changes in land distribution patterns in Bihar: is land concentration occurring?
In empirical terms, concentration of landholdings in the hands of the largest landholders 
may be observed as:
- an increase in the average size of the landholdings in the largest size-group;
- an increase in the average size of all landholdings;
- a decline in both the numbers and the area operated in the 'middle' groups of landholders;
- in the longer run, an absolute decline in the number of small and marginal holdings; in the 
short run, an increase in these numbers at the expense of the middle groups.
4 Boyce gives an interesting example of the effect on land distribution in Bangladesh once irrigation 
facilities had been acquired by a minority of cultivators: 'if a plot of land lies in the command area of an 
irrigation source owned or controlled by someone else, its implicit price is higher for the *waterlord' than 
for the actual owner of the land, if the former can ensure that the land is irrigated while the latter cannot 
The water market imperfection translates into a land market imperfection, creating a tendency for land 
sales...In the meantime, however, the desire to wrest control of additional land within the potential 
command area would give the dominant individuals an incentive to withhold water from the owners of 
such plots' (Boyce, 1987:243-244)(As Boyce's study also underlines, while thorough-going capitalist 
development in agriculture implies the emergence of a market in land, the existence of such a market is 
not a sufficient condition for capitalist development).
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Given the fact that leasing in may be as important a mechanism of land concentration as 
purchase of land, operated land should be considered in each case.
However, it should be noted that there may be specific forms of capitalist development 
occurring which actually militate against these trends, particularly in the short run. Of 
particular relevance to this study is the possibility that capitalist tendencies may be 
manifested among the intermediate rather than the largest landholding size classes, leading 
to an accumulation of land held by this group.
Further, capitalist tendencies may be compatible with a persistence, or even in some cases 
a short-term increase, in sharecropping tenancy in which investment-oriented larger 
landholders lease out to small, marginal or landless households while maintaining tight 
control over the production process (Byres 1981:431; Srivastava 1989a), resulting in 
dispersion rather than concentration of operated land.
Again, land ceilings, especially where they are effectively implemented, may mean that the 
decline of the largest landholders counteracts the effect of concentration of land 
distribution in the hands of capitalist farmers.
Conversely, some of these effects may equally be the result of processes not associated 
with capitalist development or even overall concentration. An increase in landlessness and 
in marginal holdings may signify 'pauperisation' but not necessarily 'proletarianisation' in 
the sense of the emergence of a 'doubly free' class as described above (Patnaik, 1971). A 
dramatic example of this was the large scale eviction of small tenants witnessed in Bihar 
during the six years following the introduction of the Zamindari Abolition Bill in 1947. 
Evictions took place from no less than one million acres in the state, and affected seven 
million people (Sengupta, 1982:25). The evicted tenants were transformed not into 
agricultural labourers but into unprotected bataidars (sharecroppers), a class which 
'emerged almost overnight after Independence' (op cit.:25).
Again, division of holdings through inheritance, which is also prevalent in Bihar, may mean 
that medium sized holdings are being transformed into small and marginal ones without 
any concentration occurring.
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In this section we use state-level data to attempt to establish which, if any, of the processes 
referred to above have been at work in Bihar in the 1970s and 1980s. Comparisons with 
trends observable at an all-India level, as well as with those of other selected states, are 
used to highlight the specificities of Bihar’s experience.
An important source of data on changing patterns of land distribution at the all-India and 
state levels has been the National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO). In particular, NSS 
rounds eight (1954-55), seventeen (1960-61), twentysix (1970-71), thirtyseven (1981-82) 
and fortyeight (1991-92) have contained detailed landholding surveys. The following 
section looks primarily at data from the 26th, 37th and 48th rounds.
The estimates generated by these rounds are generally comparable in terms of definitions. 
However it should be noted that whereas in the 26th and 48th rounds, estimates were 
obtained directly from the data collected for the entire agricultural year, in the 37th round 
(1981-82) estimates were generated on the basis of data collected for the major crop 
season of the reference agricultural year. This means that in enumerating 'operational 
holdings', no account was taken of holdings which had carried out agricultural production 
only during the minor crop season (Government of India, 1996:15).
a. Changes in land distribution by size groups: the growth o f marginal holdings and the 
absence o f concentration in Bihar
At an all-India level, the period 1970-71 to 1991-92 has seen a substantial increase in the 
share of smaller holdings - in terms of both numbers of households and area operated - at 
the expense of larger holdings. Bihar began this period with a much greater concentration 
of both holdings and area in the smallest size-groups. Subsequently this pattern has been 
reinforced by a shift of both holdings and operated area into the very smallest size group, 
at the expense of all other size groups. These processes and their implications are 
examined in more detail below.
Total operated area in the rural sector has remained largely unchanged during the seventies 
and eighties. But the average size of a holding at an all-India level has declined by 20 per 
cent from 1.67 ha in 1981-82, to 1.34 ha in 1991-92. In Bihar, it has declined by 25 per 
cent from 1 ha in 1982 to 0.75 ha in 1991-92.
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In terms of absolute numbers, at an all-India level, the number of marginal holdings has 
multiplied threefold from 19.8m in 1960-61 to 58.7m in 1991-92. Small holdings have 
increased in numbers, but only moderately since 1971-72. Large and medium holdings 
have declined steadily. Semi-medium holdings of 2.01 to 4.00 hectares remained stable at 
10 million from 1960-61 to 1981-82 but are now increasing. Changes in the absolute 
numbers of holdings have followed a similar pattern in Bihar, with the exception that the 
State has not witnessed any increase in the number of semi-medium holdings in the 1980s.
Table 13 gives changes in percentage of holdings and percentage of area in each size group 
at an All-India level, and for five contiguous states in the Indo-Gangetic plain - Punjab, 
Haryana, U.P., Bihar and West Bengal - which have experienced very different patterns of 
economic development.
As Table 13 shows, at an all-India level, the percentages of large, medium and 
semi-medium holdings as a proportion of total operational holdings have been declining 
steadily since 1970-71, with the steepest decline in large holdings (3 per cent to 1.3 per 
cent). The percentage of small holdings has been falling since 1970-71, while the 
percentage in the marginal category has increased from 46 per cent in 1970-71 to 63 per 
cent in 1991-92.
In Bihar, changes in the distribution of operational holdings by size-class between 1970-71 
and 1991-92 have followed a similar pattern, although holdings are much more 
concentrated in the smaller size groups than at an all-India level in all the survey years. 
However, the increases in percentages of operational holdings in the marginal category are 
much less than have occurred in Punjab and Harayana, the states which have witnessed the 
most far-reaching development of capitalism in agriculture.
In terms of area operated, at an all-India level the share of marginal holdings has increased 
from 9.2 per cent in 1970-71 to 15.6per cent in 1991-92. The shares of small holdings and 
semi-medium holdings have also grown but more slowly. There is a significant decline in 
the share of large holdings from 23 per cent in 1970-71 to 15.2 per cent in 1991-92.
123
Ta
ble
 
13
: 
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
s 
of 
ho
ld
in
gs
 a
nd
 
of 
are
a 
op
er
ate
d 
bv 
siz
e-
gr
ou
ps
 o
f 
op
er
ate
d 
ho
ld
in
gs
, 
se
lec
ted
 
St
ate
s*
 1
97
0-
92
CDsz
o  m o  © • 0 ) 0
©  T _  
_ J  ©  
>  o  n  
<
to
e I
.5 oTJ T~© o  5  ~
o
1^"
E T~ © o
W c\i
©.c
o  
CO ~
E °  
© s-5  o © 
13
CM
00
m
CM
CM
CO
CO
CM
CM
CO
ID
CM
00
CO
oo
CM
O)
00
CO
CO
CO
CD
CO
CM
1Z4
In Bihar, however the share of small and semi-medium holdings too has fallen in the 1970s 
and 1980s, suggesting that the dispersion of land occurring at an all-India level is 
particularly intense there. It is the only one of the five states chosen for comparison in 
which only the share of marginal holdings has risen (see Table 13).
It is important to note that holdings classified as 'semi-medium' in NSS data (i.e. those of 
2.01 to 4.00 hectares or approximately 5-10 acres) include the majority of the 'rich 
peasant' section of cultivators in Central Bihar. As far as state-level data can be used as an 
indicator, therefore, concentration of land has not occurred in the hands of this group, (nor 
in the hands of the 'small' group of 2.5 - 5 acres), in the 1970s or the 1980s. If, as we have 
argued above, a crucial step towards capitalist development for this group would be the 
acquisition of control over greater areas of land, this is clearly extremely significant.
Average size of operational holding in each size group is another indicator which will be 
affected differently by different patterns of capitalist development. For example, while 
concentration among the largest landholdings would lead to an increase in the average size 
of holding in this category, concentration among an intermediate group might lead to a 
decline in the average for the larger holdings, or a decline in the average in both large and 
intermediate categories, as intermediate holdings moved from a lower to a higher size 
category.
In fact, as Table 14 shows, the average size of operational holding in each size group has 
changed little at the all-India level between 1982-82 and 1991-92. It appears that changes 
in the pattern of land concentration in the 1980s have not been of sufficient magnitude to 
be reflected in average holding sizes in most of the states being compared. It should be 
noted that demographic pressures may counteract the impact of concentration in this 
context (see section 2 below). In Haryana, however, there have been significant increases 
in the average size of holdings in the medium and large size groups in the 1980s. In Bihar 
by contrast, average sizes have shown very little change, declining marginally in the, small, 
semi-medium and large categories.
In summary, the NSS data on distribution provides no evidence that capitalist
concentration of land is underway in Bihar. Bihar is undergoing a process of dispersion of
land in which marginal holdings of less than 2.5 acres are proliferating and the share in
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operated area of all size-groups except that of marginal holdings is falling. As we have 
noted, the development of ‘peasant capitalism’ may be indicated by the concentration of 
land in the intermediate rather than the largest size-groups. But NSS data shows that the 
area controlled by these groups too is declining. Nor has there been any significant change 
in the average size of holding in each size group which might indicate that a process of 
concentration is occurring.
Table 14: Average size of operational holding in each size group (hectares), selected 
states and all-India. 1981-82 and 1991-92
State Year Marginal 
(below 1.01)
Small
(1.01 to 2.00)
Semi-Medium 
(2.01 to 4.00)
Medium
(4.01tol0.00)
Large
(Above
10.00)
Bihar 1981-82 0.33 1.46 2.73 5.55 14.33
1991-92 0.31 1.39 2.79 5.56 13.48
Haryana 1981-82 0.22 1.43 6.06 13.31
1991-92 0.26 1.43 2.76 10.49 17.16
Punjab 1981-82 0.12 1.56 2.82 5.88 14.35
1991-92 0.15 1.37 2.82 6.01 13.62
U.Pradesh 1981-82 0.39 1.41 2.79 5.61 14.28
1991-92 0.37 1.43 2.68 5.49 14.83
W.Bengal 1981-82 0.31 1.4 2.7 5.26 17.98
1991-92 0.3 1.37 2.64 4.87 n.a.
All-India 1981-82 0.34 1.43 2.76 5.88 16.09
1991-92 0.33 141 2.7 5.79 15.31
Source: Calculated from National Sample Survey data, Rounds 37 and 48
b. Inequality and the Gini coefficient o f concentration: stagnation in Bihar 
Given a marked decline in the share of operated area held by the 'medium* and large' size 
groups at the all-India level, Parthasarathy argues that 'the shift from feudal to capitalist 
farming has been taking place simultaneously with a reduction in the share of large farms, 
defined in terms of physical extent of land.' He goes on to suggest that 'a better measure, in 
the context of growing demographic pressures resulting in a decline in the size of land of 
all groups of farmers including the large, is to judge the share of decile groups of 
households over time' (Parthasarathy, 1991 :A70). Changes in these shares and in the Gini 
coefficient of concentration5 are discussed below.
5 The Gini coefficient of concentration is a measure of inequality of a given distribution, and is defined as
1- P  (Pi - PnXqj+ qj-i)]/104 where:
P i  = the cumulative percentage of number of holdings in the f 1 size class of holdings, and 
q, = the cumulative percentage of area in the j* size class of holdings.
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Overall, the changes in the pattern of inequality in operated landholdings between 1970-71 
and 1991-92 indicated by the NSS data confirm that Bihar began the period with a 
particularly unequal distribution. This reflects Bihar's legacy of a 'semi-feudal' landholding 
structure characterised by sharp disparities, and the persistence in some regions of a small 
number of very large landholdings (often in reality operated as multiple unrecorded 
marginal tenancies).
The 1970s saw some increase in the share of land operated by the top 10 per cent of 
holdings, which may be consistent with the potentially capitalist development witnessed 
during this decade in some areas of the state. The 1980s however have seen relatively 
small changes in the share of area operated by percentile groups of holdings, with the share 
operated by the top 10 per cent falling slightly, and an increase in the share operated by the 
middle 30 per cent, confirming the picture of relative stagnation after 1981-82.
The limited extent and the direction of changes observed in Bihar between 1970-71 and 
1991-92 can be contrasted with the sharp increases in concentration observed in areas 
experiencing capitalist development, for example Punjab in the 1970s, Haiyana in both 
decades, and U.P. in the 1980s.
Inequality in the distribution of operated area has increased at an all-India level - the share 
of the bottom 60 per cent of households has progressively declined since 1970-71, while 
that of the top 10 per cent and top 5 per cent have both grown. The share of the middle 30 
per cent has increased steadily.
In Bihar the share of the bottom 60 per cent has similarly declined in both periods. But the 
share of the top lOper cent which increased substantially in the 1970s, has actually 
declined somewhat in the 1980s, while the share of the middle 30 per cent has declined in 
the 1970s and then risen in the 1980s.(Table 15)
A comparison of five states in the Indo-Gangetic plain shows that in the 1980s, the share 
of the top 10 per cent has increased in Punjab, Haryana and U.P. whereas it has declined in 
Bihar and West Bengal. The share of the middle 30 per cent has declined in Punjab, 
Haryana and U.P. (in U.P. this fall has been a sharp one of 16 per cent), and increased in 
West pengal and Bihar (Table 15).
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The Gini coefficient of concentration has increased in the 1980s for operational holdings at 
an all-India level. But there has been little variation in the concentration ratio of ownership 
of land in this period, (in some states including Haryana it actually decreased) suggesting 
that leasing in by larger landowners from smaller ones was largely responsible for land 
concentration in this period. By contrast, Gini coefficients of inequality changed similarly 
for owned and operated land in Bihar in the 1980s, confirming that leasing-in by larger 
landowners, associated with capitalist development elsewhere in the country, had not 
emerged on any significant scale in Bihar (Table 16).
Table 15: Percentage shares of total area operated by percentile groups of holdings
State Year Bottom 60 % Middle 30 % Top 10 %
Bihar 1970-71 18.5 43.46 38.04
1981-82 16.12 35.56 48.32
1991-92 13.06 40.26 46.67
Haryana 1970-71 26.6 44.63 28.77
1981-82 16 45.3 38.7
1991-92 11.36 39.14 49.5
Punjab 1970-71 29.62 42.38 28
1981-82 4.74 46.68 48.58
1991-92 4.65 43.67 51.68
Uttar Pradesh 1970-71 19.22 45.78 35
1981-82 18.5 51.49 30.01
1991-92 19.3 35.57 45.3
West Bengal 1970-71 24.31 53.9 29.6
1981-82 14.9 37.9 47.2
1991-92 14.2 38.2 47.6
All-India 1970-71 18.62 46.9 34.48
1981-82 14.9 37.9 47.2
1991-92 14.2 38.2 47.6
Source: Calculated from National Sample Survey data, Rounds 26, 37 and 48
As Table 17 shows, among the five Indo-Gangetic states chosen for comparison, in 
1970-71, Bihar had the highest value for the Gini coefficient of operational holdings, well 
above the all-India figure. It decreased slightly from 1970-71 to 1982, and increased 
slightly in the 1980s. But the range of these changes has been small in comparison to
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several other states, notably Punjab in the 1970s and Haryana in both decades. Both of 
these states now have considerably higher Gini coefficients than Bihar.
Table 16: Gini coefficient of owned and operated holdings in major states. 1981-82 
and 1991-92
Owned ioldings Operated Holdings
State 1982 1992 1981-82 1991-92
Andhra Pradesh 0.74 0.72 0.599 0.576
Assam 0.56 0.57 0.519 0.494
Bihar 0.68 0.70 0.606 0.637
Gujarat 0.69 0.71 0.558 0.604
Haryana 0.70 0.68 0.598 0.675
Karnataka 0.68 0.66 0.581 0.609
Kerala 0.68 0.69 0.649 0.636
Madhya Pradesh 0.65 0.65 0.535 0.558
Maharashtra 0.70 0.71 0.571 0.598
Orissa 0.61 0.66 0.526 0.514
Punjab 0.77 0.77 0.702 0.730
Rajasthan 0.62 0.65 0.604 0.613
Tamil Nadu 0.76 0.75 0.640 0.646
Uttar Pradesh 0.60 0.63 0.565 0.572
West Bengal 0.63 0.68 0.597 0.585
India 0.71 0.71 0.629 0.641
Source: National Sample Survey, Rounds 37 and 48
Table 17: Gini Coefficient of Operational Holdings for Selected States, 
1970-71 to 1991-92
State 1970-71 1981-82 1991-92
Bihar 0.617 0.606 0.637
Haryana 0.464 0.598 0.675
Punjab 0.418 0.702 0.730
Uttar Pradesh 0.495 0.565 0.572
West Bengal 0.490 0.597 0.585
India 0.586 0.629 0.641
Calculated from National Sample Survey data, Rounds 26, 37 and 48
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c. Tenancy : the absence of capitalist tenancy and an overall decline in tenancy in Bihar
The National Sample Survey data on tenancy suggests, firstly, a sharp fall in the relative 
extent of reported tenancy in Bihar, in terms of both operated area and holdings, among all 
size-groups. Secondly, the marked all-India trend towards leasing-in of land by large 
holdings which has been associated with the growth of capitalist farming (Parthasarathy 
1991) appears to be completely absent in Bihar. Nor has there been an increase in leasing 
in by the intermediate groups among whom the potential for capitalist development was 
identified in the 1970s. Thirdly, while leasing-in has remained concentrated among smaller 
holdings, there has apparently been a significant shift away from sharecropping towards 
fixed rent terms. There is thus no evidence to suggest that the type of ‘capitalist’ 
sharecropping discussed earlier in this chapter is developing in Bihar.
At an all-India level, the number of tenant holdings remained more or less stable from 
1970-71 to 1981-82 around 5.5m, but has increased sharply to 12m during the last decade. 
The total leased in operated area showed a downward trend from 1970-71 to 1981-82, but 
showed an upturn after 1981-82 (Government of India 1996:28).
The overall percentage of tenant holdings declined steadily between 1970-71 and 1991-92. 
The percentage of tenant holdings in marginal, small and semi-medium size-classes moved 
in the same direction. But while the percentage in medium and large size-classes declined 
until 1981-82, from 1982 onwards the percentage increased sharply in the large holdings,
Table 18: Percentage of tenant holdings bv size-class of holdings. all-India and 
Bihar. 1981-82 and 1991-92
INDIA Bffl[AR
size-class 1960-61 1970-71 1981-82 1991-92 1981-82 1991-92
marginal 24.1 27.0 14.4 9.6 17.66 7.14
small 25.1 27.8 17.9 14.9 30.89 10.67
semi-medium 23.6 24.8 15.9 12.2 17.20 7.05
medium 20.5 20.0 14.5 13.1 11.78 1.44
large 19.5 15.9 11.5 16.7 6.61 -
all categories 23.5 25.7 15.2 11.0 19.73 7.46
Source: National Sample Survey, Rounds 17, 26, 37 and 48
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confirming a trend towards leasing-in by big landholders. In Bihar however, recorded 
tenancy fell sharply in the 1980s in all size categories, with no leasing-in by large holdings 
recorded (Table 18).
Table 19: Percentage of area leased in bv size-class of holdings. all-India and Bihar. 
1981-82 and 1991-92
INDIA Bffl[AR
size-class 1960-61 1970-71 1981-82 1991-92 81-82 91-92
marginal 16.6 18.9 9.7 8.7 13.62 6.18
small 14.0 14.6 8.5 8.5 15.79 5.47
semi-medium 11.7 11.7 7.3 7.4 7.90 2.86
medium 9.6 8.7 6.6 6.9 5.31 0.34
large 8.3 5.9 5.3 11.4 0.11 -
all categories 10.7 10.6 7.2 8.3 10.27 3.91
Source: National Sample Survey, Rounds 17, 26, 27 and 48
As Table 19 shows, the area under tenancy has also risen in higher size-classes at an 
all-India level. Till 1982 there was a steady decline in the percentage of tenanted area in all 
the size classes. After 1982, the decline continues only in the marginal category and the 
percentage for large holdings doubles. 'The inverse relationship which had prevailed 
between the size of holding and percentage of leased-in area for two decades since 
1960-61 seems to have disappeared, with the large holdings reporting the highest 
proportion of leased-in operated area in 1991-92' (Government of India 1996:28-29). 
Again, in Bihar the percentage of area under tenancy fell sharply in the 1980s in all the size 
groups, while this 'inverse relationship' persisted.
Overall, in the 1980s, the percentage of operated area leased in increased at an all-India 
level and in all major states, except West Bengal, Orissa and Bihar. The increase in 
Haryana has been particularly sharp. Bihar recorded a marked fall in percentage of 
operated area recorded under tenancy from 10.3 per cent to 3.9 per cent. Meanwhile, the 
overall percentage of tenant holdings declined in all states except Andhra Pradesh and 
Madhya Pradesh (Table 20).
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Table 20: Percentage of tenant holdings and operated area leased in for maior states.
1981-82 and 1991-92
percentage of tenant holdings percentage share of leased in area
State 1981-82 1991-92 1981-82 1991-92
Andhra Pradesh 13.8 14.1 6.2 9.6
Assam 12.9 10.1 6.4 8.9
Bihar 19.7 5.6 10.3 3.9
Gujarat 4.8 3.7 2.0 3.3
Haryana 25.9 17.1 18.2 33.7
Karnataka 10.7 8.0 6.0 7.4
Kerala 6.7 5.2 2.6 2.9
Madhya Pradesh 8.0 9.0 3.6 6.3
Maharashtra 10.6 6.9 5.2 5.5
Orissa 18.2 16.9 9.9 9.5
Punjab 21.3 15.9 16.1 18.8
Rajasthan 7.1 6.5 4.3 5.2
Tamil Nadu 24.7 15.3 10.9 10.9
Uttar Pradesh 20.5 15.5 10.2 10.5
West Bengal 23.1 14.4 12.3 10.4
India 15.2 11.0 7.2 8.3
Source: National Sample Survey, Rounds 37 and 48
Table 21: Percentage distribution of area leased in bv terms of lease, all-India and 
Bihar
INDIA BIHAR
terms of lease 1970-71 1981-82 1991-92 1981-82 1991-92
fixed money 15.4 10.9 19.0 6.5 9.5
fixed produce 11.6 6.3 14.5 3.6 12.8
share of produce 47.9 41.9 34.4 73.3 43.5
others 25.1 40.9 32.1 16.6 34.2
all terms 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: National Sample Survey, Rounds 26, 37 and 48
Note: ‘Others’ includes 'service contract’, i.e. land leased out to labourers in lieu ofpayment.
The share of 'fixed rent' terms in leased-in area and in tenancies declined substantially from 
1970-71 to 1981-82. But since 1981-82, both of these have risen. In Bihar, sharecropping 
remained the most prevalent form of tenancy, but there was a significant shift to fixed 
terms away from sharecropping in the 1980s. (Table 21)
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The possible reasons for the trends indicated in the State-level data are explored further 
below in the light of the findings of my field study and other micro-level investigations.
4. The problems of disaggregated data in Bihar
The extent of regional uneveness within Bihar as a state makes it particularly important to 
consider disaggregated data. Bihar is conventionally described as consisting of three 
distinct regions: ’North Bihar", the plains north of the River Ganga; 'Central Bihar1, the 
plains south of the Ganga (also sometimes called South Bihar); and the 'Chhotanagpur1 
plateau. Land in these three regions has historically been very differently distributed. Some 
of Bihar’s biggest feudal landowners have succeeded in retaining their empires in the fertile 
but flood-prone districts of North Bihar - for example in the early 1980s, in Purnea district 
alone there were 41 exceptionally big landlords each owning more than 1,000 acres (Mitra 
and Vijayendra, 1982:98); Central Bihar whose soil is potentially highly productive but 
requires intensive application of labour has been characterised by a high proportion of 
landlessness, acute inequality, but few extremely large holdings; the mineral-rich forested 
Chhotanagpur region with a substantial adivasi or ‘tribal’ population has had lower levels 
of complete landlessness and larger holdings on average.
Further, these regions themselves are economically heterogeneous, a fact that is underlined 
by the cluster analysis carried out as part of the ANSISS/ILO study (Prasad, Rodgers et al. 
1988). The analysis which was restricted to 'north* and 'central' Bihar districts (i.e. the 
Bihar plains) used population growth and density, urbanisation, tenancy, cropping 
intensity, use of HYV paddy and tubewell irrigation as variables to categorise districts, and 
concluded that *these clusters did not correspond to the traditional North Bihar-South 
Bihar division...the more advanced-more backward axis was West to East rather than 
South to North' (op cit.:46)
However, as a number of scholars have noted, district-wise analyses based on official 
sources are severely hampered by what has been referred to as 'rampant adhocism in the 
reporting and collection of data' in Bihar (Jha, 1997:122). According to Ghosh 
(1992:187)1he paucity of information on Bihar's economy is largely due to the fact that the 
state-level agency to look after collection and publication of social and economic data is 
rather weak, both in terms of resources and manpower'.
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But the problem of unreliability of data is particularly acute in the case of land ownership 
and operation, where, as has been amply documented, records are consistently falsified 
from the village level upwards. For example, a report from Central Bihar’s Jehanabad 
district in the Hindustan Times (September 30 1988) revealed that 'the latest land-revenue 
survey prepared by the district administration is bogus...the revenue records suggest that 
only 0.72 per cent households among the total number of cultivators in this district hold 
land in excess of 15 acres'. This survey was prepared ostensibly 'so that those categories 
which have land in excess of the ceiling can be identified and targetted for forcing the 
implementation of the Minimum Wages Act. Thus the total number of such families in this 
category arrived at is a mere 968 families out of a total of 1,33,268 cultivator families.' 
One of the glaring problems with the survey was the use of out-of-date records compiled 
in 1965 when the settlement survey had last been conducted: 'in a specific case where the 
revenue data shows that Mr Sukhdeo Singh of Rampur Vaina of Baidrabad panchayat of 
Arwal holds 507 acres and Rambhajan and Rajendra Singh of the same village hold 700 
and 140 acres each, it was found that these people have ceased to exist 20 years ago and 
land was divided even earlier to such an extent that not even 15 acres exist with any 
member of the family in the village. The last settlement records available for the village 
were framed in 1957.'(Matthew and Hemant, 1988).
Essentially, the very unreliability of the official data on landholdings in Bihar is 
symptomatic of the continuing importance of control over land as a source of rural power, 
and the intensity of conflicts over it. It reflects firstly a deep-rooted unwillingness among 
landowners to reveal the actual extent of their holdings to any representative of the state 
apparatuses, and secondly an inherent tendency of these representatives themselves to 
collude with dominant landholders in misrepresenting the situation to the latteris 
advantage. In practical terms, it means that researchers working on Bihar are largely 
dependent on data collected by academic and other non-official sources for secondary data 
at the disaggregated level. The following sections make use of such sources and are based 
primarily on my own fieldwork.
5. Changing patterns of landholdings in Chandkura
50 per cent of households in Chandkura are completely landless, and a further 21 per cent
own less than one acre. At the other end of the spectrum, eight households own and
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operate more than ten acres (Table 22). Despite the absence of any landholdings greater 
than 25 acres in the village, this leads to a very skewed distribution of both land owned 
and land operated (Table 23).
Given both average sizes and the pattern of distribution of landholdings, I have used ’small' 
to refer to holdings of 1.01 to 2.5 acres, and 'marginal' to refer to holdings of one acre or 
less when referring to data on Chandkura.
While reliable village-level data on land distribution is not available for the earlier period, a 
comparison of the distribution of households by class in 1981-82 and 1995-96 suggests 
that the tendency in Chandkura has been towards dispersion rather than concentration of 
both owned and operated land. This confirms the impression I gained both from interviews 
carried out in the village in 1995-96, and specifically, data on changes in the land and lease 
markets in the village, inheritance, and other mechanisms of land transfer which I 
collected.
Table 22: Distribution of households in Chandkura by size categories of owned and 
operated landholdings. 1995-96
Landsize category 
(acres)
percentage of households 
(owning)
percentage of households 
(cultivating)
None 50.4 32.5
0.01-0.49 9.4 20.5
0.5-0.99 12 12
1-2.49 15.4 14.5
2.5-4.99 6 13.7
5-9.99 3.5 4.3
10 and above 3.5 2.6
Source: Fieldwork
Table 23: Percentage of area owned and operated by percentile groups of households 
in Chandkura, 1995-96
Bottom 60% of 
households
Middle 30% of 
households
Top 10% of 
households
Owned land 1.8% 32.3% 65.9%
Operated land 7.7% 36% 56.3%
Source: Fieldwork
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As Table 24 shows, average land cultivated per household in Chandkura has declined from 
1.97 acres in 1981-82 to 1.47 acres in 1995-96. The total number of households in the 
village has increased from 196 in 1981-82 to 233 in 1995-96, while total population has 
increased from 1,354 to 1,794. Households partially or fully dependent on agriculture have 
increased in number from 183 to 214. There has also been a significant increase in the 
number of non-agricultural households (defined as those engaged neither in cultivation nor 
in agricultural labour) from four (2.1 per cent) to nineteen (8 per cent) in 1995-96.
In 1981-82, 17.1 per cent of households cultivated no land (this excludes those permanent 
agricultural labourers who were given tiny plots to cultivate as part of their contract with 
their employers). When those 'non-agricultural' households who did not participate in 
either cultivation or agricultural wage labour are excluded, the figure is 15.3 per cent. In 
1995-96, the percentage of households with no access to land in Chandkura had nearly 
doubled to 32.5 per cent. Excluding non-agricultural households, the figure is 26.9 per 
cent. In terms of absolute numbers, households cultivating no land had more than doubled: 
there were 34 such households in the village in 1981-82, as compared to 76 in 1995-96.
At the same time, there was a substantial increase in the number of small and marginal 
cultivators (defined as those cultivating one hectare [2.5 acres] or less - 'marginal' holdings 
according to the NSS categories). Table 24 shows the changes in class composition of the 
village and in average area cultivated per household by classes between 1981-82 and 
1995-96.
Permanent labourer households, who have declined sharply in numbers between 1981-82 
and 1995-96, also cultivate less land, reflecting a fall in the size of plots provided by 
employers as part of the annual labour contract. Casual labourer households have grown in 
numbers, but as their percentage share in total households has increased only marginally.
Average land cultivated by them has increased slightly, which may reflect the purchase of 
marginal plots during the reference period by a handful of casual labourer households, as 
described below.
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Table 24: Number of households and mean area cultivated per household 
by economic class in Chandkura. 1981-82 and 1995-96
Economic Class Number of households Mean area per 
household (acres!
1981-82 1995-96 1981-82 1995-96
Permanent Labour 43(22.99) 30(12.88) 0.45 0.20
Casual Labour 62(33.15) 82(35.19) 0.15 0.33
Poor Middle 
Peasant
7(3.7) 45(19.31) 2.40 1.85
Middle Peasant 21(11.2) 35(15.02) 2.95 1.84
Rich Peasant 38(20.3) 18(7.72) 5.97 6.11
Landlord 12(6.4) 4(1.72) 3.09 3.83
Non-Agricultural 4(2.1) 19(8.15) 0.00 0.00
Total 187(100) 233(100) 1.97 1.47
Source: Fieldwork
Note: Figures in brackets indicate percentage o f total households in Chandkura
*Poor middle peasant' households - neither hiring in nor hiring out agricultural labour - 
have increased massively from seven households - only 3.6 per cent of total households - 
in 1981-2 when they cultivated an average of 2.4 acres, to 45 households - 19.3 per cent - 
in 1995-96, when average land cultivated by them was 1.8 acres (50 per cent of these 
households are primarily dependent on non-agricultural income).
Middle peasant' households, who do hire in labour, have also increased, from 22 
households (11.5 per cent) cultivating an average of 2.9 acres, to 35 households (15.02 
per cent). In size terms, this group had now joined the ranks of small cultivators, 
cultivating an average of only 1.8 acres. (As in the earlier period, poor middle peasants and 
middle peasants cultivate similar amounts of land on average).
This seems to be at least partially accounted for by a dramatic decline in the percentage of 
'rich peasant' households (defined by a combination of resource endowment and the
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exclusion of female household members from cultivation) from 20.3 per cent to only 7.7 
per cent of total households.
However, the point to be noted is that this has not led to a greater concentration of land in 
the hands of large-scale cultivators. The average area cultivated by rich peasant 
households has increased only very marginally, from 6.00 to 6.1 acres.
The number of landlord households (defined as any household leasing out land) has also 
fallen sharply, but the average amount of land retained by these households for 
self-cultivation has increased slightly (3.8 acres as against 3.1 acres in the earlier period). 
Both these changes are consistent with a reduction in the extent of leasing-out in the 
village.
Thus while between 1981-82 and 1995-96 there has been an increase both in landlessness 
(in terms of operated holdings) and in the proportion of marginal cultivators, this has not 
been accompanied by either a significant increase in the average size of holding of the 
largest landholders or an increase in the average size of all landholdings, which would 
suggest concentration. On the contrary, the average size of holding has fallen for all classes 
except casual labourers, whose holdings have remained tiny.
6. Absence of a land market in Chandkura
Referring to land losses and gains during the five years preceding the survey in 1981-2, the 
ANSISS/DLO report noted that, for the study villages as a whole, Not much can be 
inferred from the data as to which of the land size groups is gaining or losing relative to 
the others. If anything, the smallest landsize category, up to 1 acre seems to be faring 
relatively better. But the understatement of gain is probably disproportionately 
concentrated in the larger landholding size groups. Therefore, it would not be reasonable 
to infer that land transactions are greatly changing the pattern of land distribution' (Prasad, 
Rodgers et al. 1988:464-465). In Chandkura, the study found that households on average 
experienced a net loss of 7.5 per cent of previously owned land6.
6 The authors of the study note that 'over the survey as a whole, this significant deficit in land gained 
should be regarded as due to understatement. Given the sensitivity of land issues in Bihar, it is not 
surprising that gains of land should be less readily reported than losses. Some of the difference may be due 
to recall lapses stronger for gains than for losses' (Prasad, Rodgers et al.:463-464).
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This absence of any large-scale 'land transactions' seems to have persisted during the 1980s 
and early 1990s. My survey found that only 20 per cent of households reported any change 
in the amount of land they owned during the past 15 years. Significantly, 11 per cent of all 
households referred to the division of land through inheritance or the separation of joint 
families into more than one household, and 6.3 per cent, more than half of these, had 
joined the ranks of marginal owners owning 1 acre or less as a result. Of the fourteen 
households (6 per cent) who reported having purchased land, ten had done so using 
earnings from government service outside the village. Amounts of land bought were also 
very small, averaging 0.58 acres.
The question of the 'persistence' of marginal ownership holdings has been addressed in a 
debate concerning a study of four villages in Noakhali district in Bangladesh carried out in 
1979-80 (Bhaduri, Rahman and Am, 1986). The authors of the study found that in terms 
of ownership, the smallest landowning groups (owning 0.6 acres or less) were 
characterised by a higher percentage of 'stable' households, defined as having a ratio of 
currently owned to inherited land of between 0.9 and 1.1. This evidence, they argue, 
contradicts the Svidely held view* that Bangladesh is undergoing 'a strong process of 
polarisation between those with increasing ownership of land and those who become 
landless with nothing but their labour power to sell' (op cit.:83). They suggest that the 
small owners who have been able to 'stabilise' their holdings have done so through access 
to 'outside' income from agricultural wage labour, leasing in land, and non-agricultural 
activities.
In conclusion, Bhaduri et al. argue that this is made possible by the very process of 
polarisation in landownership: 'polarisation through net land transfer simultaneously 
activates the market for agricultural labour as well as the market for leasing in land. This in 
turn creates supplementary income opportunities for these smaller landowning households, 
helping a significant number of them to stabilise their landholding...and thus persist over 
time despite the overall tendency towards polarisation. It is in this sense that the process of 
polarisation sets up its own contradiction'(op tit.:87).
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There are clearly several methodological problems in the study, notably the authors' 
definition of 'stability1 which fails to take into account differences in the time elapsed since 
land was 'inherited' from the previous head of household (see Khan, 1987; Feldman and 
McCarthy, 1987); and the fact that they present no evidence that 'stable' households have 
greater access to 'outside' income than 'unstable' ones.
But there are also a number of conceptual problems with this approach which are more 
significant. Firstly, the authors' characterisation of marginal holdings as 'small-owner farms’ 
is misleading. As we have seen, small-scale subsistence cultivation is sustained through 
'compulsive involvement' in credit, input and produce markets, acute exploitation of family 
labour and underconsumption. As one critic points out, in this context, 'it is only too 
evident that the ownership content of their landed 'properties' is already more or less 
eliminated while what remains is little more than the shell of the real ownership'(Pandian, 
1987:535). Further, such 'juridical ownership' often persists precisely because of the 
limited and shrinking extent of other 'survival options' which means that 'small peasants 
caught in a debt trap do not sell their land in the first instance, but mortgage it' (op 
cit.:536).
Secondly, there is the related question of changes in production relations which are 
inseparable from a process of 'polarisation' of landholdings. As Feldman and McCarthy 
argue, the growth of wage labour and tenancy 'involves distinct relations of dominance and 
control'. This calls into doubt the extent to which 'small farmers' persist as a distinct class 
when households owning marginal holdings are primarily dependent on selling their labour 
power. In fact, 'the category of owner-producer also suggests forms of class identification 
different from that of wage labourers. Very small landholdings may indicate subsistence 
production but are unlikely to indicate the persistence of small farms if primary productive 
activity is off-farm' (Feldman and McCarthy, 1987:546). This is particularly relevant to the 
situation in Hilsa, where caste and class definitions both contribute to distinct and discrete 
'mazdoor1 (labourer) and Tdsan' (peasant) identities (see Chapter 6, ‘ Agricultural Labourers 
in the Fieldwork Area’), but 'mazdoors' may also be marginal landholders.
Thirdly 'polarisation' of landholdings in which land is transferred from smaller to larger
holdings will not automatically, as Bhaduri et al suggest, expand demand for labour or for
tenants, thus introducing the possibility of 'stabilisation' of holdings. The impact depends
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on a wide variety of factors, including the extent and nature of technological change 
occurring and the strategies of accumulation adopted by those gaining land. What is more 
certain is that with more and more households left with marginal ownership holdings, 
labour supply is likely to increase in absolute terms over time. As Bhaduri et al. themselves 
note, in their study, ‘whereas nearly 60 per cent of the households have less than 0.6 acres 
of landownership and almost certainly need additional income, only 26 per cent of all 
households are able to have any form of wage employment in agriculture1 (Bhaduri et al., 
1986:86). Their model of 'persistence' of smallholdings then becomes dependent on the 
relatively external factor of the availability of non-agricultural sources of income for small 
owners, intensifying the problems of categorising them as 'small farmers'.
However, the change in landownership patterns observed in Chandkura between 1981-82 
and 1995-96 suggests neither 'polarisation', nor 'stability' of small ownership holdings. On 
the one hand there is little evidence that land is being transferred from smaller to larger 
holdings. Interestingly, in the few cases where land has been purchased, this has in general 
not represented the reinvestment of surpluses accumulated in agriculture, but the 
investment of savings from salaried jobs outside agriculture. Several of these cases were of 
dalit agricultural labourer households, who had one member in a government job. For 
these previously landless households, purchasing a small plot of land was a way of 
lessening dependence on hiring out wage labour and moving into the ranks of marginal 
cultivators.
On the other, the data suggests that small owners are experiencing a slow but relentless 
shrinking of their holdings through a process of inheritance and subdivision of holdings. 
The period has not seen a significant increase in demand for wage labour, while the extent 
of tenancy has declined (see below). However, it is also worth noting in this context that in 
the case of Kurmis, who make up a quarter of marginal owners, agricultural wage labour, 
far from being a long-term strategy for sustaining ownership as suggested by Bhaduri et 
al., is entered into only as a last resort by those who have lost their land entirely. This 
section are also less likely to engage in the non-agricultural occupations available than 
other groups in the village (14 per cent of Kurmi marginal owners as compared to 48 per 
cent of all marginal owners had non-agricultural income). With input costs rising, they 
appear to be undergoing a process of gradual pauperisation.
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7. Tenancy in Chandkura
As we have noted, changes in the extent and nature of tenancy can be important indicators 
of a transition to capitalism in agriculture. On the one hand, leasing in by capitalist or 
proto-capitalist farmers may be an effective mechanism for concentration of operated land. 
On the other, especially in the initial stages of capitalist development, existing forms of 
tenancy may be adapted to the needs of potentially capitalist landowners, increasing their 
direct control over the production process and the labour of the tenants. State-level 
changes in tenancy patterns have been discussed earlier in this chapter. Here we look at the 
changes which have taken place in the fieldwork area.
In Chandkura, 19 per cent of households lease in land, with the vast majority of tenants 
owning less than 1 acre, and leasing in small amounts of land averaging 1.2 acres from the 
biggest landowners in their own and neighbouring villages. Nearly all these landowners 
retain most of their land for self-cultivation. There are no instances of leasing in by rich 
peasants, or by those owning more than 5 acres. Except for one household sharecropping 
1 acre belonging to a Brahman family living in another village, all leases are today on a 
fixed rent basis.
The proportion of households leasing out land to tenants declined from 6.4per cent of 
households in 1981-82, to 1.7 per cent in 1995-96. In terms of numbers, there were twelve 
such households in 1981-82, while at the time of my survey, there were ten. All these own 
eight acres or more. The fall in reported tenancy in Chandkura is consistent with the 
Bihar-wide decline recorded in the NSS data cited above. However, given the fact that 
some landowners lease out to tenants living in other nearby villages, there is some scope 
for under-reporting by landlords. As I suggest below, motives for under-reporting may 
have become stronger during the reference period.
What seems incontrovertible is that the proportion of share tenancies in total tenancies has
declined dramatically in the 1980s. The Bihar-level data has been noted above. The 1981
Census data for Hilsa block recorded 32.8 per cent of all tenant households as ’paying rent
as a share of produce'. (Census of India 1981). Corresponding data from the 1991 Census
is not currently available. However, my survey of twelve villages in Hilsa in 1995-96 found
that fixed rent tenancy was reported to be the only form of tenancy currently in operation
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in ten of these villages. Respondents explained that landowners had begun refusing to give 
land on share leases in the early 1980s, often in the wake of wage struggles. The prevalent 
arrangement had been for input costs to be shared 50/50 (excluding plough and bullocks 
and labour, which were provided by the tenant). Output was also shared 50/50. Thus 
sharecropping, while it remained a mechanism for extraction of surplus by the landowner 
from the tenant's labour, was seen by dalit labouring households with few resources as a 
means of access to small amounts of land.
When this group began to assert itself as a class, the larger landowning peasants of the 
area appear to have acted in a concerted way to withdraw this access (see Chapter 5, 
‘Agricultural Labour in the Fieldwork Area’) They also clearly believed that the increased 
confidence of the dalit poor threatened their own ability to enforce the terms of the 
sharecropping contract in their own favour, implying a rise in the 'supervision costs' of this 
form of leasing out. A common remark was 'if we give our land out on a share lease, when 
it's time to divide the crop how can we be sure we are getting our share, the mazdoors 
don't listen to what we say any more...'
The fact that this shift was closely related to changes in labour relations and the labour 
market is also underlined by the fact that landowners in several villages in Hilsa felt that if 
they gave small portions of their land out on share lease to agricultural labour households, 
there would no longer be a sufficient supply of labourers to work on the land they 
cultivated using wage labour. They thus preferred the security of fixed rents paid in cash at 
the beginning of the contract; high and rising levels of rent also ensured that the majority 
of agricultural labour households would be excluded from tenancy. In Chandkura in 
1995-96, only 12 out of 112 agricultural labour households (11 per cent) leased in land.
A rather different (and apparently reverse) response to wage struggles has been observed
in other parts of Central Bihar. In villages in Sahar and Sandesh blocks of Bhojpur district,
a 'storm centre' of these struggles in the 1990s, where I conducted a number of group and
individual interviews in 1993-94 and 1995, many of the mainly Bhumihar large landowners
reacted to wage demands by switching over from cultivation using wage labour to leasing
out on a sharecropping basis to middle peasant households of the Yadav caste. However
the point to be noted is that, as in Hilsa, the access to resources of the dalit labouring
households declined rather than increased as a result. In fact in Bhojpur, the strategy of
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leasing out was adopted in order to bring in an intermediate class (and caste) which could 
act as a buffer between the upper caste big landowners and the dalit agricultural labourers; 
this strategy is not open to the dominant landowners of Hilsa, whose holdings are generally 
smaller and who themselves belong to intermediate castes.
At the same time as these processes have occurred, other factors have militated in favour 
of fixed rent or ’patta' tenancies. Firstly, as yields continued to rise during the 1980s, rents 
could be increased substantially: in monetary terms they have tripled since the late 1970s. 
(As we have seen, this was one of the factors compelling small tenant cultivators to adopt 
the new technology). As elsewhere in Central Bihar, in Hilsa a 'bidding system’ is prevalent 
in which each year the plot or set of plots is offered to whichever potential tenant can offer 
the highest rent. As a study in neighbouring Gaya district noted, the bidding system itself 
can also be used to increase rents: as bidding does not take place openly, landowners can 
claim that rival bidders are offering more to push up the bid (Pandey, 1980:51).
Secondly, the prevalent form of rent payment has been cash (in Chandkura 65 per cent of 
tenants paid rent in cash and 35 per cent in kind; cash rents were also predominant in all 
the other villages surveyed in Hilsa). This payment has to be made in full at the beginning 
of the one year contract. As fertiliser, diesel and other input costs have increased with 
produce prices failing to keep pace, rental payments are a valuable source of cash at the 
time it is most needed by the landlords of Hilsa, who continue to operate the major portion 
of their land themselves.
The bidding system also leads to regular switching of tenants: in Chandkura in 1995-96,
only 17 per cent of tenants had leased in their current plot for more than one year,
although the majority had been leasing in land for five years or more. This continual
change may be one reason for a possible increase in under-reporting of these tenancies
(which are generally never recorded in official land records) by the National Sample
Survey Organisation between 1981-82 and 1991-92. My discussions with larger
landowners in Hilsa and elsewhere in Central Bihar suggest that despite the continuing -
and well-documented - failure of the state to implement land reforms legislation (see for
example, Jannuzi, 1974; Sengupta 1982; Land Reforms Unit, 1990; Das, 1992), the
struggles of the rural poor around wages and land as well as (since 1990) the 'social
justice' rhetoric of the Laloo Yadav government have increased fears among landlords of
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tenants claiming - and being able to enforce - occupancy rights. In interviews conducted in 
early 1995, landlords in Nalanda, Patna, Jehanabad and Bhojpur districts of Central Bihar 
referred to rumours of impending new tenancy legislation. Thus both frequent evictions 
and switching of tenants as well as actual under-reporting of land leased out may also be 
symptomatic of the changing climate of agrarian relations in the 1980s and 1990s.
Historically, sharecroppers in Bihar, who emerged 'almost overnight' with the mass 
eviction of tenants in the wake of Zamindari Abolition (Sengupta 1982:25) have been the 
most powerless of tenants7. Interlocking of share lease markets with labour and credit
7 Considerable debate has taken place regarding sharecropping between neo-classical and Marxist 
economists. Neo-classical economists have considered share tenancy arrangements, and indeed the 
operation of markets in general, essentially in terms of their allocative efficiency. The starting point for 
neo-classical analyses of the implications of sharecropping is contained in Marshall (1920), where 
sharecropping is defined as an essentially ‘inefficient' form of tenancy, because, ‘when the cultivator has 
to give to his landlord half of the returns to each dose of capital and labour that he applies to the land, it 
will not be in his interest to apply any doses the total return to which is less than twice enough to reward 
him’ (opcit:644).
The challenge to this view from within the neo-classical framework itself has centred upon two main 
issues: ‘risk’ and ‘transaction costs’ (i.e. the costs of supervision of the labour process). According to 
Cheung, ‘different contractual arrangements do not imply different efficiencies of resource use’(Cheung 
1969:158): with private property in land, the landlord will inevitably adjust cost-sharing and crop-sharing 
arrangements in order to maximise profits. Share tenancy arrangements are chosen ‘to attain the preferred 
distribution of risk subject to the constraint of transaction costs’ (Cheung, 1969:159). When there are 
significant risks, sharecropping provides a method by which some of the risks are borne by the landlords, 
while at the same time reducing the costs to the landlord of direct involvement in the production process.
Among those who elaborated upon and extended this theory, Stiglitz (1974; 1986) contrasted 
sharecropping with wage labour, arguing that the former provides an incentive for more intensive 
application of inputs (greater ‘effort’) by the direct producers, and develops partly in response to ‘the 
limited ability to monitor the actions of the tenant (or the high costs of doing so)’ (Stiglitz, 1986). 
Hanumantha Rao (1971) argued that the efficiency of share-cropping is dependent on the production 
function of the crop in question : Marshall's objection that sharecropping left tenants free to restrict their 
inputs does not apply to crops where there is little scope for varying inputs. Hanumantha Rao 
distinguished between risk or ‘uncertainty’ and the scope for decision-making in the face of uncertainty, 
the ‘entrepreneurial function’. Where both uncertainty and the scope for entrepreneurship are low, ‘and 
where, therefore, the farm takes on the character of a managerial or supervisory unit, the landlord may 
find it profitable to lease out (on a share-rent basis)’ (Hanumantha Rao 1971:580-81). Meanwhile 
Newbery (1977) admitted that ‘labour market imperfections’ in the shape of uncertain alternative earnings 
for tenants - were among the circumstances conducive to sharecropping arrangements.
However, while this debate took place on the assumption that the function of exchange is to ‘clear’ the 
market, and that markets as institutions continue to survive as long as they are allocatively efficient in 
their respective economic environments, Marxist writers were looking at exchange as a mechanism for 
giving one party an advantage at the cost o f another (Bhaduri, 1986). As we discussed in Chapter 1, 
Indian political economists have looked in depth at the factors which determine the position from which a 
particular agrarian household interacts with land, labour, and credit markets, including resource 
endowment, the nature of labour use, and the extent of surplus produced.
From this perspective, ‘sharecropping cannot be seen merely as a form of rent or of labour remuneration 
but as a particular method o f surplus appropriation’ (Pearce, 1983:53), an arrangement through which the 
landlord effectively gains access to the sharecropping tenant's labour. Analysis based on an assessment of
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markets has been a marked feature of Central Bihar's agrarian economy (see for example 
Verma and Mishra, 1984; Prasad 1987; Prasad, Rodgers et al. 1988; Bharti, 1990). In this 
context, the relationship between individual sharecroppers and landlords has tended to be a 
long term one: for example, a study sponsored by the Ministry of Rural Development in 
1989-90 found that in Bihar as a whole, 66per cent of sharecroppers surveyed had been 
leasing-in from the same landlord for more than ten years, and 58per cent for more than 
twenty years (Land Reforms Unit, 1990:38), although none had been recorded as 
occupancy tenants. At the same time, the proportion of tenants who had experienced 
eviction was highest in Bihar of the six states surveyed (Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Tamil 
Nadu, U.P. and West Bengal), and this high incidence was linked to 'instances of tenants 
asserting their rights' in Bihar (op cit.:33-4).
However, I would argue that the shift to fixed rent tenancy which has occurred in the 
1980s has meant a qualitative change in the nature of evictions, which now occur as a 
matter of course on an annual basis. Under the 'patta' fixed rent system, insecurity of 
tenure is itself institutionalised.
But while a shift to fixed rent tenancy may well have increased under-reporting, it has also 
meant a real decline in even temporary access to land for poor households, who simply 
cannot afford the level of rent payments, particularly when, as in the case of cash 
payments, the entire year's rent has to be paid at the beginning of the lease. This was a 
view almost universally expressed by members of agricultural labourer households both in 
Chandkura and in other villages surveyed in Hilsa. In Chandkura, of those households who 
had previously leased in land but no longer did so, 70 per cent had stopped because of lack
differential access to the means of production, and on questions of power stemming directly or indirectly 
from this -a class-based analysis - allows us to explain the features of agrarian economies which are 
simply described by neo-classical economists when identifying the conditions ‘conducive’ to 
sharecropping arrangements. For instance, the ‘uncertainty’ identified by Hanumantha Rao (1971) is 
‘higher the narrower the resource base... when labour processes are characterised by uncertainty, the 
extent to which one class can extract surplus labour from another increases’(Pearce, 1983:58).
Similarly, ‘transaction’ or supervision costs vary inversely with the extent of dependence of the tenant or 
labourer. Substantial inequality in the distribution of the productive forces combined with the absence of 
alternative sources of employment gives one class extensive economic power over another. This is what 
generates the insecurity and ‘poverty’ of the tenant described in Marshall's original thesis as the only 
conditions under which sharecropping could be profitable, ensuring a greater intensity of effort on the part 
of the labourer/tenant, who needs to maintain the landlord's favour.
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of capital. As we have seen, the proportion of households not cultivating any land has 
increased significantly between 1981-82 and 1995-96.
This would suggest that the decline in sharecropping tenancy has not been fully countered 
by a rise in fixed rent tenancy, and the decrease in the extent of tenancy (in terms of both 
households leasing in land and area leased in) reported in aggregate level data at least 
partially reflects a genuine decline8.
In conclusion, changes in the pattern of tenancy, as reflected in both aggregate level data 
and micro-level field data appear to corroborate my hypothesis that larger landholders in 
Central Bihar have not pursued strategies of capital accumulation through productive 
investment in agriculture in the 1980s.
Firstly, leasing in by rich peasants, which has been a key means through which land has 
been concentrated in the hands of this group elsewhere in the country, has been completely 
absent. Secondly, the terms on which small plots of land are leased out by large 
landholders to landless and marginal cultivator households have changed significantly with 
a fall in the extent of sharecropping tenancy and an increase in fixed rent tenancy. In the 
fieldwork area, this change has been a response to assertion by agricultural labourers on 
the one hand, and increasing yields resulting from the adoption of new technology on the 
other. However, it is important to note that this change implies a decline rather than an 
increase in the involvement of the landlord in the production process - in terms of both 
bearing input costs and supervision. This can be contrasted with the situation observed in 
parts of Western U.P. for example, in which sharecropping tenancy was being adapted by 
capitalist farmers 'as a form of control over labour power, the appropriation of its produce, 
and a means for furthering accumulation' in which 'net daily returns to sharecroppers are
8 Jha has observed a similar decline in tenancy in Pumea district in North Bihar, noting ‘two important 
changes': ‘landlords prefer to change a tenant, or the piece of land leased out to the particular tenant, or 
both, almost every season’ and ‘there has been a substantial decline in area under tenancy’ (Jha 1997:180), 
although here tenancy had been, and remained, predominantly sharecropping. However, as well as 
agrarian movements and tenancy regulation, Jha cites an ‘increasing tendency’ for educated youths from 
households which were previously lessors to take up self-cultivation. He links this to both a decline in 
access to non-agricultural professional jobs as well as increased yields of major crops during the 1980s 
making self-cultivation more lucrative (op cit.: 181-182). This is very different from the changes observed 
in Hilsa in the 1980s and 1990s, when returns to self-cultivation were perceived to be falling. In fact some 
of the few examples of sharecropping tenancy were those of small cultivator households leasing out to 
others of the same caste when rising input costs led the younger men of the family to seek work outside. 
But this regional uneveness also strengthens the view that parts of North Bihar may be currently 
experiencing changes which were observed in an earlier period in Central Bihar.
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sometimes well below daily wages'. These landlords lease out land for a single season, 
specify the cropping pattern, bear a high proportion of the costs and receive a large share 
of the output; the tenant is 'virtually a piece rated labourer1 (Srivastava 1989a:381-382).
The growth of fixed rent tenancy observed in Hilsa, on the other hand, represents rental 
appropriation of a major part of the meagre surpluses which tenants who are essentially 
subsistence peasants can produce, without any investment in the production process, or in 
neo-classical terms, any sharing of 'risk'. High rental levels are possible because - and 
further ensure that - these tenants are compelled to operate at a high technological level 
(see Chapter 4, ‘Agriculture, Technology and Class in the Fieldwork Area’ for a discussion 
of this phenomenon). At the same time these rates effectively prohibit any accumulation by 
the tenants, and along with the bidding system which results in yearly switching of tenants, 
prevent them from making any long term improvements to the land.
Conclusion: land, class and accumulation strategies
In conclusion, my fieldwork suggests that concentration of cultivated land, either owned 
or operated, in the hands of large landowners has not been a significant phenomenon in the 
fieldwork area during the period from 1981-82 until 1995-96. While a decline in tenancy 
(involving leasing out by larger to smaller landowners) has reduced poor and landless 
households’ access to land, it has not been sufficient to counter other trends away from the 
concentration of operated land. In fact, the reverse phenomenon, that of dispersion of land 
in increasing numbers of small and marginal holdings, appears to have occurred. In the 
light of other trends I have identified, a number of reasons for this can be posited.
Firstly, there is clearly increased demographic pressure on cultivable land. Both the 
number of households and the total population fully or partially dependent on cultivation 
have increased considerably during the reference period. Although the number of 
households not participating in agriculture at all has also grown, changes in employment 
patterns have not been sufficient to counteract this pressure, and in any case are clearly 
limited in scope (see Chapter 6, ‘Agricultural Labour in the Fieldwork Area’ for a 
discussion).
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Inheritance patterns in which a man's land is divided equally among all his sons (women do 
not have any rights to their fathers' land) have been a major factor in increasing the 
numbers of small and marginal holdings without a corresponding increase in the share of 
land controlled by larger holdings. This has been accompanied by fragmentation of 
holdings which has important implications for production.
However, land scarcity and increasing demographic pressure characterised many other 
regions of India which have nevertheless witnessed land concentration in the hands of 
capitalist farmers. In fact the recognition that there was virtually no scope for further 
extension of cultivated area was one of the factors which led to the introduction of'Green 
Revolution' policies in India in the mid-1960s. And as we have noted, the emergence of 
capitalist farmers in other regions has led to concerted action to ensure consolidation of 
holdings. Thus these factors in themselves would not be expected to act as a barrier to 
concentration in a situation where large-scale surplus producing landowners were oriented 
towards acquiring land through purchase and lease.
But the extent of land transfers through the market in the fieldwork area has continued to 
be marginal during the reference period. And the phenomenon of large landowners using 
the lease market to concentrate operated land in their hands is completely absent.
The possible reasons for this relate to the accumulation strategies of different sections of 
landowners. Firstly, there is that section of intermediate caste cultivators which were able 
to accumulate surpluses in agricultural production under the particularly favourable 
conditions prevailing in the 1970s. At the same time as conditions for agricultural 
investment became progressively less favourable during the 1980s, new avenues for 
investment of surpluses emerged for these rich peasants of the 'backward' castes. These 
were related to their strengthened links with, and at a block level, control over, the state 
apparatuses, and ranged from bribing block officials in order to comer the supply of 
subsidised inputs, which could then be resold to smaller cultivators at inflated rates, to 
bribing higher officials in order to acquire contracts for public works, to buying support to 
enter politics (itself a lucrative career).
Other avenues of investment included the private construction business (as we have noted,
this is often the main reason for buying a tractor); private buses, and cinema halls. These
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phenomena are discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, ‘Patterns of Accumulation in the 
Fieldwork Area’.
Alongside these sources of accumulation, the 1980s saw the emergence of large-scale 
conspicuous consumption among the newly rich backward caste peasants. This had 
previously characterised the upper caste non-cultivating landed groups, and its rapid 
escalation among traditionally cultivating castes reflects the fact that despite the 
consolidation of 'new* agrarian classes, pre-exisiting patterns of surplus investment and 
consumption had not been swept away.
Large new two and three storey houses both in the villages and in Hilsa town, are, along 
with extravagant weddings, enormous dowries and in some cases a formidable array of 
licensed and unlicensed weapons, potent symbols of the upward mobility of a section of 
the rich peasants of the area. These are the major sources of expenditure for that group 
which has been able to consolidate the improvement in their class status afforded by 
technological change and increased yields by integrating themselves into the political and 
bureaucratic structures and networks which allow them to divert and appropriate a large 
portion of the Block’s development resources. While buying land, which remains at the 
heart of definitions of power in the area, has also been an important marker of improved 
status in the past, intensified conflict with labourers - and potential tenants - in the 1980s 
has increased the perceived risks involved and substantially decreased its popularity.
If these factors - a decline in the profitability of investment in agricultural production; 
increased access to state structures opening up new avenues of accumulation; a growing 
culture of conspicuous consumption; and increasing class conflicts - all militated against 
land concentration by the richest section of the peasantry in Hilsa, processes at work 
among the vast majority of cultivators also had implications for land distribution.
For poor and middle peasants in Hilsa, as we have seen, these same conditions have 
effectively blocked any possibilities for accumulation or land acquisition. Having been 
compelled to adopt the new technology, they have been badly affected by increased input 
costs, and by the virtual collapse of the infrastructure (both of which have been 
exacerbated by the appropriation of resources by rich peasants described above). Faced
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with chronic fragmentation of holdings through inheritance, they are becoming increasingly 
pauperised.
This in turn has intensified traditional relations of dependence of poor peasants on rich 
peasants (these are complex ones mediated by caste: see Chapter 6, 'Agricultural Labour in 
the Fieldwork Area' for a discussion). Even in villages where the latter are not engaged in 
the types of essentially non-productive accumulation described above, moneylending and 
renting out of machinery to poor peasants at high rates of return appears a better 
investment than either agricultural production or land itself, particularly when they can be 
used to cement caste and Tdsan' solidarity in periods of conflict with labourers.
Possibly the only group which has gained land is a small minority of previously landless 
agricultural labourer households who have acquired small plots for self-cultivation. This is 
significant in as far as it reduces the dependence of these dalit households on agricultural 
wage labour, and is regarded by them as representing an improvement in their social status 
(although this view is heavily contested by higher caste peasants). This has certain 
implications for 'mazdoor-kisan' class relations which have been referred to earlier. 
However, firstly, the source of savings for these land purchases is almost invariably 
non-agricultural (usually government) salaried employment, a source which has little 
likelihood of further expansion. And secondly, in economic terms these purchases have 
simply inducted more households into the ranks of the poor peasantry operating under the 
conditions described above.
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CHAPTER 6: AGRICULTURAL LABOUR IN THE FIELDWORK AREA
Introduction: Agricultural Labour in Bihar
Historically the social formation which developed in the plains of Central Bihar, potentially 
fertile but lacking substantial river irrigation, and requiring intensive application of labour, 
has had a high population density and a high proportion of 'untouchable' landless 
agricultural labourers. This overlap betweeen class and caste has remained, and it appears 
that the presence today of a class of agricultural labourers constituting 40 per cent or more 
of the population in these areas may have as much to do with continuity with pre-capitalist 
and even pre-colonial periods as with the changes which have occurred in the last three 
decades. It is the latter changes, however, which we will discuss in this chapter.
The 1991 Census recorded 37.21 per cent of all 'main workers' in Bihar as agricultural 
labourers. This was the highest proportion of agricultural labourers recorded in any major 
state with the exception of Andhra Pradesh (see Table 25).
Table 25: Percentage Distribution of Main Workers bv Occupation 
In Major States. 1991
Major States Cultivators Agricultural
Labourers
Household
Industry
Workers
Other
Workers
All Main 
Workers
Andhra Pradesh 27.76 40.76 5.04 26.44 100
Assam 51.24 12.89 2.51 33.36 100
Bihar 43.41 37.21 2.69 16.69 100
Gujarat 33.46 22.98 2.18 41.38 100
Haryana 39.38 19.53 2.99 38.1 100
Karnataka 34.36 28.75 2.81 34.08 100
Kerala 12.38 25.66 3.92 58.04 100
Madhya Pradesh 51.87 23.5 3.08 21.55 100
Maharashtra 32.81 26.91 3.07 37.21 100
Orissa 44.21 28.85 3.47 23.47 100
Punjab 32.83 23.31 2.93 40.93 100
Rajasthan 59.18 10.13 2.84 27.85 100
Tamil Nadu 24.94 34.16 4.66 36.24 100
Uttar Pradesh 52.84 19.23 4.38 23.55 100
West Bengal 28.42 24.53 4.98 42.07 100
All India 38.75 26.15 3.63 31.47 100
Source: Census of India, 1991
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However, the definition and application of the category of 'main worker1 in the Decennial 
Censuses from 1971 onwards has been widely criticised. Main workers are defined as 
those who have worked for at least six months or 183 days during the reference period of 
one year. This seems to have led to substantial underestimation of the worker-population 
ratio, and is particularly problematic in the case of agricultural labourers. According to 
preliminary estimates generated by the 1987-88 Rural Labour Enquiry surveys, agricultural 
labourers get wage employment for far less than 180 days a year on average in most parts 
of the country (Jha, 1997: 18). Further, the Report of the National Commisssion on Rural 
Labour argues that 'those who do manual labour and sell their labour power, and those 
small and marginal farmers who may be supplementing even fiveper cent of their income 
by earning wages through selling their labour power should come under the category of 
rural labour1 (cited in Jha, 1997:15). Using this definition, the estimated all-India total 
number of rural labourers in 1987-88 was approximately 156 million, almost 50 per cent 
higher than the Rural Labour Enquiry's estimate of 109.5 million for the same year.
Certain specific features of the social and economic situation in Bihar make it particularly 
likely that the 'main workers' approach leads to an underestimation of agricultural 
labourers in the state.
Firstly, a very small proportion of even those workers who are wholly dependent on 
agricultural wage labour get employment for more than 180 days per year (Prasad, 
Rodgers et al, 1988:155; see also Jha, 1997:18, for Pumea District; Bharti, 1991, for 
Gaya; this was also the case in my fieldwork area).
Secondly, Bihar has a particularly high proportion of small and marginal cultivators: 77per 
cent of operational holdings were one hectare or less, and the average size of holding was
0.3 hectares for this group of holdings in 1991-92 (Government of India, 1996a). A 
significant number of these, though enumerated as cultivators in the Census, are dependent 
on wage labour as their main source of income. Thirdly, it has been suggested that 'given 
the status hierarchy in rural Bihar', many of these small and marginal cultivators 'while 
responding to official enquiries..prefer to get categorised as cultivators and not labourers' 
(Jha, 1997:115).
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The Growth o f Agricultural Labour
A number of observers have pointed to a significant growth in the proportion of 
agricultural labour in Bihar, as in almost every State, from the early 1970s onwards 
(Vaidyanathan, 1986; Parthasarathy, 1991; Sharma, 1996). According to National Sample 
Survey data, at an all-Bihar level, the percentage of wage labour households in total rural 
households rose from 36.4 per cent in 1974-75 to 42.4 percent in 1987-88 (Unni, 
1997:454). And given low levels of rural non-farm employment, it is estimated that 
agricultural labour households constitute about 93 per cent of all rural labour households 
(Sharma, 1996:8).
Possible reasons for this growth include firstly the sharp increase in the proportion of 
marginal operational holdings, which in Bihar, as we have seen in Chapter 5, has occurred 
at the expense of all other size-groups. Secondly, the growth in the proportion of 
households which are completely landless. The proportion of landless households in total 
rural households in the state has increased from 12.22 percent in 1964-65 to 34.8 percent 
in 1987-88 (NCRL 1991 cited in Jha, 1997:112).
However, the question arises of whether these changes indicate relative dynamism or 
stagnation (or a regionally and temporally uneven combination of the two): are Bihar’s 
rural producers experiencing 'proletarianisation' or 'pauperisation'? This ambiguity has been 
highlighted by Parthasarathy in a State-wise comparison: 'if a faster pace of capitalist 
farming has contributed to the growth of wage labour in technologically leading States, 
demographic pressures and fast-declining land-man ratios have increased the proportions 
of wage labour in technologically lagging States' (Parthasarathy, 1991.A72). But it is also 
possible to identify a number of factors other than purely demographic ones which may 
contribute to an increase in agricultural wage labour, in the absence of a dynamic transition 
to capitalism or, as in the case we are considering, in the context of a 'stalled' transition. 
These factors essentially involve a decline in access to both land and non-agricultural 
income among the rural poor.
Tenancy, which, as we have seen, in Bihar overwhelmingly consists of leasing in by small
and marginal cultivators, appears to have declined sharply. The percentage of holdings
leasing in land has decreased from 19.7 per cent in 1981-82 to 7.5 per cent in 1991-92,
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while the percentage of operated area leased in has declined from 10.3 per cent to 3.9 per 
cent according to National Sample Survey data (Government of India, 1996a; see Tables 
18 and 19 in Chapter 5 above).
The reasons for this have been discussed in detail in Chapter 5, ‘Land Ownership and 
Access to Land in the Fieldwork Area’. We saw that while the figures cited for the 1990s 
suggest under-recording of tenancy, recording of tenancy may be less effective in the 
1990s precisely because of a growing tendency for tenants to be changed on a yearly basis. 
Despite the continuing failure of the state to implement land reforms legislation, the 
changing climate of agrarian relations in the 1980s has increased fears among landlords of 
tenants claiming - and being able to enforce - occupancy rights. This is one reason for 
regular switching of tenants - another is the introduction of a 'bidding' system for tenancies 
as the spread of new technology to small cultivators has enabled fixed rents to increase 
rapidly. At the same time, in some areas a genuine net decline in tenancy - and particularly 
share tenancy - may have occurred in response to organising by the rural poor. This 
phenomenon is discussed further in this chapter. In any case, the result has clearly been a 
decline in secure access to land among the poorest households, increasing their 
dependency on agricultural wage labour as a source of income.
As we have noted, other factors affecting the 'viability' of small and marginal holdings - 
apart from ongoing subdivision and fragmentation - are escalating costs of inputs, and 
lack of availability of these inputs - often as a result of their appropriation by locally 
powerful rich peasants. This increases the necessity for small cultivators to sell their labour 
power in order to survive.
In terms of non-agricultural income, changes in the structure of employment during the 
1980s, which were intensified sharply after the introduction of the New Economic Policies 
in 1991, have meant that 'rural areas have borne the brunt of the workforce restructuring 
process, with agriculture in particular reverting to its traditional role as the residual sector 
for rural bom workers who have not been able to find more productive non-farm jobs, 
either in rural areas, or in the cities' (Bhalla, 1997:222). As a result, 'real agricultural value 
added per agricultural worker dropped significantly, by over 8per cent, even if comparison 
is restricted to the years 1989-90 and 1992-93 when monsoon conditions were very 
similar1 (Sen, 1996:2466).
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Bhalla notes 'the tendency of the secondary sector in the rural workforce to stagnate or 
decline, in the years before the watershed of 1991. This reflects the collapse of 
employment in rural household industry. After 1991, not only the rural secondary sector, 
but all of non-agriculture, suffered a rout....The number of persons who settled for work in 
agriculture...is roughly four times the number who obtained work in the non-farm sectors 
from 1987-88 to 1993-94. This compares decidedly unfavourably with the numbers for the 
preceding quinquennium. From 1983 to 1987-88, roughly three times as many fresh jobs 
had been generated in non-agriculture as were generated within the farm sector.' (op 
rit.219).
While Bihar has long been characterised by relative stagnation in its sector-wise 
employment structure, Sharma suggests that figures for the period 1981-1991 indicate 
’retrogression in the employment structure of the State'. Employment in mining and 
quarrying, manufacturing, construction and transport all showed negative growth rates in 
this period, while agriculture and allied activities recorded a growth rate of 2.28 per cent, 
trade 1.83 per cent and services 5.94 per cent. 'It is also significant to note that the decline 
in the share of manufacturing is accompanied by a rise in the share of agricultural labour in 
the workforce' (Sharma, 1996:5-6) (see Table 1 in Chapter 2 above).
Further, with a large proportion of total interstate migrants in search of work originating in 
Bihar (42 per cent were from Bihar and U.P. in 1981, according to Jha [1997: 31]), the 
decline in secondary sector employment at an all-India level has inevitably hit the workers 
of these states particularly hard.
The Feminisation o f Agricultural Labour' Hypothesis
As Table 26 shows, Nalanda district has a high proportion of agricultural labourers among 
women ‘main workers’, as does Bihar as a whole. With a figure of nearly 58 per cent, 
Bihar is second only to Andhra Pradesh among major States according to the 1991 
Census. Bihar also has the second highest proportion of agricultural labourers among main 
workers of both sexes, and the highest proportion among male main workers (Table 26). 
But, as in several other States there is a striking disparity between the proportion of 
agricultural labourers
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among female main workers recorded {SI.92 per cent) and that among male main workers 
(33.02 per cent)1.
This may be partly a result of problems in enumeration which themselves stem from gender 
inequalities. In particular, evidence suggests that women’s participation in ‘cultivation’ 
(i.e. cultivating family land) is systematically under-reported. This is the case both for the 
Census and other official sources (Sharma, 1992) and is due to two major factors. Firstly, 
there is the actual underestimation of the amount of productive labour carried out by 
women - which is reinforced when this labour is not bringing in a wage. Secondly, there is 
unwillingness to acknowledge that women are participating in field labour where family 
status would be considered to be lowered by their doing so, as is the case among upper 
castes in Bihar (who in agriculture are concentrated in the ‘cultivator’ category). Thus 
more widespread under-reporting of women cultivators could lead to an overestimation of 
the proportion of agricultural labourers among female main workers.
However, it is unlikely that these enumeration problems alone could account for the extent 
of the gender disparity in participation in agricultural wage labour in Bihar. The Census 
figures underline the fact that for the vast majority of women from poor households in 
Bihar, agricultural wage labour is the only means of survival. Any discussion of the 
conditions of agricultural labourers in the State must therefore make women’s experience 
a central focus.
But while in nearly all major States the increase in the proportion of agricultural labourers 
among women main workers has been higher than that among male main workers during 
the period 1961-1991, this has not been the case in Bihar (da Corta and Venkateshwaiiu, 
1997). Bihar is one of only two States (the other is Uttar Pradesh) which has not 
undergone what has been referred to as the ‘feminisation’ of agricultural wage labour in 
this period (op cit.). It is thus worth briefly examining some of the explanations put 
forward for the 'feminisation' of agricultural wage labour at an all-India level, and
1 It should be noted that due to the very low percentage of women identified as ‘main workers' in Bihar, 
this does not imply a high female-male ratio among agricultural labourers in the State. Less than one-third 
of agricultural labourers are women according to this method of enumeration. The problems with the 
‘m ain  worker’ category used in the Census of India have been referred to earlier in this chapter. The use 
of this category does not, for example, reflect the large scale employment of women labourers during 
paddy transplanting and harvesting each of which take place over a period of less than two months.
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comparing descriptions of this process in other regions of India with the conditions 
prevailing in the fieldwork area.
A number of observers have linked 'feminisation' to technological changes which have 
brought about higher participation of women in agricultural tasks as a whole, particularly 
in the 1980s (see da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1997, for a summary of this 'neo-liberal' 
literature) In response to this 'feminisation of agriculture' hypothesis, Baneijee argues that 
the increase in women's employment was confined to five states - Andhra Pradesh, 
Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu and U.P., where 'women have been the 
traditional mainstay of three crops - paddy, sugar cane and cotton. A further intensification 
of their cultivation over this period was probably the main factor behind the additional 
work days for women. So far, there are no signs of any change in the technologies of 
cultivating these crops, so, when cultivation is intensified, women get more 
work.'(Baneijee, 1997:435)
However, other writers have argued that the significant change is the increase in rural 
women's dependence on wage labour, and agricultural labour in particular. Unni suggests 
that a fall in the percentage of days in wage employment for rural households as a whole 
reflects a diversification of earning opportunities for these households, which is however 
not shared by women: 'among men, the percentage of wage employed days declined even 
in labour households without land, but among women, it increased in such households until 
1983. Thus, while men in labour households were able to find other kinds of work, women 
remained mainly casual workers' (Unni, 1997:460). Subsequently, even in areas where 
women had been employed in the rural secondary sector, they have been pushed out on a 
massive scale by the New Economic Policies associated with liberalisation from 1991 
onwards (Bhalla 1997, Unni 1997).
Da Corta and Venkateshwarlu (1997) cite new non-agricultural employment opportunities 
for men as well as the acquisition of small plots of land by previously landless households 
resulting from state policies specific to Andhra Pradesh - in this context men withdraw 
from agricultural wage labour to cultivate their own plots while women continue to work 
on others' land.
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Choudhry (1993) refers to downward rather than upward mobility in the context of rural 
Haryana, with poor peasant households increasingly sending women out for agricultural 
labour while men continue to cultivate their own holdings or seek alternative employment.
However my observations suggest that none of these situations are likely to emerge in my 
fieldwork area or elsewhere in Central Bihar in the immediate future. Firstly, as we will see 
later in this chapter, large-scale non-agricultural employment is increasingly concentrated 
in construction and related areas such as brick-kilns, where women are generally employed 
alongside men. My survey found similar levels of participation by both men and women in 
this activity. The emergence of employment opportunities which are heavily biased 
towards men is itself an indicator of a specific pattern of development (see for example 
Sharma and Poleman, 1994, for a description of the emergence of permanent employment 
in small-scale industrial units in small towns in Western Uttar Pradesh). Such development, 
as I have argued, has in Bihar been seriously constrained by the very nature of the state’s 
institutional structures, and in the 1990s is further limited by the economic policies of the 
central government.
Secondly, in Central Bihar land redistribution by the state has been negligible; in the few 
cases where previously landless labourer households have been able to acquire small plots 
through savings or in some cases participation in collective struggles for land 
redistribution, both male and female members of such households have been compelled to 
continue to work as agricultural labourers - the only cases of withdrawal I came across 
were in fact of women.
Thirdly as we discuss in more detail in this chapter, the continuing dominance of essentially 
feudal notions about women and status in Central Bihar acts as more of a constraint on 
women performing agricultural labour than men. This is the case even for dalit households 
and is all the more applicable to poor peasants of non-dalit castes.
The Impact o f Technological Change on Labour Use
With a variety of factors intensifying the growth in numbers dependent on agricultural
labour as a source of livelihood, the question of changes in the demand for agricultural
labour becomes a vital one. Jha notes that according to the findings of the National
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Commisssion on Rural Labour (1991), 'the expansion of gross cropped area has been the 
single most important determinant of labour absorption per hectare during the 
post-independence period'.(Jha, 1997:113). But between 1960-61 and 1984-85, net sown 
area declined by 2.4 per cent and gross cropped area showed 'only a marginal increase' 
with year-to-year fluctuations at an all-Bihar level (op tit.: 112). And between 1980-81 
and 1993-94, both the net sown area and the gross cropped area have actually declined by 
approximately 13 per cent (ADRI,1997).
However since the intensity of cropping clearly has increased in certain parts of of the 
state, including my fieldwork area, since the early 1960s, it is worth looking in more detail 
at the possible impact on agricultural employment of various technological changes of the 
type which have occurred in the fieldwork area since the early 1970s.
Literature on technological changes in agricultural production has tended to make a 
distinction between labour saving' and land augmenting' agricultural technology, and this 
has been assumed to broadly correspond to farm mechanization on the one hand, and 
biological innovation on the other (e.g. Ellis, 1993; Binswanger, 1984). However, in 
reality, as we have seen, the two kinds of changes are often inextricably linked. The overall 
impact on employment can thus only be assessed if these linkages are taken into account.
Further, as Agarwal has argued, in order to assess the employment effects of agricultural 
mechanisation, it is necessary to analyse both the disaggregate effects of specific 
techniques by operations and crops, as well as aggregative, farm level effects such as 
changes in cropping intensity (Agarwal, 1978).
For example Billings and Singh (1970) found that the actual labour time required for 
irrigation when pumpsets were substituted for persian wheels was reduced by three 
quarters (a comparable reduction could be expected to apply to substitution for the manual 
labour associated with the 'ahar-pyne' irrigation system prevalent in my fieldwork region 
till the late 1960s). But this estimate did not take account of the impact of mechanised 
irrigation on the level of cropping intensity. Agarwal's study of mechanisation in Punjab 
found that tubewell irrigation, through its effects of increasing both cropping intensities 
and yields (see 'Chapter 4, ‘Agriculture Technology and Class in the Fieldwork Area'), 
generates a higher demand for labour, both in irrigation itself as well as in harvesting and
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threshing.2 In addition, seasonal peaks in labour demand are intensified and, once new 
seeds and chemical fertilisers are introduced, the tendency towards 'time-bound operations 
and tighter crop rotation' is reinforced considerably (Bardhan, 1977b: 1102).
This in turn encourages the mechanisation of other tasks. Mechanical threshers reduce the 
demand for labour (Agarwal, 1978:220, Byres, 1981:412-413). As far as tractors are 
concerned, attempts to evaluate the impact on employment of the introduction of tractors 
have been closely linked to the debate surrounding the impact of tractorisation on yields 
and cropping intensity (see Sen, 1975:154-164 and Byres, 1981: 411-420 for discussions 
of this debate).
While Hanumantha Rao (1975) argued that the technological displacement of labour is 
roughly compensated by the rise in employment mainly as a result of the increase in yield 
associated with tractor use, a more widely accepted view has been that the independent 
impact of tractorisation on yields has not been significant, with irrigation and the use of 
HYV seeds and fertilisers the main yield increasing factors (Vashishtha, 1972 cited in Sen, 
1975:163; Agarwal, 1978:223; Ellis, 1993:237-8).
In terms of cropping intensity, on the basis of a number of micro-level studies Bardhan 
(1977a) concluded that despite its potential for easing the time constraints associated with 
the 'new technology', in the context of northwest India, tractorisation had little 
independent effect on cropping intensity.
But as Byres points out, it may often be the case that ‘for a capitalist or-proto capitalist 
fanner, the full benefits of the use of biochemical inputs cannot be secured without the use 
of tractors (given a labour constraint, in terms of actual shortage of labour at the 
appropriate times or apprehension about 'labour trouble')’(Byres, 1981:414). As this 
implies, in practice one of the main incentives for introducing tractors was actually to 
reduce dependence on wage labour.3
2 In rice cultivating areas, the demand for labour for paddy transplanting also increases.
3 For instance Frankel (1971:147) quotes the Joint Director for the IADP in Palghat, Kerala in 1968-69 as 
saying that he 'could immediately dispose of an additional 1,000 (tractors)...the major source of attraction 
being not greater efficiency in farm operations but the opportunity to be rid of the labourers'.
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This decline in demand for labour would be expected to increase as tractorisation spreads 
to a wider range of operations. But in Agarwal's survey, tractor use was found to reduce 
the demand for labour substantially even though, as in our study, it was confined to 
ploughing and to a lesser extent sowing. While the study did find some increase in 
cropping intensity associated directly with tractorisation, this was 'insufficient to neutralise 
the crop-specific labour displacement effect'.(Agarwal, 1978:224)
In summary then, a survey of the existing literature suggests that the impact on the total 
volume of demand for labour hours of the type of technological changes introduced in the 
fieldwork area since the late 1960s would be as follows. The introduction of mechanised 
tubewell irrigation would be expected, as a result of its effects on cropping intensity and 
yields - and in particular in this case the introduction of HYV seeds and fertilisers - to lead 
to a net increase in total labour hours required for cultivation. The subsequent introduction 
of mechanical threshers would lead to a substantial fall in labour demand, as would the 
introduction of tractors in ploughing and sowing.
But the magnitude of these changes would depend on the cropping pattern (not only is the 
impact of mechanisation on labour demand crop-specific, but cultivation of certain crops 
may well be more extensively mechanised than others, even on the same farm)and other 
conditions prevailing in the area under discussion4. These specificities of the fieldwork area 
are dealt with in the following sections.
We are concerned here not only with changes in the total volume of demand for labour 
time, but also with changes in both numbers of people employed and the forms of wage 
labour. An example of an early study of these changes that carried out by Ashok Rudra, on 
the basis of his survey of farms in Punjab operating more than 20 acres (Rudra, 1971). 
Rudra argued that given a certain number of male family workers, the introduction of a 
tubewell and pump 'reduces somewhat the demand for permanent servants but...increases 
the demand for casual labour'.The further addition of a tractor cancelled out this increased 
demand for casual labour, while creating a demand for permanent labour (op cit.:A94).
4 Agarwal refers to soil conditions, the proportion of family labour to total labour used and the size of the 
plot as additional factors affecting labour demand measured in hours per hectare (Agarwal, 1978:220)
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Bardhan similarly argues that as mechanisation progresses one would expect to see a rising 
proportion of wage labour to be permanent, citing ‘several factors including the increased 
proportion of larger farms, their need to ensure ready availability of a certain basic amount 
of labour for the new intensive crop rotation with its time-bound peak operations, and the 
importance of the labourer’s familiarity with the machines and the specific schedule of 
operations’ (Bardhan, 1977c : 1113).
By contrast, Agarwal comes to a different conclusion in her study, in which tractorisation 
was confined to ploughing and to a lesser extent sowing, and harvesting remained manual. 
She suggests that 'tractors tend to displace mainly family labour time on small farms and 
permanent labour time on large ones...Threshers tend to displace mainly family and casual 
labour time on small farms and family and permanent labour time on large ones’ (Agarwal, 
1978:220) (see Table in Note 7).
However, while as we have suggested, existing studies of the impact of mechanisation on 
overall demand for labour hours per hectare in different parts of India can at least allow us 
to make broad predictions about its impact in the fieldwork area, the same cannot be said 
for studies of the composition of labour hours. The composition of labour demand - the 
proportions of family labour, casual wage labour and permanent wage labour hours used - 
is affected by the specific characteristics of the region under discussion far more even than 
the total demand for labour hours. In addition to the central question of cropping patterns, 
a number of interrelated factors could be expected to determine both the extent of different 
types of mechanisation, and subsequently their effects on labour composition in Central 
Bihar.
These include the extent and nature of permanent and casual labour prior to 
mechanisation; the attitude to manual labour (for women as well as men) among different 
cultivating groups; the initiatives taken by labourers themselves in relation to the forms and 
conditions of agricultural employment; and the responses of the employers to these 
initiatives. These aspects of the fieldwork area are explored below.
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1. Agricultural Labourers in the Fieldwork Area
a) Class, Caste and Gender
Notwithstanding the criticisms referred to above, we are primarily dependent on the 
Decennial Censuses for district wise-data on employment patterns. According to this 
source, the proportion of agricultural labourers in Nalanda District increased marginally 
from 41.81 per cent of total main workers in 1981, to 43.7 per cent in 1991.
In terms of caste composition, in the late 1970s agricultural labourers were distributed as 
follows at an all-Bihar level: 0.3 per cent belonged to upper castes; 34.2 per cent to middle 
castes; 39.1 per cent to Scheduled Castes; 12.4 per cent to Scheduled Tribes; and 14 per 
cent were Muslims (Ghosh and Bose, 1978). Middle castes', however, include both 
traditionally cultivating castes - the Yadavs, Kurmis and Koeris (sometimes referred to as 
'upper backward castes') and those traditionally engaged in 'jajmani' or service occupations 
who are accorded a lower caste status and are often today largely engaged in agricultural 
labour. These lower backward castes' include, for example, the Beldars of Central Bihar, 
who traditionally engaged in manual labour such as constructing irrigation works and 
today survive through performing various kinds of manual wage labour including 
agricultural labour. The terms 'mazdoor1 and 'dalit' as they have been used in movements of 
the rural poor in Central Bihar encompass these groups as well as the official 'Scheduled' 
castes.
The ANSISS/ILO study of 1981-83 found that in Central Bihar districts, households 
participating in agricultural labour comprised 1.84 per cent of upper caste households, 
26.35 per cent of 'upper backward castes', 84.74 per cent of other 'backward castes', and 
92.74 per cent of scheduled castes (Prasad, 1989). Applying these ratios to Nalanda in 
1991, when Scheduled Castes comprised 20.88 per cent of the rural population according 
to Census figures, gives us a rough estimate of 20 per cent of the rural population in the 
district as a whole belonging to scheduled caste agricultural labourer households. In terms 
of households, in a majority of the villages I surveyed in Hilsa block, including Chandkura, 
this proportion was much higher, at around 40 per cent or more (see Table 27).
The social distinction between those who perform wage labour on others' land and those
who limit themselves to the cultivation of their own holdings is an extremely sharp one
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throughout Central Bihar. For agricultural labourers in Hilsa furthermore, the correlation 
between class position and caste status is as we have seen very strong. The term 'mazdoor1 
or labourer connotes a position in both hierarchies - a 'mazdoor* is by definition low caste. 
The fact that labourers are defined, both by others and by themselves as a cohesive 
community in this sense has important implications for their ability to organise.
It is also significant that while paid labour performed by any household member on 
another's land denotes a 'mazdoor* household, it is the participation of women in such 
labour which is at the heart of the definition. As far as agriculture is concerned, only 
women of a low caste work 'outside1. (For women of the upper 'backward' castes - Kurmis, 
Koeris and Yadavs - there is no stigma attached to cultivating family holdings, but upper 
caste women are prohibited from doing any work in the fields). The pervasive - albeit 
contested - influence of feudal high caste norms in this respect is partly responsible for the 
withdrawal of women - particularly younger daughters-in-law - from paid agricultural 
labour by dalit labour households who acquire alternative sources of income and/or land. 
However an equally important factor which makes women's wage labour undesirable both 
to dalit women themselves and their families is the other side of upper caste morality - the 
sexual harassment and even rape of women labourers working in the fields which higher 
caste employers long considered their birth-right.
Altogether, it is clear that the complex notion of family 'izzat' - honour or dignity - is 
crucially affected by women participating in wage labour in Central Bihar. Bardhan 
observes that in rural India ‘work is not merely a medium of generating earnings or 
production. It is a symbol of hierarchical position, a conveyor of the value system ordering 
the village society. A woman’s work has a stronger significance for family status, and is 
thus much more closely regulated’ (Bardhan, 1986:88). This attitude appears to be more 
entrenched in Central Bihar than several accounts suggest to be the case in most of South 
India and even some other parts of the North (Kapadia, 1992, 1996, da Corta and 
Venkateshwarlu, 1997, Chowdhry,1993)5.
5 Examples from South India include Kapadia's work on Tamil Nadu (1992, 1996) and da Corta and 
Venkateshwarlu (1997) who suggest that among labourers in Andhra Pradesh, 'men's own withdrawal 
from paid work is much more important to their status than their wives’ withdrawal'. Meanwhile 
Chowdhiy has observed that in Haryana, fragmentation of holdings among non-scheduled caste cultivators 
has meant that 'status considerations' have been 'superseded' and 'it is the male, by and large, who 
continues to operate his own holding, sending out the female for wage work, while he himself might 
explore the possibility of outside employment, particularly in the urban centres.' (Chowdhry, 1993: 
A-144).
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Table 27: Distribution of households in Chandkura by caste and economic class. 
1995-96
‘Dalits’ Intermediate Castes Upper Castes
SC LBC LJBC
Yadav
UBC
Koeri
UBC
Kurmi
UBC
Other
Brahman & 
Rajput
TOTAL
Agricultural Labour 94(40.3) 14(6.0) 3 0 1 0 0 112(48.1)
Poor Peasant 10 9 7 2 13 4 0 45(19.3)
Middle Peasant 0 2 2 4 26 0 1 35(15.0)
Rich Peasant 0 0 2 1 14 0 1 18(7.7)
Landlord 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 4(1.7)
Non-Agricultural 4 7 0 0 3 4 1 19(8.2)
TOTAL 108
(46.4)
32
(13.7)
14
(6.0)
7
(3.0)
59
(25.3)
10
(4.3)
3
(1.3)
233(100)
SC=Scheduled Caste; LBC = Lower Backward Caste; UBC=Upper Backward Caste 
Source: Fieldwork
Note: Figures in brackets indicate percentage of total households in Chandkura
Key determinants of variations in the attitude to women's work seem to be twofold. 
Firstly, the extent - and durability - of pre-capitalist patriarchal relationships and the 
hegemony of upper caste ideology (for a discussion of this see Chakravarti, 1995). For 
example, in Central Bihar, the joint family, in which women are considered possessions of 
the family and repositories of its honour, prevails throughout the social spectrum and even 
among poor dalit households - 62 per cent of dalit agricultural labourer households in 
Chandkura in 1995-96 were joint households. This is in contrast, for example, to the 
situation described by Kapadia for Tamil Nadu where 'among the impoverished Pallars 
there were no joint families, only nuclear households'(Kapadia 1992:231).
Secondly the degree and nature of capitalist penetration and capitalist development. The 
latter may have a number of direct and indirect regionally specific effects on attitudes to 
women's paid labour in agriculture including classic polarisation and proletarianisation of 
poor peasants, the emergence of sources of non-agricultural employment for men, the 
collapse of the joint family or even (as the studies of South India cited above suggest) the 
collapse of the nuclear family with men withdrawing completely from family subsistence. 
For a variety of reasons, many of which are the subject of the present study, all these 
tendencies have been absent or weak in Central Bihar to date. The seclusion of women 
remains a key marker of status for the upper castes; and for lower castes, the chance to
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withdraw women from wage labour is a step towards the ‘izzat’ - dignity or honour - 
which is denied them in the caste hierarchy.
However, despite the attitudes described above, in reality few labour households can 
actually afford to prevent women from working in periods of peak labour demand, given 
the overall acute scarcity of employment. In fact, with rice the major crop, it is women’s 
paid labour which assures the employer of realising his surplus - women are solely 
responsible for the labour-intensive and time-bound tasks of weeding and transplanting, 
and play a major role in harvesting the crop. And this also means that women are at the 
forefront of agitations demanding higher wages, refusing to work en masse during the 
transplanting and harvesting seasons.
On the one hand, women as wage workers are playing a vital role in the actions which are 
at the core of the agricutural labourers’ movement; on the other, an ideology in which 
family status depends largely on women’s seclusion continues to have a powerful 
resonance. The implications of these contradictory tendencies are explored further later in 
this chapter, and in Chapter 7, ‘Patterns of Accumulation in the Fieldwork Area’.
b) Forms and Conditions o f Agricultural Labour
Agricultural wage labour in Chandkura and other villages in Hilsa takes two forms. Casual 
labourers are paid daily wages in kind, fixed in advance, except during harvesting when 
they are paid a predetermined fraction of what they harvest. Attached labourers are 
employed on one year oral contracts, but are also paid on a daily basis in kind. They 
receive a small plot (usually 10-12 katthas, approximately one third of an acre) to 
cultivate.
Male attached labourers are generally employed for non-mechanised ploughing, and in
addition carry out maintenance work in the fields such as looking after the drainage
system. They also take part in harvesting and in uprooting the paddy seedlings (a task
carried out by men during the transplanting season, while women are replanting), and in
operating mechanical threshers where these are used. Unpaid labour, such as cutting grass
and bringing in animals, existed previously but is no longer widespread. Those who employ
attached labourers in Chandkura do not give work to the women family members of male
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attached labourers for most of the year. However during transplanting and harvesting, 
these women have to carry out the work on the employer's land before accepting 
employment anywhere else, even though wage rates are often lower. In fact this 
guaranteed supply of female labour during peak periods is a key advantage of attachment 
from the employer's point of view.
It is important to note that the position of attached labourers in Chandkura is somewhat 
different from that of those in upper-caste dominated areas who are often referred to as 
'farm servants'. Under the latter system, both men and women carry out a variety of tasks 
both in the fields and in the compound. Employers in Chandkura are almost all of the 
Kurmi caste and almost universally the men engage in cultivation themselves: labourers, 
whether attached or casual, are employed only for specific tasks in the fields. This also 
means that even male attached labourers only receive a maximum total of six months work 
per year. And while attached labourers can (and in fact are usually compelled to) seek 
other employment when there is no work at all provided by their employer, unlike casual 
labourers they are not 'free' to do so in periods when there is some work to be done, but 
not enough to earn a daily wage. As we will see, this has been one of several reasons for 
labourers preferring casual labour in the context of changing patterns of non-agricultural 
employment.
While the employer generally provides the seeds and sometimes also the plough and 
bullocks for the cultivation of the attached labourer's plot, the labourers provide all other 
inputs, including fertilisers and diesel pumpsets which they hire from the employer at 
standard rates. This is in contrast to the situation observed in 1981-82 when it was found 
that electric powered tubewell irrigation was provided free by employers to attached 
labourers, and was seen as one of the mechanisms through which attachment was 
reinforced.(Prasad, Rodgers et al, 1988: 538)
c) The Changing Nature o f Interlocked Relationships
People who had been attached labourers in the past described the classic interlocking of 
loan and labour markets in which on entering a contract they were given a sum of money 
and made to put a thumb print on an 'agreement' according to which the loan' along with
unspecified amounts of interest had to be paid back before they could leave the employer.
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In 1995-96 however attached labourers were not automatically given loans by their 
employers. Approximately 31 per cent of attached labourers as compared to 15 per cent of 
casual labourers took loans from Hasans' currently employing them. Several attached 
labourers stated that they took loans (usually between RslOO and Rs300) only if they 
needed them for an emergency such as illness or a funeral. These loans were subject to the 
same interest rates (six per cent per month) as other loans given by 'kisans' to 'mazdoors', 
but did not require collateral. However until these loans were paid back (with interest) the 
labourers could not leave the employer. In some villages crops from the allotted land were 
seized by the landowner if the labourer defaulted on the loan at the end of the year. In 
Chandkura however the most significant factor preventing labourers from defaulting on 
loans was the fact that if they did so they would not be able to get further credit in 
emergencies from any of the Hasans' in the village6.
In fact there appears to have been a shift from highly personalised interlocked relationships 
between individual households to a more generalised relation of dependence of agricultural 
labourers on a small group of potential creditors and employers. But the element of control 
by one class over another in this relationship remains strong. The large landowners of the 
village are the primary source of credit as well as employment for all the agricultural 
labourers of the village, whether casual or attached. Credit available to them from other 
sources, generally moneylenders and gold merchants in Hilsa town, is on substantially less 
favourable terms. However, interest is always charged in such Hrisan-mazdoor' 
transactions. In contrast, smaller cultivators of the Kurmi caste can often get loans 
interest-free from larger ones. As we will see, these relationships become particularly 
significant in periods when class contradictions intensify.
d) Changes in Labour Demand and Composition o f Agricultural Labour
While we do not have information on the precise extent of attached labour in Chandkura in 
the late 1960s, it is evident that the 1970s saw a substantial decline in the proportion of 
labourers who were attached throughout Hilsa. A large proportion of agricultural 
labourers describe being bonded' in the 1960s or can recall their parents working under
6 In a study of rural credit markets in Western Orissa, Sarap describes ‘the threat of loss of future 
borrowing opportunity for the poorer households’ as a ‘collateral substitute’, noting that ‘in a small and 
immobile rural community the news of wilful default of borrowers can be quickly transmitted to most of 
the potential lenders’(Sarap, 1987:94)
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these conditions. By 1981-82, 59 per cent of agricultural labourer households had no 
members working as attached labourers. Technological change is clearly a key factor 
determining this shift. As noted above, similar changes in the structure of labour demand 
have been observed elsewhere in India in the context of the introduction of tubewell 
irrigation. The changes in cropping patterns and the spread of HYVs which accompanied 
tubewell irrigation increased demand for labour, but intensified seasonal peaks in this 
demand. This generated a shift away from permanent labour to casual labour.
Subsequently there was some displacement of both casual and permanent labour through 
the adoption of threshers, which are now used by approximately 29 per cent of cultivators 
in Chandkura. The main labour-intensive tasks of harvesting and paddy transplanting 
continued (and still continue) to be performed manually by casual labourers. Thus the large 
scale displacement of casual labour and the increased proportion of permanent labourers 
employed to operate machinery predicted earlier (see for example Bardhan 1977c) did not 
take place in the fieldwork area.
In fact even the limited introduction of tractors which occurred in the area in the latter half 
of the 1970s, did not, as elsewhere, mean the employment of permanent labourers whose 
work included driving them. In households which had previously employed a male 
permanent labourer ('halwaha') whose principle task was ploughing with bullocks, the 
power tiller or tractor was often operated by a male family member. In other villages in 
Hilsa with landowners belonging to upper castes, it was observed that even those castes 
who traditionally refuse to perform manual labour - ploughing in particular - did not 
consider tractor driving demeaning. However, owners of large tractors often employed 
drivers. Tractor drivers in Hilsa are generally, like their owners, from cultivating Kurmi 
families, they receive a monthly salary of Rs 500-700, and do not identify themselves in 
any way as agricultural labourers. In any case, as we have seen, tractor driving is not 
exclusively, or even primarily an agricultural occupation in Hilsa.
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Overall, therefore, the impact of the appearance of tractors and power tillers has been a 
decline in total labour demand, and specifically demand for permanent labour7.
However, the major impact of these processes had already been felt by the time the first 
study of Chandkura took place in 1981-82. Although there has been a further extension of 
irrigation during the last fifteen years, this has been largely a result of the adoption of 
diesel pumpset irrigation by small and marginal cultivators. The proportion of family 
labour in total labour used tends to be higher for these households. As Table 28 shows, on 
average, smaller landholdings in Chandkura have a greater number of both male and 
female family workers per acre cultivated in comparison to larger holdings. These 
households have never employed permanent labourers; in fact, many hire out both male 
and female labour. While their adoption of the new technology has increased their labour 
requirements during peak seasons, many of them meet these additional needs by 
exchanging labour, particularly women’s labour, with other similar households, rather than 
hiring in casual labour*. Those small and marginal cultivators who hire in tractors do not 
displace wage labour but family labour in doing so. Thus the impact of the second, 
post-electricity phase of extension of irrigation has had relatively little impact on the
7 The following table shows the direction of changes in demand for labour which were found to take place 
as a result of the introduction of tubewells, tractors and threshers, in two important studies from the 1970s 
(both referring to Punjab) discussed earlier in this chapter, and in the present study.
Impart on total labour demand and use of permanent and casual wage labour
bv tvne of mechanisation
Type of 
mechanisation
Name of Study Total Labour 
Demand
Use of
Permanent Labour
Use of Casual 
Labour
Tubewell Punjab 1 (Rudra) increases decreases increases
Punjab 2(Agarwal) increases increases increases
m arg in a lly
Chandkura increases decreases increases
Thresher Punjab 1 (Rudra) n.a. n.a. n.a.
Punjab 2(Agarwal) decreases decreases decreases
Chandkura decreases decreases decreases
Tractor Punjab l(Rudra) decreases increases decreases
Punjab 2 
(Agarwal)
decreases decreases no change
Chandkura decreases decreases decreases
Sources:
Punjab 1: Rudra, 1971; Punjab 2: Agarwal, 1978; Chandkura: fieldwork
Note: In all three cases, it is assumed that tractors and/or threshers are introduced subsequent to the
introduction of tubewell irrigation.
8 Bharadwaj has pointed out that for small cultivators hiring in labour, wage rates, like hire of equipment, 
may be higher. This is due in particular to the fact that small farmers hire in during peak seasons and the 
‘diseconomies of buying inputs in small quantities’ (Bharadwaj, 1974b:62). Exchange of labour is a way of 
counteracting this effect.
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structure and extent of demand for wage labour in Chandkura. If anything, the 
proliferation of small and marginal holdings at the expense of larger ones, which, as we 
have seen, occurred during the same period, may have slightly reduced the overall demand 
for wage labour.
Table 28; Use of Adult Family Labour (persons per acre! in Cultivation bv Size of 
Operated Landholding in Chandkura. 1995-96
Land Operated Mean adult family 
members cultivating 
(persons/acre 
cultivated)
Mean male adult 
family members 
cultivating 
(persons/acre 
cultivated)
Mean female adult 
family members 
cultivating 
(persons/acre 
cultivated)
less than 0.5 acres 3.8 2.4 1.4
0.5 - 0.99 acres 4.3 2.7 1.6
1 - 2.49 acres 2.8 1.5 1.3
2.5 - 4.99 acres 1.7 0.9 0.8
5-10  acres 0.7 0.4 0.3
10 acres and above 0.4 0.3 0.1
All landholdings 2.9 1.7 1.2
Source: Fieldwork
Further changes in the cropping pattern in this period have also been limited so far in their 
effects on demand for labour. As we have noted, onion growing has increased even in the 
smallest landholding size categories. Cultivation of onions requires intensive labour, and 
operations are extremely time-bound. This means that even the smallest cultivators, who 
do not employ labour at any other time, have to employ wage labour for weeding and 
harvesting the onions. Further increases could have important effects on the structure of 
demand for labour within the village: weeding is performed entirely by women, and is paid 
at the same rate as paddy transplantation. However onions are also a very capital intensive 
crop - requiring larger applications of fertilisers, pesticides and in particular irrigation than 
any other crop (onions need 12 to 13 waterings as compared to two waterings for wheat). 
Given the constraints described earlier, it seems unlikely that in this area there will be a 
rapid expansion beyond current levels in the immediate future.
The other crop which has seen considerable expansion during the last fifteen years, wheat, 
by contrast, mainly provides male employment in ploughing and sowing during the rabi 
season when it is grown, particularly as threshing is partially mechanised. However this too
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has not been sufficient to change the basic pattern of demand for labour which provides a 
maximum of six months regular employment, peaking in July/August when kharif paddy is 
transplanted by women labourers, and November/December when it is harvested.
In summary, the period from the introduction of mechanised irrigation in the late 1960s 
until 1981-82 was one which saw an overall expansion in the total demand for wage 
labour, and an increase in the ratio of casual labour hours to permanent labour hours hired 
in. In the 1970s, the limited introduction of threshers led to some displacement of both 
permanent and casual labour, while the adoption of tractors by a small number of larger 
cultivators led to some further displacement of permanent labourers.
The pace of mechanisation from 1981-82 until 1995-96 has been much slower. This period 
has seen the adoption of mechanised irrigation by small and marginal cultivators. However, 
due to the greater use of family labour and exchange labour among these households, the 
impact on demand for wage labour has been limited. In fact, the proliferation of such 
holdings at the expense of larger cultivators may have led to some reduction in overall 
demand for wage labour. The impact of the use of tractors among the smallest size-groups 
of landholdings on demand for wage labour has not been significant. While changes in 
cropping patterns, particularly increased wheat and onion cultivation, may lead to further 
changes in the extent and structure of demand for wage labour in the future, they have not 
been of a sufficient magnitude to do so in this period.
Yet from the point of view of agricultural labourers in Chandkura, it is the 1980s and 
1990s which have seen the most significant improvements in both the conditions of 
agricultural labour and relationships between employers and labourers in the village. A 
central reason for this has been the forms of class action which emerged and developed 
during this period. This is discussed in detail in the second half of this chapter, 
‘Agricultural Labourers’ Struggles in Hilsa’. Other changes which are occurring beyond 
the confines of the village have also had a significant impact: in particular, changes in the 
alternative sources of employment available to households who engage in agricultural 
labour.
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e) Alternative Sources o f Employment fo r Rural Labour Households
There have been a number of changes in the pattern of non-agricultural employment 
available to labouring households in Hilsa during the 1980s and 1990s.
The ANSISS/ILO survey of 1981-83 found 'a number of caste groups like barber, 
carpenter, kahar (palanquin bearer) and teli(oil presser) who are still engaged in their caste 
occupations' in Chandkura (Prasad, Rodgers et al, 1988:86). However, 72.7 per cent of 
those belonging to these castes also engaged in agricultural wage labour, and the 
remainder in cultivation, confirming the testimony of the older generation in the village 
that the main decline in income from these 'jajmani' (service) occupations had occurred 
earlier.
Nalanda district has not been an area of high outmigration in comparison to other parts of 
Bihar. The ANSISS/ILO survey found that for the villages surveyed in Nalanda, only 8 per 
cent of all households had outmigrant members, compared to 17 per cent at an all-Bihar 
level (Prasad, Rodgers et al, 1988: 136). (The incidence of migration did not however vary 
widely across classes although the type of work carried out by migrants from different 
classes was very different, [op tit. : 125]) But from the point of view of labour households 
in this area, in the 1970s and 1980s migration represented the main possibility for 
non-agricultural employment.
In Hilsa there were three main types of migration open to these households9. Firstly, there 
was migration to Calcutta and the surrounding area for work in jute mills. Although the 
Magadh region of Central Bihar which includes Nalanda has historically been a less 
important source of Bihari workers for the jute mills of Bengal than the Bhojpur region (de 
Haan, 1997), it still provided considerable numbers. However, with the decline of the jute 
industry in the 1980s and 1990s, this is no longer a significant source of employment in 
Hilsa. In 1995-96, only two households in Chandkura had members who were currently 
jute mill workers, although there were a number of men in the village who had retired from
this work._______________________________________________________________
9 In comparison to North Bihar, there has been relatively little 'rural-to-rural' migration from Central 
Bihar to work in agriculture in Punjab and Haryana. But I was told of the recent emergence of such 
migration from areas of Bhojpur district in Central Bihar, where class conflicts have become very acute.
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Secondly, and this was a much more recent phenomenon which emerged in the 1980s, men 
migrated to work in small factories in Punjab, Haryana, U.P. and the Delhi area. These 
were small scale units such as metal processing or furniture making, based in small urban 
centres rather than big cities. Men doing these jobs stayed away for periods ranging from 
five months to one year. Earnings could vary between Rs 300 to Rs 1,000 per month, out 
of which all living expenses had to be met. It was generally felt that the harsh working 
conditions together with isolation made it difficult to continue with such work for long 
periods. We do not have data on the extent of such migration in different periods. But in 
the light of the sharp decline in employment in the secondary sector I would hypothesise 
that this source of employment is a declining one.
The third type of migration involved both men and women going to work as construction 
labour or loaders or in brick kilns elsewhere in Central Bihar. This is the only type of 
migration which has not declined. In fact there appears to be a growing trend of groups of 
women or whole families migrating further afield to Haryana, Punjab and Kanpur (U.P.) to 
work in brick kilns. Where entire families migrate, they sometimes leave in September or 
October, and only return in July, when there is work available - mainly for women - in 
paddy transplanting. This type of migration was prevalent in several villages surveyed in 
1995-96. Labourers said that one of the reasons was that in the wake of struggles over 
wages, local landowners were refusing to give them consumption loans, which had enabled 
them to survive the lean season in the village in the past (see below). However, this 
particular type of long-distance migration did not take place in Chandkura at the time of 
my survey.10
An important point to note is that both the first two types of migration - to jute mills and 
to small factories in Northwestern India - involved mainly young men. In the latter case in 
particular, it involved those who were educated, including graduates, but had been unable 
to find government jobs. The cutting off of these 'escape routes' has meant that increasing 
numbers of young male graduates are remaining in the village, and trying to make a living 
through agricultural labour. For example, in Chandkura in 1995-96, about eight
10Migration patterns are often extremely localised. As well as inter-village uneveness in wage rates and 
other socio-economic conditions, this is obviously partially to do with systems of recruitment and the 
dissemination of information about possibilities for employment, which have been analysed in depth by 
Breman (1978) and others. Chandkura was a village with relatively low outmigration overall.
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households (approximately 7 per cent of agricultural labour households) had members who 
were university graduates working as agricultural labourers (all were male). Many more 
young male labourers had stayed on at school in the hope of getting a government job - 
several told me that because of this they had not learnt to plough or to carry heavy 
headloads and this meant that their earning capacity was actually lower. This section of 
agricultural labourers have in many cases been drawn to the CPI(ML) and emerged as 
articulate village level leaders of movements for higher wages and land redistribution and 
against caste-based forms of oppression.
Today the most important source of employment outside the village for both men and 
women is daily wage labour on construction sites in neighbouring villages or in Hilsa town. 
This is now an important source of income during the lean season for the majority of 
agricultural labour households. As Bhalla points out, construction is a 'residual sector1 to 
which 'underemployed workers gravitate...as a last resort' (Bhalla, 1997). Jha (1997:45) 
refers to the use of the term 'distress diversification' to describe the movement of 
agricultural labour household members into low productivity/low earning non-agricultural 
work of this type.
In addition, several men from agricultural labour families in the village have become 
'rajmistris' or masons during the last fifteen years and this is now a significant source of 
income for their families, although household members still participate in agricultural 
labour during peak seasons. My survey also found that in 1995-96, about one quarter of 
'jajmani' caste households were no longer participating in agriculture at all. But this again 
was the result of an increase in construction and loading work rather than a revival of 
'traditional' occupations.
The boom in construction has been mainly the result of the investment of the agrarian 
surpluses generated in the 1970s and early 1980s in 'conspicuous consumption'. Large new 
two and three storey houses both in the villages and in Hilsa town, are, along with 
extravagant weddings, enormous dowries and in some cases a formidable array of licensed 
and unlicensed weapons, potent symbols of the upward mobility of a section of the rich 
peasants of the area. These are the major sources of expenditure for that group which has 
been able to consolidate the improvement in their class status afforded by technological 
change and increased yields by integrating themselves into the political and bureaucratic
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structures and networks which allow them to divert and appropriate a large portion of the 
Block's development resources. As this suggests, the growth of employment in the 
construction sector does not indicate the presence of the kind of productive investment 
which could be expected to create more diverse opportunities for non-agricultural 
employment in rural Central Bihar. Clearly too, the situation is not a stable one and 
construction work itself is liable to dry up as quickly as it proliferated.
The labour market in Chandkura has never of course been completely isolated, and it has 
long been common practice for casual agricultural labourers to occasionally work for 
employers in adjacent villages. In fact, this mobility, as well as the physical proximity of 
villages which are often less than a kilometre apart, has been a key factor in determining 
the impact of class conflicts. But a more recent development for agricultural labourers in 
Hilsa has been the increased demand for labourers for large-scale potato and onion 
cultivation in the Jalla area of neighbouring Patna district. In Chandkura, agents come to 
the village and recruit men in groups of ten or twenty for the potato harvest in March and 
the onion harvest in April. In a number of other villages however, whole families go to 
Patna district for a period of two to four months between January and April. They 
construct their own shelters on the land of the rich peasant employers. During this period 
each adult can earn between Rs 25 and Rs 40 daily.
Thus both of the major types of employment which were available to rural labour 
households outside their own villages in 1995-96, construction work and contract 
agricultural work, take place in nearby areas, are relatively short term, and are generally 
engaged in by both women and men. The change in the nature of employment available has 
several implications.
Firstly, whereas earlier forms of non-agricultural employment involved long-distance 
migration, and essentially removed a small number of people from the socio-economic 
arena of the village for long periods, today non-agricultural employment is engaged in by a 
far greater proportion of labouring households, but can only offer a secondary source of 
income. Whereas previously it was seen an escape route, as we will see today the 
availability of local construction work in particular has helped labourers to demand higher 
wages for agricultural labour from employers in the village, by allowing them to sustain 
long disputes.
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Secondly, the emergence of contract work in a neighbouring district has had a direct 
impact on the expectations of agricultural labourers by providing an example of the 
possibility for earning more within the agricultural sector itself
Thirdly, both these types of employment involve labourers being exploited by employers 
from the same class and caste as the village landowners. Thus it has intensified rather than 
defusing contradictions between labourers and employers in the village. For example dalit 
labourers in Bhokila described how one of them had been taken to another village to work 
on the construction of a new house for a local rich peasant landowner. A wall collapsed 
killing the young man. The landowner brought back the body and told his father that he 
had died of dysentry. But they found out what had really happened and this led to a 
campaign to have the landowner prosecuted (this ultimately failed due to the witnesses' 
fear of retaliation).
Fourthly, the participation of women and/or entire families rather than lone men in these 
activities means that the additional income has a greater impact on household consumption 
levels: as a number of studies have shown, women invariably spend a greater proportion of 
their earnings on family necessities (e.g. Kelkar and Gala, 1990:101, Agarwal 
1994:28-29). Women's participation also reinforces all the effects described above, making 
alternative sources of earning more directly comparable with those in the village. And the 
availability of alternative sources of employment for women workers has a particularly 
important effect on disputes during periods of peak labour demand for agricultural 
operations in the village, since it is women's labour which is most in demand at these times.
Apart from increasing the bargaining power and confidence of labourers, strengthening 
their aversion to unequal relations based on caste, and intensifying class contradictions, the 
increased availability of work outside the village in 1995-96 meant that agricultural 
labourers in Chandkura felt that their earning capacity was now substantially greater if they 
were unattached and free to take up both non-agricultural casual daily labour and 
agricultural contract work. This is despite the fact that permanent labourer households 
carried out an average of 94 more persondays local agricultural wage labour per household 
in a year.
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However, it is important to note that even in the case of unattached workers, local 
agricultural wage labour remained their primary source of income, and improving the 
conditions of this labour was a major concern. As I have suggested, one of the most 
significant effects of the growth in construction work in Hilsa was that it helped labourers 
to sustain long disputes with agricultural employers. These struggles are discussed in more 
detail below.
2. Agricultural Labourers' Struggles in Hilsa
a) Issues and Strategies
While there are a number of earlier instances of agricultural labourers in Hilsa organising 
to demand basic improvements in the conditions of their lives, during the 1980s these 
struggles entered a new and more concerted phase with the emergence of the movement 
led by the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist).
Agitations led by the CPI(ML) began in Hilsa in 1979. As elsewhere in Bihar, the base and 
local leadership of the party was drawn from among the mainly dalit landless agricultural 
labourers and poor peasants. The main focus of the movement in its intial phase was 
wages, forced attachment of labour through debt, and caste-based or 'social' oppression. In 
several villages, mobilisation began around women's resistance to rapists of the higher 
caste landed classes.
While this movement had direct links with earlier struggles which had taken place 
elsewhere in central Bihar in the early 1970s, the catalyst for its emergence in this area at 
this juncture was the visibly growing profits of a section of the rich peasantiy, which had 
not been paralleled by an increase in the wages of labourers. As a local activist of the 
movement explained, 'here we don't have landlords owning hundreds of acres as in some 
other parts of Bihar, but the rich peasants, the new economic class, are exploiting people 
brutally, and they are a target of our struggle. They are attacking women, attacking 
labourers. They have supported the big landowners - like the mahants - against our 
movement.'11_____________________________________________________________
11A number of large tracts of land in this area are owned by religious trusts or 'maths' - the priests who 
control them are known as 'mahants'. In Hilsa, there are two major mahants: Swami Harinarain Anand, 
President of the All-India Sadhu Samaj, and Shamsundar Das Mahant, who controls approximately 1,500
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Nor had there been a decline in the everyday experiences of humiliation and brutality faced 
by the dalit rural poor - and particularly dalit women - at the hands of the economically 
powerful higher castes. In fact this type of coercion had intensified as opportunities for 
rapid accumulation by the richer landowners grew and contradictions with labourers 
sharpened, and was increasingly occurring even in villages which, dominated by backward 
caste' cultivating landowners, had been relatively free of the extremes of feudal oppression.
As the authors of one of the few published accounts of this phase of the movement put it, 
'ironically, the very sections of the better-off backward caste tenants which once provided 
the backbone of the erstwhile Kisan Sabha movement, have now transformed themselves 
into kulaks and are ofien found to be more aggressive than others against agricultural 
labourers demanding increased wages'(CPI(ML), 1986:47).
By 1980 a wave of strikes had begun, demanding an increase in wages. In a survey of 12 
villages in the block where wage-related struggles had occurred, I found that in all these 
villages, strikes often lasting from the period of rice transplanting in July/August until the 
harvest in November/December, had taken place between 1980 and 1988. In all except one 
case, it was these struggles which had established the wage rate for casual labour which 
still predominates in the area, 2kg rice and 0.5kg sattu12, with or without a 250gm 'nasta' 
(breakfast), and one out of every twelve to fifteen bundles harvested. Often strikes had 
taken place in tens of villages simultaneously, and this was a key factor in preventing the 
employers from bringing in labour from other villages. Meanwhile in some villages, the 
labourers were able to negotiate a wage rise with the employers without going on strike 
after wages had increased in neighbouring villages. This was the case in Chandkura, where 
wages increased in 1988.
During these struggles, demands were also raised relating to the attachment of labour by
employers. It was then still common for employers to give loans to permanent labourers in
acres across Bihar. In a CPI(ML)-led action on 23 August 1992, about 4,000 local people armed with 
traditional weapons such as sickles and knives marched onto and occupied a 200 acre stretch of land in 
Hilsa controlled by Shamsundar Das Mahant, planting red flags on it
12 Sattu is a flour usually made from ground gram, which is mixed with water to make a type of porridge 
(also known as sattu) which is a staple in the diet of the poor in much of Bihar.
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order to compel them to remain working indefinitely for lower wages, ostensibly to pay off 
an ever-growing debt. The movement advised labourers not to take such loans if they 
could avoid it, and demanded that all such debts should be cancelled. This was one of the 
major factors which led to the virtual disappearance of long-term attached labour, which 
had previously lasted entire lifetimes. However as we will see, one of the responses of 
employers in many villages to labourers organising in general, and to the resulting decline 
in debt bondage in particular, has been to withdraw from the credit market, refusing to 
give loans to labourers altogether.
Struggles for land redistribution were launched in this block a few years later, focussing on 
two main types of land seizure - that of ‘gair mazarua’ (government and public commons) 
land occupied - and often left uncultivated - by the larger landowners of the village, and 
that of sections of the huge tracts of land controlled by religious trusts or 'Maths' (see Note 
11). These campaigns generated a response which had as much to do with the threat posed 
to the authority of the dominant classes as with the actual land at stake.
For example, in Baradih, one of the villages in my survey, 19 acres illegally occupied by 
large landowners were seized in 1982. One night the dalit ‘tola’ of the village was invaded 
by armed members of the Kurmi landowners’ army, the Bhoomi Sena (see below). The hut 
of a family belonging to the Bhuniya scheduled caste who had been active supporters of 
the movement was set alight with the occupants inside. The family only just managed to 
escape with their lives. But the police refused to take any action against the culprits.13
As well as organising armed attacks - supported by the police - on the labourers and poor 
peasants, the landowners used the mechanism of conceitedly denying them access to key 
resources. Thus for example in Bairiganj, where the landowners are Awadhia Kurmis who 
do not engage in cultivation, at the height of a struggle to capture vested land, landowners
13The relationship between dominant landowners and the state apparatuses is explored in Chapter 7 below. 
Chaudhry gives the following illustration: ‘on October 22, 1981, the Bhoomi Sena held an armed 
demonstration of about 3,000 people in defiance of prohibitory orders... The police was not only escorting 
this illegal procession but was even distributing pamphlets and raising slogans. This armed procession of 
landlords...included Diwaker Sharma and Jaiprakash Singh of Congress(I), Subhas Chandra Singh, 
vice-president of the Patna district BJP and Siddeshwar Singh of the CPI. Lok Dal activists were also 
reported to have been present in the procession’(Chaudhry, 1988:55). Even more explicit was police 
collaboration in the massacre at Ekwari, Bhojpur carried out by the Ranvir Sena on 10 April 1997. The 
police accompanied the Ranvir Sena men around the village, knocked at the doors of poor dalit households 
in the village and got them opened on the pretext of making enquiries, allowing the Ranvir Sena men to 
enter the houses and kill those inside.
182
tried to physically prevent the labourers from leaving the village, even setting up barricades 
on the roads out of the village and manning them with arms. At the same time they 
imposed a ’social boycott’ by denying them their established right to graze their cattle and 
cut grass in the landowners' fields.
One section of landowners in Hilsa formed the 'Kshetriyta Kisan Mahasangh', an armed 
organisation which conducted attacks on several villages and killed a number of poor 
peasants and agricultural labourers. The CPI(ML) responded with a combination of armed 
resistance, measures aimed at benefitting small Kurmi cultivators such as laying a canal and 
constructing a dam on the Lokayan river, and negotiations with 'middle peasants and a 
section of rich peasants' (CPI(ML), 1986:149), and by 1982-3 the Mahasangh had 
collapsed.
However large landowners of Nalanda district also took part in one of the most prominent 
of the 'private armies' or 'senas', the Bhoomi Sena, a Rurmi organisation formed in 1982 
which operated in Patna, Gaya, Jehanabad and Nalanda districts. The Bhoomi Sena 
continued until the late 1980s, when it collapsed after key figures were targetted by armed 
squads of the CPI(ML) and several others were given life sentences as the main accused in 
the 1980 Pipra massacre in Patna district (carried out by an earlier incarnation, the Kisan 
Suraksha Samiti) in which fourteen labourers and poor peasants from both dalit and Kurmi 
castes were killed (Chaudhry, 1988; Patnaik, 1990; Bhatia, 1997a). Both these 'senas' 
however were dominated by the Awadhia Kurmi landlords, who had withdrawn from 
cultivation.
The Bhoomi Sena's activities have been described as follows: 'during 1982-85, they killed 
at least 65 persons, mostly rural poor...set 216 houses ablaze, and drove out 325 families 
from 13 villages of Poonpoon, Naubatpur and Masaurhi blocks. In the process, their heavy 
hand fell on their caste brethren also. They used to extort a massive amount of levy from 
Kurmi peasants, and also used to force them to provide shelters, chicken, liquor, and at 
times even women. And the Kurmis who sided with the peasant movement were simply 
done away with..'(CPI(ML), 1986:75)
However, the Bhoomi Sena also used subtler methods to try to gain the support of all
sections of Kurmis: 'To a rich, well-to-do Kurmi peasant, they would say, "the life liberty
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and property of the Kurmis is at stake. What remains in our life if there is no prestige and 
dignity?". And to the middle peasants or other middle strata the approach would be 
somewhat different: "You see, input costs are rising and you are the worst sufferers. And 
these Naxalites are instigating the labourers to demand higher wages. Those who are 
well-to-do can afford higher wages, but you will be ruined" '(op cit. :74).
As this implies, a key aspect determining the success or failure of landowners in resisting 
the movement's demands was the ability of the dominant landowners to mobilise smaller 
non-dalit cultivators behind them. Possibly the single most important factor in doing this 
was caste solidarity; in Kurmi dominated areas, the closely related 'kisan' identity was also 
extremely potent. But as we have seen, there are relations of dependence of smaller upon 
larger cultivators in both input and credit markets which have also often helped them to 
secure this support. This is despite the fact that CPI(ML) led movements have as a matter 
of policy avoided targetting smaller cultivators or 'middle peasants', whom they view as 
potential allies.
For example in Murarpur village in Hilsa, one of the villages in my survey which had a 
history of intense wage struggles, the most recent strike had occurred in 1995, beginning 
on 3 August during paddy transplanting and ending during the rice harvest, on 22 
November. The labourers had deliberately targetted only the big landowners, and were 
prepared to work for the smaller ones. But the big landowners were able to put pressure 
on the smaller peasants, some of whom owned less than an acre, to also stop cultivation. 
They did this in order to both cut off all sources of employment for the labourers in the 
village, and to extend the range of those who suffered economically as a result of the strike 
to small cultivators.
In this case, labourers were able to find work in neighbouring villages, and the strike 
ultimately was successful in increasing wages paid by the main employers in the village. 
However, for agricultural labourers, the challenge of 'building solid unity with middle 
peasants', which is still viewed as 'a question of decisive importance in tilting the balance in 
favour of agrarian revolution' by the CPI(ML) (op cit.:48; CPI(ML), 1997) remains a 
difficult one.
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b) Women's participation
Women played a central role in all the struggles described here. On the one hand, strikes 
took place during the periods of peak labour demand - paddy transplanting, which only 
women are considered capable of doing, and paddy harvesting, in which women 
participate heavily. It was therefore women who initially placed wage demands before 
employers, and subsequently collectively refused to work. Women labourers in one village 
dominated by upper caste Bhumihar landowners related how, faced with losing the entire 
paddy crop during a strike, the employers frantically summoned home all the available 
males of their families from the towns - but still would not break the taboo on Bhumihar 
women working in the fields. However, as everyone knows, the women said, men can 
never do a good job of transplanting and they still lost a lot of the crop.
Women have also led marches of thousands to physically occupy land for redistribution, 
and have been at the forefront of resistance and protest against the repression unleashed by 
the landowners and the police. It is women who, armed with bricks, small scythes or 
houshold utensils, have driven the police out of their villages when they have arrived 
heavily armed in midnight or dawn raids, or who have surrounded police jeeps and 
snatched back those arrested, even forcing the police to apologise in some instances.14
Women who had participated in such struggles often referred to women’s courage and 
determination, that they were ’prepared to fire a gun’ if necessary. Because of the 
movement’s focus on rape and sexual harassment by upper castes, they perceived these 
struggles as primarily struggles for their own dignity.
At the same time, these women's involvement has led to their challenging oppressive 
domestic relations. These challenges have focussed on domestic violence, cases of 
abandonment of women by husbands, and the increasing incidence of dowry (for a 
discussion of dowry and its growth among poor dalit households, see Chapter 7). They
14 A recent instance of this occurred in Bargaon village in Bhojpur district in the wake of the Lakshmanpur 
Bathe massacre perpetrated by the Ranvir Sena. Police entered the village in the early morning with the 
intention of arresting some local CPI(ML) activists. They were observed by three women in the fields on 
the outskirts of the village. They alerted others and within minutes 70 or 80 women had surrounded the 
police and prevented them from taking anyone away for several hours (in this case the police finally 
succeeded in making the arrests but only after radioing for reinforcements from several police camps 
which were nearby).
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spring from a wider questioning of unequal relationships between men and women within 
the family. As Savitri Devi, a woman labourer attending the Jehanabad District Kisan 
Sabha (Peasant Association) conference in 1994 explained while introducing a song 
entitled ‘give women respect in society’ : ‘a woman gets up in the morning, she has to 
wash the utensils, take the children out to relieve themselves, prepare the meal...the man 
just gets up, goes to relieve himself, comes back and if the food isn’t ready, he’ll start 
beating her’.
The question of gender inequality within the family remains a contested area for the 
movement at a local level, with many village-level male activists continuing to believe that 
such issues should not be within the scope of the movement, even while the All-India 
Progressive Women's Association, (AIPWA), which is linked to the CPI(ML), is trying to 
strengthen its network at the village level to take up questions of women's oppression.
The practice of paying women labourers less than their male counterparts prevails 
throughout Central Bihar. According to AWI data, at an all-Bihar level, wage rates of 
female agricultural labourers as a percentage of wage rates of male agricultural labourers 
rose fairly steadily from 81 per cent in 1970-71 to 93 per cent in 1984-85 (calculated from 
Jose, 1988:A48-A49) However the reliability of the Bihar AWI data appears doubtful: Jha 
points out that wage rates reported for female agricultural labour were higher than that of 
their male counterparts in 17.8per cent of the total data on sowing and weeding 
operations, and in 21.3per cent of the total data for harvesting and other operations, a 
phenomenon 'unheard of in Bihar (Jha, 1997:127-128).
In Hilsa, there were some cases where men received three kgs of rice and women only 
two; what was universal was for women to receive a smaller 'nasta' despite the fact that 
they often have to feed young children who accompany them to work out of this amount. 
Despite women's participation in wage struggles, the question of unequal wages has not as 
yet been effectively addressed. In several cases women themselves as well as men have 
given the explanation that men's work - such as uprooting paddy seedlings for 
transplan ting  and carrying harvested bundles - is 'heavier', despite the fact that tasks 
performed by women are equally if not more arduous.
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Again, the existence of women’s organisations with some degree of autonomy appears to 
be a crucial factor in getting such questions onto the agenda of the movement. According 
to a recent survey carried out in four Central Bihar districts by the Bihar unit of AIPWA, 
'our study shows that men and women receive equal wages only in areas where wage 
levels are very low. And where agricultural labourers have succeeded through struggles in 
pushing up wages, the increases agreed have not been equal. This is defended on the basis 
of the social understanding that women have less physical strength. Even some women 
labourers offered this argument. This shows the power of received patriarchal notions. The 
struggle for equal wages is thus not just for economic equality, but has to also be directed 
against patriarchal prejudices.' (Chaubey,1996)
c) Changing Relationships
The most striking aspect of the movement is that it enabled the dalit poor and landless to 
challenge the practices which underpin the social and economic authority of both the older 
and the more recently emerged dominant classes throughout central Bihar. These are 
forms of oppression based on caste and gender as much as class. Thus dalit women 
frequently explain that the men from higher caste landowning families used to sexually 
harrass and abuse them, physically assault them if they missed a day's work, or refuse to 
allow them to take breaks to drink water, telling them to drink the muddy water in the 
drainage canals, but now they no longer 'dare' to do these things.
Naresh Ram, a dalit agricultural labourer who lives in Bhokila, a village dominated by 
large landowners of the Kurmi caste, uses the following example to explain how things 
have and haven't changed in his village during the last fifteen years:
R ef ore i f  I  remained sitting on the khatia outside my house when a landowner walked 
through this tola, he would abuse me or even beat me up. Now after we have got 
organised, I  can cany on sitting here and invite him to sit down. But i f  I  were to go to his 
house and sit down next to him on the khatia outside, it would be a different matter... ’
As this suggests, the change in the relationship between agricultural labourers and the
landowners who employ them has been a complex one. It is one which has resulted not
from a thoroughgoing transformation of production relations or the collapse of the
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dominant caste-based ideology, but from a perception among all classes and castes that 
there has been a shift in the balance of forces in those villages where the CPI(ML) has a 
presence.
In Hilsa a very small number of dalit households - two or three in most villages - have 
experienced a significant improvement in their economic situation during the last 15 years 
as a result of having a family member in an urban white collar job, usually in government 
service. This has enabled them to build pucca houses and in some cases to buy tiny plots of 
land and to withdraw partially or completely from agricultural labour. It is noticeable that 
the members of such families are usually enthusiastic supporters of the CPI(ML). This is 
firstly because the change in their economic status originates outside the village and has 
had little impact on their relative position within the agrarian hierarchy - at most such 
households have shifted from total reliance on agricultural wage labour to marginal 
self-cultivation, usually supplemented by hiring out of family labour. Secondly they 
continue to be subject to the daily expressions of the social power of the dominant castes 
within the village. But it appears from discussions with them that it is the CPI(ML)'s ability 
to project itself as a progressive force in wider terms - challenging feudal and caste-based 
practices, corruption and crime - as much as its commitment to village-level struggles that 
attracts this section of dalit communities.15
d) Wage Increases
Although still a mere fraction of the minimum rate set by the Bihar government (Rs 27.30 
per day with effect from 21.12.95 under the Minimum Wages Act 1948), wage rates have 
increased in response to the demands made by labourers in Hilsa. In 1995-96, the standard 
wage rate for casual labour, both male and female, was 2kg rice and 0.5kg sattu 
(equivalent to approximately Rs.10), with labourers in some villages being also given 
’nasta' (breakfast). Significant inter-village disparities in wages persist however, with casual 
labourers in some villages still getting the old rate of one kachchi seer of rice 
(approximately 800g).
15 This section of dalit communities form an important part of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)'s base in 
neighbouring Uttar Pradesh. Bihar’s history of left activism, and specifically the emergence and 
development of the Marxist-Leninist stream, in recent decades may be one reason why the BSP has failed 
to make inroads in the state.
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In the case of attached labour, there is much more variation: in villages where the majority 
of labourers are still attached, they too receive this rate, as well as a small plot of land for 
self-cultivation. But in villages where the majority of labourers are casual, attached 
labourers are paid substantially less. Thus in Chandkura, whereas all casual labourers now 
receive 2kg rice and 0.5kg sattu, there is no fixed rate for attached labourers, who are paid 
on average 1.59kg of rice, with some receiving as little as 1kg.
The question of harvest wages is more complex. For casual labourers in Chandkura, the 
wage had almost universally risen in 1988 to one out of every 14 bundles harvested, from a 
previous rate of one out of every 21 bundles harvested. Similarly in the other villages 
surveyed, harvest wages increased in the 1980s from one out of 21 to one out of 12-15 
bundles.
Interestingly, wages paid in kind predominate in Nalanda and Patna districts, the parts of 
Central Bihar which witnessed the most widespread signs of peasant-based capitalist 
development in the 1970s. I found no incidences of cash wages for agricultural labour in 
Hilsa itself, and neither employers nor labourers had attempted to bring about a shift to 
cash payments. Local CPI(ML) activists say that kind demands are more achievable: 
employers are facing falling rates of profit as a result of increases in input prices, and low 
produce prices, but yields are continuing to increase. Thus wage increases in kind are 
considered to be more affordable by employers than cash increases, since kind wage 
demands are not fully linked to prices, being mostly consumed rather than resold.
An increase in wage rates is also recorded in aggregate statistics for Bihar. According to 
Parthsarathy (1991 :A72) ‘the technologically lagging States of Bihar, Orissa, Madhya 
Pradesh, pockets of low wages, have been noted to show improvement in real wages since 
1970s'. Bhalla points out that 'initially, in the late sixties and early seventies, when 
agricultural productivity went up, real wages had stagnated. After the mid-seventies, real 
wages went up everywhere, even in states where agricultural labour productivity was in 
long term decline, like Bihar.' (Bhalla 1997:215). Bhalla attributes this increase, which 
continued until the end of the 1980s, to an increased share of the workforce in 
non-agricultural employment in each state. I would argue that in Bihar intra-state regional
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uneveness in productivity and the impact of class-for-itself action by agricultural labourers 
in the 1980s are both also key explanatory factors.
On the basis of'Agricultural Wages in India' (AWI) data, Jose (1988:A51-A53) confirms 
that 'a prolonged period of stagnation or decline of real wages in agriculture' in Bihar until 
1974-75 was followed by a sharp increase (despite considerable fluctuations) in the period 
up to 1984-85. But a recent study (Jha, 1997) casts serious doubt on the reliability of AWI 
data collection in Bihar, and argues that 'there is an important data source which seems to 
suggest that the wage-rate in Bihar has declined' between the late 1970s and 1983-84. 
Cost of cultivation studies, Jha suggests, point to a decline in the real wage rate for four 
major crops - wheat, paddy, maize and jute - for this period despite substantial increases in 
labour productivity in wheat and maize cultivation (Jha, 1997:117).
If this is indeed a more accurate source, it reinforces the view that organising by 
agricultural labourers in the 1980s and 1990s has been a key factor in bringing about wage 
increases in Bihar. Movements for higher wages initially took off in pockets of Central 
Bihar (including Hilsa) in the early 1980s, but it was only in the second half of the decade 
that such movements became widespread enough to potentially have an impact on 
aggregate wage levels. The successful negotiation of increases in real wages - albeit on the 
basis of extremely low previous levels, has continued in the 1990s.
In either case, it appears that class-for-itself action by agricultural labourers in parts of 
Central Bihar has been able to achieve increases in wage levels. This is despite, firstly a 
stagnation or even reduction in demand for wage labour (with little technological change 
and continuing land fragmentation and dispersion) from the early 1980s onwards, secondly 
declining profitability in cultivation from the mid-1980s; and thirdly, the collapse of 
non-agricultural employment leading to a fall in labour productivity in agriculture from the 
late 1980s.
e) Employers' Responses
In the wake of struggles over wages and an increase in the agreed rates, there have been a
number of changes in employers' daily practices which reflect direct or indirect attempts to
reduce the labourers' share in the produce. In Chandkura during harvesting there are
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frequent arguments in which the employers try to reduce the size of the bundles taken by 
the labourers. In other villages in my survey too employers are now for the first time 
insisting on choosing or making up the bundles themselves. In Murarpur, labourers now 
have to carry the harvested crops to the landowners' homes before they are paid, leading to 
a delay of up to two days in payment. In Baradih, conflict has developed over the number 
of hours worked by the labourers, with the employers demanding that they start earlier; 
claiming that pigs owned by the labourers get into their fields and eat the crops, 
landowners have also begun confiscating the pigs and charging their owners Rs 15 each for 
their return.
More significantly, perhaps, employers have responded to successful agitations over wages 
by withdrawing from credit and tenancy relations with the labourers. In Chandkura and 
several other villages surveyed, the surplus-producing landowners, who were previously 
the main source of credit for all types of agricultural labourers, have begun refusing to give 
loans without collateral to casual labourers and have simultaneously increased interest 
rates substantially.
In Murarpur, the landowners stopped leasing out land on a crop-sharing basis to the 
labourers after the most recent wage struggle in 1995. Elsewhere too, landowners became 
unwilling to lease out on a sharecropping basis, the only form of lease accessible to most 
landless labourers, after wage struggles had occurred. The reasons given by the 
landowners were that they could no longer ensure that they got their share of the produce, 
and also that if the labourers could lease in land, they would no longer be available to work 
on the landowners' self-cultivated land.
This underlines the specific nature of the ‘interlocked’ relationships between Idsans' and 
'mazdoors' in Hilsa noted above. Although labourers were relatively rarely dependent 
solely on their own employers for leases or credit, their dependence on the large 
landowners of the village as a whole, which they consciously articulated as the dependence 
of one class upon another, meant that 'class for itself action by the labourers in the labour 
market could lead to similarly conscious and co-ordinated action by the dominant class in 
the lease and credit markets.
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Observers of the trajectory of capitalist development in Haryana have pointed out that in 
the context of an increased and more time-specific demand for labour, the interlocking of 
labour and credit markets can be used to undermine attempts to organise by labourers and 
create 'new1 forms of attachment suited to the needs of capitalist employers (see for 
example Bhalla 1976; Brass 1995). Formal contracts for labourers lasting unprecedentedly 
long periods of up to five years, and various forms of interlocking including three-way 
credit arrangements between labourer, shopkeeper and employer were among what Bhalla 
describes as ‘threads in the redesigned fabric of conservative rural power’ in ‘model Green 
Revolution’ districts of Haryana as early as the mid-70s (Bhalla, 1976:A27).
However, the withdrawal of credit and land from casual labourers which has occurred in 
Hilsa does not appear to be primarily a systematic attempt to create new relations of 
dependence, but rather a long term extension of the 'social boycott' strategy of 
withdrawing key resources in a bid to maintain the status quo -particularly as far as wages 
are concerned - in the context of an agricultural economy where the process of 
accumulation has essentially come to a standstill. Thus in several villages, credit had been 
withdrawn across the board from permanent as well casual labourers, while there were 
also instances of landowners refusing to provide plots of land to permanent labourers in 
the aftermath of struggles over vested land.
In Chandkura, however, several labourers who had entered into contracts as permanent 
labourers in 1995-96 had done so (as in earlier periods) in order to get a loan without 
collateral in an emergency, along with a small plot which would help them pay off the loan. 
But these labourers too expressed an aversion to this form of employment, and were 
determined not to remain attached for long, not only because daily wages were lower, but 
because of the element of feudal coercion which remained in the relationship - for example, 
if the labourer could not come to work on a particular day, his wages might be witheld the 
next day. The labourers use of the term *bandhua'(bonded) as opposed to 'chhuta' (free) 
reflects their continuing perception of a strong element of coercion in the relationship.
And most importantly, the period when these changes occurred has witnessed a further 
reduction in the incidence of permanent labour in both relative and absolute terms: the 
proportion of agricultural labourer households with at least one member employed as a 
permanent labourer has declined from 41 per cent of agricultural labour households
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1981-3 to only 26 per cent in 1995-96. My survey indicates that a similar decline has 
occurred in at least 50 per cent of the villages in Hilsa. In villages where struggles had 
occurred but where permanent labour was still prevalent, labourers regarded this as an 
indication of their current lack of organisation and relative weakness within the overall 
balance of class forces in the village.
Landowners employing labour throughout Hilsa complained of a decline in the availability 
of labour, the increase in labour costs, and the labourers' 'unwillingness to work', which 
they attributed to new sources of employment 'in the towns' as well as the 'misleading' of 
the labourers by the CPI(ML). But the evidence suggests that in general they have been 
unable to effectively resist the changes initiated by the agricultural labourers' movement in 
the area through the introduction of new forms of attachment or dependence.
J) New aspects o f class confrontations
At the same time, the involvement of one section of the dominant classes in Hilsa in 
networks of criminals, bureaucrats and politicians stretching across central Bihar and 
beyond has changed the very nature of class confrontations since the early 1980s. On the 
one hand, landowners are now more on the defensive, and less likely to respond to 
agitations by labourers as in the past, by personally orchestrating violence against them. 
And for the moment, perhaps because of the heterogeneity, in both caste and economic 
terms, of the dominant classes, there is no consolidated landowners' army active in Hilsa. 
On the other hand, that section which has links with criminal gangs and their ubiquitous 
patrons in political parties and the administration are able to use them to unleash brutal 
attacks on anyone who challenges their dominance. (Nalanda has the distinction of having 
the highest number of licenced arms of any district in Bihar [Gupta 1997] - many more are 
unlicensed).Today it is those with such connections, the major source of capital 
accumulation in the area, who, regardless of caste background^ are adopting the coercive 
practices previously associated with the extremes of feudalism.
Thus in a case in Hilsa in early 1997, supporters of a medium sized landowner, who was
also a Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) belonging to the Janata Dal, killed an
agricultural labourer who wanted to work elsewhere. The man was being treated as a
bonded labourer although he had no debts. Although the killers had the support of the
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Block Development Officer and several other MLAs, mass protests by the people of the 
village succeeded in having them arrested. (The implications of the links between 
landowners, politicians, the administration and criminal gangs in the fieldwork area is 
discussed further in Chapter 7, ‘Patterns of Accumulation in the Fieldwork Area’).
This 'criminalisation' of the landowners' response, which has intensified during the 1990s, 
has also affected the nature of the agricultural labourers' movement in Hilsa, as elsewhere 
in central Bihar. Precisely by continuing to wage struggles on issues affecting the lives of 
landless agricultural labourers and poor peasants, the CPI(ML)-led movement has found 
itself posing a challenge to forces whose terror tactics extend beyond the dalit poor and 
landless to other sections of rural society, particularly small cultivators from the backward 
castes. This tenacity, expressed in a new wave of wage and land-related struggles since 
199216, seems to be effectively widening the support base of the movement to include new 
sections of the working people.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the dependence of rural poor households on agricultural wage labour as a 
means of survival has increased in Bihar, as in other States, during the 1970s and the 
1980s. We have argued that, in Bihar, this increase is linked to a declining access to land - 
either owned or leased in - for such households. The situation has been further exacerbated 
by the decline in non-agricultural employment on an India-wide scale, particularly after 
1991.
The technological changes which occurred in the fieldwork area in the 1970s - primarily 
the spread of mechanised irrigation and the adoption of High Yielding Varieties and 
chemical fertilisers, with only limited mechanisation of other tasks - led to an overall 
increase in the demand for agricultural wage labour, and a shift in the composition of 
labour demand from permanent to casual labour. However, in the 1980s and early 1990s,
16According to reports, in the first two months of a land-grab' movement launched in August 1992 by the 
Indian People's Front and the Bihar Pradesh Kisan Sabha, mass fronts linked to the CPI(ML), 1,829 acres 
of land were taken over in 27 cases of seizure in Nalanda district This included land belonging to 
‘Maths’, trusts, and estates as well as ceiling surplus and ‘gair mazarua’ land, and land controlled by 
absentee landlords (Indian People's Front,1992).
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when the further extension of the ‘new’ technology mainly involved its adoption by small 
and marginal cultivators, there have not been major changes in the extent and structure of 
demand for wage labour.
Despite these apparently unfavourable conditions, in the 1980s and 1990s agricultural 
labourers have been able to bring about significant changes in the relations of production, 
through concerted class action.
The left-led movement of the rural exploited classes which emerged during the initial spurt 
of capital accumulation by a section of larger landowners has been consolidated and has 
continued to develop in this period. This movement has been shaped by the interrelated 
questions of class, caste, and gender. There is a significant overlap between class and caste 
identities in the fieldwork area; further, practices based upon the ideology of caste 
inequality have been a key aspect of agricultural production relations in the area. These 
forms of oppression have been directed at dalit women labourers in particular. Bihar does 
not appear to be undergoing the process of ‘feminisation’ of agricultural labour which has 
been identified in several States which are experiencing various forms of capitalist 
development and state intervention in agriculture. But agricultural labour is and continues 
to be the only substantial source of income for poor women in the state.
The role of women labourers in peak agricultural seasons has meant that they have been at 
the forefront of struggles over wages; women have also played an active part in other 
aspects of the movement. At the same time an ideology in which the seclusion and 
subordination of women is an important marker of family status and ‘dignity’ remains 
dominant. However this ideology is being increasingly challenged by women from within 
the movement.
Changes which had taken place in agricultural production relations since the early 1980s 
were a direct result of demands put forward by agricultural labourers in the course of 
organised struggles.
Firstly, the movement has succeeded in enabling the dalit poor and landless to challenge 
the practices which underpin the social and economic authority of both the older and the 
more recently emerged dominant classes.
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Secondly, organising by agricultural labourers in the 1980s and 1990s has been a key 
factor in bringing about wage increases - albeit on the basis of extremely low previous 
levels.
In the wake of struggles over wages and an increase in the agreed rates, employers in the 
fieldwork area have introduced a number of changes in their daily practices which reflect 
direct or indirect attempts to reduce the labourers' share in the produce. Employers have 
also responded to successful agitations over wages by withdrawing from credit and 
tenancy relations with the labourers.
However, the withdrawal of credit and land from casual labourers does not appear to be 
primarily a systematic attempt to create new relations of dependence, but rather a long 
term extension of the 'social boycott' strategy of withdrawing key resources in a bid to 
maintain the status quo, particularly as far as wages are concerned - in the context of an 
agricultural economy where the process of accumulation has essentially come to a 
standstill. Significantly, the incidence of permanent labour has also declined more 
dramatically in those villages where organisation by agricultural labourers has been 
sustained.
Thus, in contrast to areas where capitalist development has taken root, employers in the 
fieldwork area had not been able to incorporate new forms of exploitation and control of 
labour into processes of production. Rather their responses were essentially defensive 
attempts to maintain the status quo.
In the 1990s, while the incidence of violence against agricutural labourers by individual 
landowners has declined, a section of landowners with connections with criminal gangs, 
politicians, and administrators are increasingly attempting to terrorise those who challenge 
their dominance. By resisting this ‘criminalisation’ of the agrarian economy, the 
agricultural labourers’ movement is gaining the support of wider sections of rural society.
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CHAPTER 7: PATTERNS OF ACCUMULATION IN THE FIELDWORK AREA
Introduction
In the preceding three chapters, through an examination of changes in technology use, 
landholding patterns and production relations, we have argued that the dominant 
landowners in the fieldwork area have not been engaging in a process of expanded 
reproduction in agriculture - the accumulation and reinvestment of surplus in agricultural 
production, leading to the generation of surplus values on an ever-expanding scale - in the 
period since the early 1980s. In this chapter we will look in more detail at the forms of 
accumulation which, by contrast, have developed or been sustained in the fieldwork area 
during the same period.
Bharadwaj has identified the central role of an analysis of accumulation in identifying 
capitalist development: ‘the question is..one of the process of transformation, of the 
dissolution of feudal features and the onset of pervasive dominance of capitalist 
relations...the forces that work towards retarding and muting such a dynamic 
outcome...can be seen, in summary, as a struggle between the forces promoting productive 
accumulation and those stabilising, perpetuating and reinforcing unproductive investment’ 
(Bharadwaj, 1985: 21).
The key factor underlying the forces which ‘stabilise, perpetuate and reinforce’ 
unproductive investment in Indian agriculture, Bharadwaj argues, is the ‘desperate 
dependence on land as the basis for survival’ and the resulting preponderance of marginal 
landholders who ‘are in no position to undertake productive accumulation themselves but 
could provide the ground for diversion of surplus into unproductive avenues’ (op cit.:7). 
On the one hand, for the dominant, surplus producing landholders, ‘possibilities of 
exploiting labour become almost limitless’ and there is thus ‘less incentive to improve 
productive forces, that is, undertake productive investment’(op tit.: 15). On the other 
hand, the relations of inequality and dependence between the ‘chronically deficit’ 
households and the dominant surplus producing households create the conditions for 
various types of usurious and speculative investment by the latter.
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The participation of the rural poor in land, labour, credit and produce ‘markets’ has been 
characterised as ‘compulsive involvement’ (Bharadwaj, 1979) or ‘forced commerce’ 
(Bhaduri, 1983, 1986). This characterisation refers both to their acute dearth of resources 
and to the production relations which ‘socially interrelate both the parties to the 
exchange’(Bharadwaj, 1985:12): for example those between agricultural labourers and 
their employer or small tenants and their landlord.
More specifically, the existence of interlinked markets, in which ‘market and social power 
is vested in the dominant rural classes and...the dominant party often combines multiple 
functions, thus enjoying a superior position simultaneously in a number of 
markets’(Bharadwaj 1974b:4), may have two important implications. Firstly, the 
compulsory participation of the weaker party in exchange. For instance, for poor tenants 
taking loans from moneylender-landlords, ‘trading in the credit market in the form of 
consumption loans, usually induced by a threat to survival, leads to involuntary 
participation in exchange in some other markets’(Bhaduri 1986:269). And secondly, 
interpenetration of markets, by intensifying dependence, may facilitate an increase in the 
rate of exploitation. Thus creditors may be able to extract free labour services or to impose 
more exploitative tenancy arrangements on borrowers1.
Amit Bhaduri (Bhaduri, 1973) incorporated the concept of interlinked markets or 
‘interlocked modes of exploitation’ into his analysis of ‘semi-feudalism’ in the context of 
rural Bengal (see Chapter 1 for a discussion). Other writers, notably Prasad (Prasad, 1973; 
Prasad,1974; Prasad, 1987) applied the ‘semi-feudal' thesis to conditions in Central Bihar. 
Prasad emphasised the fact that this type of creditor will channel resources into lending 
under conditions where default is almost a certainty, precisely in order to facilitate the 
appropriation of a surplus from the borrower through lease, labour, product and 
consumption markets (Prasad, 1974; Breman, 1974). Bhaduri later elaborated on the 
concept of ‘borrower's risk’. The burden of risk is shifted to the borrower through the 
treatment of collaterals: since the collaterals the poor peasants can offer are not readily 
acceptable in the organized credit market, the lender is in a position to substantially
1 Srivastava (1989b) notes the distinction between the appropriation of the borrower's own labour through 
adjustments in wages, and the appropriation of family labour through adjustments in tenancy 
arrangements. For example, in U.P. he observed stock adjustments against the sale of buffaloes (raised on 
a shared basis) which implied ‘the appropriation of surplus labour of women and children in the labourer's 
household' (Srivastava 1989b: 516)
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undervalue them, transferring the risk of default from the lender to the borrower (Bhaduri 
1983)2.
These forms of unproductive investment have a tendency to be self-perpetuating: ‘the 
greater the predominance of the chronically deficit households, the greater the diversion of 
re-investible resources into usury. Not only does this offer a fertile ground for exploitation 
but its relative attraction over productive investment persists so long as the backward 
production conditions continue’(Bharadwaj, 1985:20).
However, as we have noted (see Chapter 1), interlocked relationships may persist or even 
be introduced as a means of intensifying control over labour in situations where 
technological change and productive investment in agriculture are taking place (see for 
example Bhalla 1976, Srivastava, 1989b). The central question for capitalist development, 
therefore, concerns the dominant pattern of accumulation : the presence or absence of 
expanded reproduction; the outcome (in the short term as well as the longer term) of the 
struggle identified by Bharadwaj (op cit.) between the forces which promote productive 
accumulation and those which retard it.
More recently, observers of Bihar have attempted to develop an analysis which draws on
this work but examines the dynamics of perpetuation and transformation of these
relationships in the wider context of the social, political and technological changes which
have taken place in the post-independence period. As Das has pointed out, ‘semi-feudal’
also implies ‘semi-capitalist’ (Das, 1992). Over the past one-and-a-half decades the
process of agrarian change in Bihar as well as the role of bourgeois capitalist institutions
such as the state apparatuses and electoral politics in the accumulation of economic
surpluses by Bihar's powerful classes have become a compulsory focus for analysts who
2 The question of interlinked markets has also been addressed by neoclassical economists (see for example 
Newbeiy, 1977, Bardhan and Rudra, 1979, Srinivasan, 1979, Braverman and Stiglitz, 1982, Stiglitz, 
1986). From the neoclassical perspective, when actions in one market affect the outcome in another, ‘a 
natural market solution is to internalise the externality, and that is precisely what fire interlinkage of 
markets does’(Stiglitz 1986:259). Interlinkage is therefore viewed as increasing ‘economic efficiency’ but 
without definite implications regarding the improvement or deterioration of the relative position of the 
participants in the interlinked transactions. Braverman and Stiglitz put forward the view that interlinkage 
increases the landlord's control over the inputs - including labour - applied by the sharecropping tenant, in 
the face of ‘imperfect information’. However, this is not analysed as a strategy for intensifying exploitation 
- and the question of the landlord's economic and social power is simply not considered (Braverman and 
Stiglitz 1982; Stiglitz 1986).
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aim to go beyond the dominant view of Bihar as inherently and inevitably corrupt, violent 
and caste-ridden.
Das argues that ‘the proliferation of the bureaucracy, the enormous accretion of power 
with the government and the rise of corruption and crime as the fastest modes of 
accumulation changed occupational patterns and social urges. The plateauing off of 
agricultural growth was contrasted with the immense opportunities availed by those who 
had access to governmental position and patronage’(Das, 1992:25)
Similarly, Dev Nathan (1990:16)observes that ‘...upper caste landlords have sought to use 
their bureaucratic-political positions, their control of the state machinery to get a share of 
the peasants’ surplus, through taking a cut in the distribution of state-controlled inputs to 
peasants. Along with looting the state exchequer through contracts, this bureaucratic 
feudalism is stronger than the tendency to capitalist landlordism among the upper castes. 
In fact the possibility of earning income through controlling the distribution of inputs 
inhibits their use in production and thus retards the transformation of the landlord 
economy’
Drawing mainly on developments up to the early 1980s, Dev Nathan restricts this analysis 
to ‘upper caste landlords’, whom he distinguishes from the more production-oriented 
‘peasant capitalists’ of the backward castes. Das argues that the phenomenon has become 
more widespread and that the possibility of gaining access to state structures and using 
them to appropriate wealth provided a major impetus for intervention in the electoral arena 
by rich peasants of the backward castes: ‘one way for traditionally agrarian groups to 
move into the “modem sector” where faster, albeit primitive, accumulation is more feasible 
is through the assertion of the power of numbers in a democratic polity...This is the 
political economy of casteism’(Das, 1992:25).
Rameshwar Verma, Secretary of the Bihar Pradesh Kisan Sabha in Jehanabad District,
described the activities of surplus producing landowners in the district. This group, he
explained, do not invest in land: they channel their surpluses into contracting, buses,
trucks, cinema halls, clothes shops, hardware shops, and brick kilns. Rs 1 lakh (100,000)
per year is allocated to each panchayat for development purposes: this vanishes into the
pockets of local politicians who pass some of it on to their supporters among the
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landowners, corrupt officials, thikadars (contractors) and dalals (middlemen).(Interview, 
14.1.94, Jehanabad)
In this chapter we look at patterns of accumulation adopted by the dominant landowners in 
the fieldwork area - backward caste cultivators who in the 1970s had shown signs of 
dynamic investment in agriculture - in the 1980s and early 1990s. We aim to test the 
hypothesis that this group has increasingly channeled surpluses into unproductive avenues 
such as moneylending, house construction, and dowries as well using them to gain access 
to the sources of wealth referred to by Arvind Das and Dev Nathan, as cited above. If this 
is the case, what has been the impact on the different classes within the fieldwork area and 
the relations between them? How has it affected the process of expanded reproduction in 
agriculture?
By looking in more detail at forces and processes which have become synonymous with 
the state of Bihar, we also hope to gauge whether these processes actually are ‘uniquely 
Bihari’ or whether they can provide insight into wider questions of political economy. 
Further, we consider their implications for the nature of power in this context. How far 
has power - economic, political and social - remained rooted in agrarian production 
relations?
I. Credit, Usury and Agricultural Production
This section examines the nature of credit in the fieldwork area, looking in particular at the 
access of different agrarian classes to ‘traditional’ and institutional loans; the purposes for 
which they are used; the role of different types of credit in agricultural production; the 
investment of agrarian surpluses in lending; and the implications of lending both as a 
source of direct accumulation and a mechanism for strengthening the economic and social 
power of the lender. Wherever possible we have attempted to assess the changes which 
have occurred between 1981-82 and 1995-96; however, much of the data on credit from 
the ANSISS/ILO study is only available in an aggregated form which refers to all twelve of 
the villages in the study.
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a) Access to and use of traditional credit
The ANSISS/ILO study defines credit according to source as falling into two main 
categories - 'modem' from an 'institution or government agency1, and 'traditional', from 
'moneylenders and landlords' (those from 'relations' are treated separately to reduce 
variations in the characteristics of *traditional' loans) (Prasad, Rodgers et al.,1988:471). 
Sources of *traditional' cash loans in Chandkura in 1995-96 were rich peasants in the 
village itself, and goldsmith-cum-moneylenders in Hilsa town, who generally required gold 
or silver jewellery as collateral.
According to the 1981-82 findings of the ANSISS/ILO survey, overall ‘traditional debt 
has mainly been used for non-productive purposes like current consumption, exceptional 
social expenditure and health expenditure and hardly at all for development purposes’ 
(Prasad, Rodgers et al., 1988:480).
In 1995-96, the use of traditional credit to meet costs of medical treatment or in other 
emergencies was universal in Chandkura across classes. All households had either taken 
loans for this purpose or could envisage doing so should such situations arise. Among 
those households who had actually taken traditional loans, this was the most frequently 
cited reason. The second most frequently cited reason was to meet the ‘exceptional social 
expenditure’ incurred by marriage. Marriage, and in particular the marriage of daughters, 
was a significant item of expenditure across classes, a fact which is discussed in more 
detail below.
The ANSISS/ILO study found that 41.9 per cent of all households used traditional credit 
to meet current consumption needs in 1981-82. My survey of Chandkura in 1995-96 found 
21 per cent of households using traditional loans for this purpose. However, this should be 
viewed in the context of declining access to traditional credit for agricultural labourers, in 
the wake of struggles over wages. The use of traditional loans to meet current 
consumption needs was confined to households participating in agricultural labour in 
1995-96. 43 per cent of agricultural labour households and at least 75 per cent of 
non-cultivating agricultural labour households took such loans, which included loans of 
rice and wheat from richer peasants in the village. This underlines the continuing extent of
202
acute poverty among this class, despite some increase in wages and alternative sources of 
employment.
Only 8.5 per cent of households in the ANSISS/ILO study as a whole used traditional 
credit for agricultural operations in 1981-82. In contrast, 31 per cent of all cultivating 
households and 45 per cent of poor and middle peasant households in Chandkura in 
1995-96 used traditional loans to meet the costs of fertiliser and other agricultural inputs. 
This reflects the phenomenon of small cultivators being drawn into the ‘new’ technology 
under conditions which, as we have discussed earlier, are highly unfavourable.
It also seems likely that despite their adoption of these inputs, these cultivators still have 
very limited access to institutional credit. We examine this below.
The pattern of borrowing and lending in Chandkura clearly also implies that there is 
considerable potential for the interlocking of markets.
b) Interest rates variations and interlocking relationships
There has been no significant change in the mean interest rate on traditional loans in 
Chandkura, which was calculated to be 56.37 per cent per annum in 1981-82 and 55.09 
per cent per annum in 1995-96. But variations by class appear to have become more 
pronounced.
Class-wise interest rates for Chandkura are not available for the earlier period. But 
according to the authors of the ANSISS/ILO study, in the eary 1980s for the study villages 
as a whole, 'apart from the tendency for wage labour to pay higher interest rates, there is 
no clear pattern to interest rate differentials' (Prasad, Rodgers et al., 1988:475). However, 
considerable inter-village variations in interest rates may have made such patterns more 
difficult to identify in aggregate figures. The ANSISS/ILO study found a stronger 
correlation between interest rates on traditional loans and land owned, than between 
interest rates and class, and linked the former to the capacity of the borrower to repay. 
After allowing for inter-village variations, there were 'over twenty percentage points 
difference in interest paid between the top and bottom of the land hierarchy (op cit.:477).
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The reverse was the case in Chandkura in 1995-96, when as Table 29 shows, no clear 
correlation between interest rates and land owned was discernible, but, as Table 30 shows, 
there were marked variations in interest rates across classes. Not only were interest rates 
charged to labouring households almost twice as high as those charged to poor middle 
peasants, but, strikingly, loans taken by middle peasants were interest free.
I would argue that in the intervening decade and a half, credit relationships between 
different groups in the village had become enmeshed in the class conflicts which have 
emerged or intensified during the period. Some aspects of this have already been 
discussed. Interest rates charged to agricultural labourers had increased after wage 
struggles with some rich peasants charging as much as 120 per cent per annum interest on 
loans and others demanding jewellery as collateral. In this situation several agricultural 
labourer families found it preferable to pawn their few pieces of jewellery in Hilsa town 
where the rate of interest was much lower at 42 per cent. Permanent labourers paid rates 
similar to those paid by casual labourers, but were not asked to provide collateral by 
employers, who had the option of confiscating the crops from their allotted plots in case of 
default.
While the rise in interest rates could be seen as an attempt by employers to compensate for 
the loss of income due to increased wages paid to labourers, my discussions in Chandkura 
and other villages in Hilsa suggest that it was more of an attempt to use the interlocking of 
markets to maintain the status quo, by effectively withdrawing access to credit from 
labourer households who challenged it, an attempt which has however largely failed in its 
objective (see Chapter 6, ‘Agricultural Labour in the Fieldwork Area’).
Table 29: Interest Rates on Traditional Loans in Chandkura in 1995-96 
by Land Owned bv Borrowers
Land Owned (acres) Mean Interest Rate on Traditional Loans 
(percent per annum)
None 72.6
Up to 0.99 93
1 - 2.49 0
2.5-4.99 72
5 and above 36
Source: Fieldwork
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Table 30: Interest Rates on Traditional Loans in Chandkura in 1995-96
bv Economic Class of Borrowers
Class Mean Interest Rate on Traditional Loans 
(percent per annum)
Permanent Labourer 72
Casual Labourer 75.6
Poor Peasant 41
Middle Peasant 0
Rich Peasant 36
Source: Fieldwork
Note: Loans taken by rich peasants were from goldsmith-moneylenders in Hilsa town. All the other loans 
were taken from landowning peasants in the village itself.
On the other hand, poor middle peasant households (who by definition did not participate 
in agricultural wage labour) paid much lower interest rates on the loans they took from the 
richer cultivators in the village. Their creditors were often also those from whom they 
hired in diesel pumpsets, threshers and power tillers. In cases where the loans were used 
for purchasing inputs, they were also often the black market sources of these inputs. Given 
the existence of ‘interlocked’ relationships of this kind, it appears that rich peasant lenders 
charged relatively low interest rates (albeit still very high compared to those on ‘modem’ 
loans) to poor peasants in order to reinforce and cement other profitable interactions with 
them.
But there was also another crucial role played by these interest rate differentials - they 
served to reinforce ‘kisan’3 solidarity among cultivators across classes, which has become 
increasingly important for rich peasants as class conflicts with labourers have intensified. 
As we have seen, caste is a key aspect of the ‘kisan’ identity, and in Chandkura, where all 
the rich peasant lenders as well as many of the poor and middle peasant borrowers, were 
of the Kurmi caste, Kurmis as a whole paid an average interest rate of only 12 per cent, 
only one fifth of the average for the village. But even more significant is the fact that 
middle peasants, who cultivated as little land as poor peasants, but unlike the latter also 
employed wage labour, generally paid no interest at all on the loans they took from richer 
peasants. Several middle peasant respondents explained this in terms of 'good relations' 
with the rich peasants in the village. An important aspect of these relations was the extent
3 Kisan m a^ns literally ‘peasant’. For a discussion of the significance of ‘kisan’ and ‘mazdoor’ (labourer) 
identities in the fieldwork area, see Chapter 6, ‘Agricultural Labour in the Fieldwoik Area’.
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of solidarity they showed with the richer peasants during disputes with labour, which as we 
have seen was a key factor in the outcome of these disputes.
However, while as elsewhere traditional credit in Chandkura mediates a variety of class 
relations, and thus cannot be assessed simply in terms of direct returns to the lender, 
lending is also clearly an important direct source of surplus for a number of households in 
the village.
c) Lending and Accumulation
Traditionally the dominant ethos among the Kurmi cultivating peasants of Chandkura has 
been one which ascribes a high moral value to the productive labour they engage in as 
self-cultivating farmers, and conversely, devalues unproductive ‘exploitative’ activities 
such as moneylending. This means that very few people were willing to give detailed 
information about their lending activities which would enable these surpluses to be 
quantified. However, the experience of one of these lenders, one of the smaller landowners 
engaged in lending in the village, gives us an insight into this phenomenon.
Bachchu Prasad is a 32 year old Kurmi cultivator owning 2.7 acres, which he cultivates 
himself along with his wife, 26 year old Binita. Their two sons, aged 10 and 8, attend 
school and also have private tuition at home. They employ casual labourers during 
transplanting and harvesting, and hire in a diesel pump set and wheat and rice threshers 
when needed. Bachchu Prasad does his own ploughing with the pair of bullocks he owns.
Bachchu Prasad's cropping pattern and use of inputs is comparable with those of other 
small cultivators in the village, with HYVs used in wheat and rice. In 1996, he had planted 
onions for the first time on three katthas of land. His operational costs were rather high 
due to the fact that all the machinery he used was hired in. The gross value of output at 
1995-96 prices on Bachchu Prasad's farm was approximately Rs 20,375. With total 
operational costs at around Rs7,355, this implies that the net crop income of the farm was 
an estimated Rs 13,020. Allowing for inflation, this barely exceeds the 'subsistence' level of 
annual net crop income per farm estimated by Haque (1996) as Rs 11,000 in 1990-91 (see 
Chapter 4, ‘Agriculture, Technology and Class’). Even taking into account the fact that 
the family is slightly smaller than average, there does not appear to be scope for capital
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accumulation through cultivation under existing production conditions. Like the majority 
of households in Chandkura, the small size of the holding is a major constraint to 
accumulation.
Despite this however, the family was able to have a brick house costing Rs 1 lakh 
(100,000) constructed in 1992. They see this as the major change in their living standard 
which has occurred during the last fifteen years. These savings have only been possible via 
shrewd investment in lending over several years. Currently, Bachchu Prasad gives loans to 
other cultivators of up to Rs 3,000 at a time, at interest rates of at least 48 per cent per 
year. He also gives loans of rice and wheat which are repaid in kind at 50 per cent interest. 
This he feels is more profitable than investing in a diesel pumpset or any other agricultural 
equipment.
Both Bachchu Prasad and his wife identify strongly as Kurmi peasants who work hard on 
their own land. But it is only through moneylending and the extremely high returns it 
yields, that they have been able to accumulate surpluses on a scale which has had a 
significant impact on their living standards.
d) Access to and use o f institutional credit
The ANSISS/ILO study found that in 1981-82, Very little of modem debt as a whole has 
been used for capital investment...the use of modem debt has been more for agricultural 
operations’. However for the study as a whole the highest percentages of households using 
modem loans for capital investments were found among big peasants and those of the 
Kurmi caste, who were concentrated in Nalanda district (Prasad, Rodgers et al, 1988:478).
Significantly, as Table 31 shows, in 1981-82 the value of modem capital goods (and of 
machinery) actually owned was highest among those cultivating 5-10 acres, but the use of 
institutional loans to purchase them was by far the highest among those owning ten or 
more acres. (Data is not available on the use of loans according to land cultivated, 
however the differences are large enough to remain significant even when referring to 
landholding categories rather than landownership categories). While the study's authors 
suggest that the availability of modem debt can be taken to indicate the productive use of
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credit’, this inconsistency points to greater access to institutional loans among the biggest 
landowners, who were not the most production-oriented.
Table 31 : Use of Institutional Loans for Capital Investment and Value of Capital 
Goods in 12 Bihar Villages. 1981-82
Land Owned 
(acres)
Percentage of 
households using 
institutional debt 
for capital 
investment
Land
Cultivated(acres)
Per capita 
value of 
modern 
capital 
goods(Rs.)
Up to 0.5 3.6 Up to 0.5 0
0.5 to 1 0 0.5 to 1 6.74
1 to 2 1.8 1 to 2 9.7
2 to 5 11.5 2 to 5 60.89
5 to 10 7.4 5 to 10 155.48
10 or more 20.8 10 or more 96.89
Source: Prasad, Rodgers et al, 1988
Shivsagar Sharma, Secretary of the Bihar Pradesh Kisan Sabha, recalls that ‘in the 1970s, 
you had big landowners getting bank loans and buying up to four or five tractors at a time 
- each one was worth one lakh then. Typically, for every five people given 12 lakhs in 
loans between them, there would be another 300 people, applying for smaller things like 
pumpsets and horse-carts, who would be given a total of only 2 lakhs’(Interview, Patna, 
7.3.97).
The ANSISS/ILO data does not provide the composition of the capital investment referred 
to, but is consistent with the phenomenon of the largest landowners cornering a large 
proportion of the available institutional credit in the late 1970s and early 1980s to purchase 
tractors which were mainly used for hiring out and non-agricultural activities (see Table 
31).
My study found that in 1995-96, an estimated 23 per cent of households in Chandkura had 
at some point in time received institutional loans for capital investments. This figure 
includes buffaloes and horse carts (which are used for non-agricultural activities) 
purchased under the IRDP which is specifically aimed at the rural poor (see below). Even
208
so, more than half of these loans, and nearly 75 per cent of total institutional credit, went 
to the small minority of rich peasants in the village.
In an in-depth field study of transactions in rural credit markets in Sambalpur District in 
Orissa, another Indian State frequently characterised as ‘backward’, Sarap (1987) found 
that ‘there is a large gap between the demand (current as well as potential calculated on 
the basis of adoption of HYV technology) and supply of formal credit to small fanners. 
For instance, hardly 21 per cent of the total requirement for production of small farmers in 
the non-irrigated area and about 37 per cent in the irrigated area, has been met by formal 
credit institutions in the survey year. By contrast, the large farmers have obtained further 
credit which was more than their requirement for production purposes’ (Sarap, 1987: 87). 
He further noted, in a situation which parallels that in our fieldwork area, that ‘large 
farmers’ have ‘political connections and dominance in formal credit institutions’. This 
allows them to postpone repayment of institutional loans over much longer periods than 
small farmers. ‘To the extent that the price of credit in the regulated market is very low...it 
is a sort of income transfer to the large farmers’(op cit.: 90).
The reality of differential access to institutional loans in our fieldwork area is illustrated by 
the fact that many poor and middle peasants interviewed in 1995-96 commented that they 
had never applied for bank loans because they were 'too costly* - a reference to the bribes 
that have to be paid to bank officials by those without connections. Several also feared 
losing land as a result of getting into debt. The experience of small cultivator Raghubir 
Prasad is illuminating in this context.
Raghubir Prasad Yadav is a fifty year old farmer who owns 2.7 acres in Chandkura, 
consisting of 15 different plots. He cultivates this land himself alongside his wife Munni, 
elderly father, two sons aged 12 and 25, and one daughter aged 13. The two younger 
children are also at school while the eldest son is a BA pass. Raghubir Prasad is basically a 
subsistence cultivator, and unlike many others is almost self-sufficient, producing his own 
oil and vegetables and exchanging rice at the village shop for salt, sugar etc. He uses 
fertilisers intensively on rice, wheat and onions, and irrigates rabi crops using a hired diesel 
pumpset. In order to cover these input costs he frequently takes loans from larger 
landowners, which are repaid by selling a small proportion of his crops.
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But this pattern has changed slightly since 1990. That year his eldest daughter got married, 
and to raise the expenses of the marriage, Raghubir Prasad had to sell off a small amount 
of land (0.03 acres). A larger amount (two-thirds of an acre) was mortgaged to another 
large landowner for Rs 20,000. In order to pay this off Raghubir Prasad began cultivating 
onions - which other farmers told him were a good source of earnings - on one third of an 
acre. This helped him to pay off the loan within four years. However, the capital intensity 
of onion cultivation means that he also needs to take bigger loans than before, of up to Rs 
1,200, from the rich peasants in the village. He pays interest on these loans of between 72 
and 120 per cent. This high rate reflects a number of factors - as a Yadav, Raghubir Prasad 
does not benefit from the 'good relations' between Kurmi peasants of different classes in 
the village; and unlike many poor and middle peasants of the Kurmi caste who have lost 
land through subdivision quite recently, he is a second generation small cultivator. He 
cultivates entirely through family labour and is thus not bound by the solidarity which 
exists between employers of labour.
Despite the change in his cropping pattern, Raghubir Prasad is not optimistic about the 
future - buying a diesel pumpset would lower his production costs, but he fears that 
applying for a bank loan to buy one would involve him in endless demands for bribes and 
spiralling debt. His younger daughters marriage has to be arranged and will cost up to Rs 
40,000: Rs 5,000 on the ceremony, and Rs 35,000 on the dowry. He may well have to sell 
more of his land this time. The only improvement he can visualise would be his son using 
his BA to get a (preferably government) job. But again, this would require a bribe of at 
least Rs 5,000 which the family can't afford unless they sell land. Thus Raghubir Prasad’s 
adoption of a capital intensive, high value crop (onions) was motivated primarily by the 
requirement of unproductive expenditure on his daughters' marriages; rather than leading 
to accumulation it has increased his dependence on large landowners who are able to 
appropriate a significant part of his surplus as interest. Without capital for bribes he is 
effectively denied access to institutional credit.4
4 Interestingly, Raghubir Prasad, who is from the Yadav caste, felt that there was no difference between 
Janata Dal and Congress(I) rule in Bihar in this respect. While Janata Dal Chief Minister Laloo Yadav 
and his successor Rabri Devi have often been portrayed as providing preferential treatment to Yadavs as a 
caste, the experience of Raghubir Prasad and others in my study underlines that poor peasant and 
agricultural labourer households of this caste have benefitted little.
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In Chandkura very little of the machinery in use had been purchased (whether using loans 
or other sources) since the early 1980s. Some of the possible reasons for this have been 
discussed in earlier chapters in the context of a 'stalling' of capitalist development in 
agriculture in this area.
A factor which has clearly both contributed to and been exacerbated by this process is the 
'drying up' of institutional credit under government schemes from 1985 onwards. This has 
intensified after 1991: as Sharma notes, *the credit flow to agriculture in Bihar through 
financial institutions has...deteriorated in real terms in the post- reforms period. The total 
flow of institutional credit to agriculture in Bihar in 1989-90 was Rs 138 crores which 
marginally increased to Rs 139 crores in 1991-92 and further to Rs 142 crores in 1992-93. 
In the wake of inflation and rise in fertilizer prices, it certainly denotes a declining 
availability of credit in real terms' (Sharma, 1996:14). In 1992-93, total agricultural credit 
requirements under exisiting conditions in rural Bihar were estimated as between Rs 1,900 
and Rs2,900 crores (Singh and Singh, 1993), i.e at least 13 times the amount actually 
disbursed. Per capita bank credit to agriculture in 1993 was RsllO in Bihar, half the 
all-India figure of Rs 222. In Nalanda district, the corresponding figure was Rs 146.
e) The Integrated Rural Development Programme
Another development which has taken place since the ANSISS/ILO study was carried out 
is the implementation of the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP). This was 
only brought into full operation under the Sixth Plan (1980-1985) and is not covered in the 
earlier study. As Jha notes, public sector credit institutions, by linking credit to collateral 
(basically size of landholding), ensured that agricultural labourers were almost universally 
excluded until recently. ‘Since the inception of IRDP, which aims at providing 
concessional credit for productive purposes to households below the poverty line, a new 
source has become accessible to the labourers in principle’(Jha, 1997:184).
The IRDP has been widely criticised, both conceptually and in relation to its 
implementation. It has been pointed out that, in common with other target-oriented 
poverty alleviation programmes, it was delinked from agrarian reform and ‘designed as if 
redistributive land reform and security of tenure had nothing to do with poverty 
alleviation’(D.Bandhyopadhyay, Unpublished Manuscript, cited in Jannuzi, 1996:194). It
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has been further argued that the adoption of such programmes, which accompanied the 
shift of emphasis away from land reforms in the Five Year Plans, was a result of pressure 
from global capital on the Indian state to abandon an independent accumulation strategy 
which required thoroughgoing agrarian reform. According to Prasad, ‘that is why 
international governmental organisations (like World Bank, International Labour 
Organisation, Asian Development Bank, etc.)began to aggressively follow the McNamara 
strategy of high consumption-oriented, concessional loans programmes for target 
groups...This also suited the rural oligarchy as it would be able to usurp the bulk of the 
funds flowing into the rural areas for poverty alleviation and also pressure would be 
diverted away from land reforms’ (Prasad, 1987:64-65).
As regards implementation, Vaidyanathan (1995:339) summarises the existing studies as 
follows: ‘Among the main points repeatedly made, the following are the most common: 1. 
The benefits of the programmes are not reaching the intended beneficiaries because it is 
easy for the better-off by virtue of their superior connections with local bureaucracy, to 
appropriate a sizeable part of the benefits. 2. Even when the beneficiaries are part of the 
target groups, their selection is often biased, and intermediaries tend to siphon off a 
substantial part of the resources. 3. The intended beneficiaries lack knowledge/information 
about the programmes under which they could seek assistance or about its form and terms. 
4. Intended beneficiaries are not organised to press their claims, to correct biased selection 
and other defects.’
An analysis of the functioning of the IRDP in Hilsa is outside the scope of the present
study. However, it is worth noting that Chandkura clearly has a high proportion of
households whose total household income places them below the poverty line and who are
therefore eligible for credit under the programme. Awareness of the programme is
widespread, and since 1982, thirteen households have actually received credit under the
IRDP accounting for 5.6 per cent of all households. Two had received loans for
horse-carts and the remaining eleven for buffaloes. Six of these households were
completely landless. However, another twenty households had applied for loans for several
different types of productive assets and been rejected, of whom twelve were completely
landless labourer households, and only three households were already operating above the
poverty line. And once again, demands for bribes raised the real costs to the borrower of
these loans and restricted access to them. In a typical experience, Gulabchand Das and
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Ghauli Devi, agricultural labourers who also owned a small amount of land, had to pay Rs 
700 to staff at the Allahabad Bank in Hilsa in order to get their loan of Rs 4,000 for a 
buffalo released. It was reported that bank managers and various 'dalals' (middlemen) in 
the block administration frequently charged ’commissions' of up to 50 per cent on 
government loans.
The question of institutionalised corruption - and in particular, the appropriation of 
development resources - as a source of accumulation is explored further below. First 
however we will look at patterns of expenditure of surpluses in Chandkura.
2. Major expenditures in Chandkura
As we have seen, there had been remarkably little expenditure (whether using credit or 
accumulated surpluses) on capital goods in the village since the early 1980s, the exception 
being a tractor bought by one of the largest landowners in 1992 solely for the purpose of 
hiring out in transport and construction work. And purchase of land in this period had been 
negligible.
The main avenues of major expenditure (which we have defined as expenditures of Rs
10,000 and above at 1995-96 prices) in this period fall into two categories: house 
construction, and marriage.
a) House Construction
In contrast to the near-stagnant land market, construction was clearly booming in all the 
twelve villages I surveyed in 1995-96, as well as in Hilsa town. Some of the implications of 
this have been discussed in earlier chapters: it provides a source of employment outside 
agriculture (although often with the same group of employers) for labouring households 
which has increased their ability to demand higher wages in agriculture, but it is an 
inherently unstable and limited source of income. It is also a source of accumulation for 
tractor-owners who can hire out their tractors for construction work.
In this section however, our concern is with how accumulated surpluses are being invested
in the fieldwork area. Spacious two and three storey houses both in the villages and in
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Hilsa town, are, along with extravagant weddings, vast dowries and in some cases a 
formidable array of licensed and unlicensed weapons, potent symbols of the upward 
mobility of a section of the rich peasants of the area. House construction is a major source 
of expenditure for that group which has been able to consolidate the improvement in their 
class status afforded by technological change and increased yields by integrating 
themselves into the political and bureaucratic structures and networks which allow them to 
divert and appropriate a large portion of the Block's development resources.
However house construction has also been an important channel of expenditure for a much 
wider section of rural households. Remarkably, as many as 30 per cent of all households 
and 44 per cent of households cultivating land in Chandkura had invested more than Rs
10,000 on house construction in the period 1981-96. The majority of these investments 
were in ‘pakka’ houses (i.e with walls of brick and cement rather than mud) costing one 
lakh (Rs 100,000) or more. Of these households, approximately one third were rich 
peasants, half were classified as middle peasants and the remainder as poor peasants. 
However, all the ‘poor peasant’ constructing households had sources of non-agricultural 
income, mainly family members with salaried employment outside the village, and this was 
what had made it possible to construct a new house. In fact, 62 per cent of all the 
constructing households had used savings from non-agricultural salaried employment. The 
remaining 38 per cent had used agricultural surpluses generated either directly through 
their own activities in cultivation, or, as we have discussed, indirectly, through 
moneylending.
It was through family members in 'government service' that the only two 'pakka' houses
belonging to scheduled caste households in Chandkura had been constructed in the early
1990s. Since 1980, Jagroop Das spent most of the time away from the village due to his
job as a police wireless operator in Saharsa district - although he returned to the village
during the peak season to help cultivate the small amount of land the family had also
bought from his savings. In 1991 the family had built a two storey house painted in pastel
shades, whose roof commanded a view of the entire village from its location at the farthest
comer of what the Kurmi peasants referred to contemptuously as the 'Chamar tola'. While
this family had withdrawn from agricultural wage labour, their neighbours, Ghauli Devi
and her husband Gulabchand Das, continued hire themselves out to work on others’ land,
although their two younger sons, both college students, worked only on the tiny plots the
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family leased in. The eldest son, a graduate, worked for the Life Insurance Corporation in 
Nawada district. At the time of this son’s marriage in 1992, they had received a dowry of 
Rs. 10,000 from his bride’s family, which allowed them to begin the construction of a 
‘pakka’ house in 1993.
b) Expenditure on Marriage and the Nature o f Dowry
Marriage expenses have in much of the literature on agrarian change and rural poverty 
been included within the general category of 'social expenditure' or, in the terms of the 
'semi-feudal' thesis, conspicuous consumption.
On the one hand, the ANSISS/ILO study, for instance, states that 'it is a common feature 
in tradition-bound rural Bihar that people spend lavishly on occasions such as marriage, 
shradha, festivals etc. Not only do the deficit households take loans for spending on such 
occasions, but this is true even of the relatively better off households' (Prasad, Rodgers et 
al, 1988:479).
On the other, Das has argued forcefully that 'much is made by smug urbanites and officials 
about the 'extravagant social needs' of the rural poor which drive them into debt. It is even 
suggested that they should stop getting married and dying. What is not realised is that the 
marriage loan is not generally a loan for a band-baaja-ghori-gas barat 5; it is for 
consumption. The occasion may be a marriage or a death, but the cause is poverty and 
starvation. In the situation in which the rural poor exist, a 'good' meal once in 5 or ten 
years is not a luxury; it is a necessity. The pitifully small amounts borrowed - ten, fifteen, 
twenty, a maximum of two hundred rupees - bear testimony to this’ (Das, 1979:13).
But while Das’s argument still rings true as far as 'social expenditure' in general is 
concerned, I would argue that marriage expenses, and specifically the giving and receiving 
of dowry (‘dahej’ or ‘tilak’) which is prevalent in Bihar6 need to be analysed as a separate 
category from other social expenditure and consumption.
5 This refers to the necessary components of an ostentatious ‘barat’ - the wedding procession which the 
groom and his relatives take to the bride’s house: a band, firecrackers, a horse and lights.
6 Agarwal (1994:505) defines dowry thus: ‘in broad terms a dowry transaction involves a transfer (of 
movables or immovables) from the girl’s family to the girl, her husband or his kin, at the time of her 
marriage.’
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The practice of dowry is not simply a form of social interaction: it is inextricably linked to 
patterns of accumulation. In pre-capitalist agrarian societies, it can be analysed as a means 
by which households with sons can consolidate resources - and land in particular - in their 
hands. Dowry practices, like those of inheritance, are subject to considerable variation 
according to region, community and caste. But the dominant form of dowry throughout 
North India allows property to be transferred from one family to another via daughters 
without giving women themselves any control over it or challenging the patriarchal pattern 
of inheritance which takes place solely through the male line. Some writers have argued 
that dowry is a ‘rotating fund’, where families get back on the marriage of sons what they 
spend on the marriage of daughters, but, as Mies argues, this fails to recognise ‘the 
basically asymmetric, non-reciprocal and hypergamous relationship between bride-giving 
and bride-receiving families in India...the groom’s family can almost totally determine the 
amount of the dowry’ (Mies, 1986:158).
At the same time, the institution of dowry is part of an ideology which justifies and 
reinforces the subordination and exploitation of women by devaluing them, and their role 
in production in particular. The link between dowry and property has meant that dowry in 
India has traditionally been most prevalent among the upper caste groups who own the 
land. As Chakravarti argues ‘the status of women in the high castes is related among other 
things to control over property inherited by men, which may foster the degradation of 
women in order to exclude them from a share in inheritance...An important factor 
responsible for the differences between high and low castes is the contrast between high 
castes as landowners and the low castes as wage earners. There is here an equality 
between adult sons and father, and between husband and wife, which comes from then- 
separate and more or less equal status as wage earners. The lower caste woman’s 
economic role accounts for her more equal rights both in her marital and natal homes. 
Thus the difference between high caste and low caste women is caused by differences in 
relation to production’(Chakravarti, 1995:2254).
The extent of dowry and its implications for women’s status have also been linked to the
place of residence after marriage: with women being most vulnerable in situations where
the woman goes to live with her husband’s family on marriage (patrilocality) especially
when it is compulsory to marry outside one’s natal village. According to Kelkar and Gala
(1990:108)‘the rules of patrilocal residence governing women have been considered to be
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a key element in the origins of sexual stratification of women’s role in production which 
enable men to utilize and appropriate women’s labour in ways that ultimately enhance the 
authority of the husband’s family’. All the castes in my fieldwork area practiced 
patrilocality. The only exceptions were in cases in which landed families had no sons, 
where one or more daughters remained at home to look after the family land together with 
their husbands, who either lived with their wives and parents-in-law or visited them 
frequently.
Like other forms of interaction which together make up the relations of production, the 
nature of dowry in particular regions- its prevalence, extent and form, cannot be regarded 
as determined by static 'traditions’. It has been transformed by changes in the mode of 
production. For example, it has been observed that in regions which have witnessed 
considerable capitalist development in agriculture, levels of dowry among landowning 
groups have escalated sharply. This has been linked to both the penetration of the market 
as well as a decline in women’s status as they are increasingly marginalised from the direct 
production process (see for example Jain et al, 1987; Wilson, 1991).
My data on dowry costs is limited to those households who had married - or got their 
children married - recently, or were planning to do so, in Chandkura village (although 
group discussions in other villages included in my study revealed that similar levels prevail 
among the same castes and classes there). It should therefore only be treated as giving a 
rough approximation of the situation prevailing in the area.
As Tables 32 - 34 show, dowry is considerably higher among higher landowning size 
groups, as well as among the landowning castes (Kurmis and Yadavs in this case) and 
among middle peasants, rich peasants and landlords. As we have noted, the Kurmis who 
dominate the fieldwork area are a peasant caste in which women traditionally work on the 
land cultivated by the family. In the colonial period they were occupancy tenants : in 
Chandkura for example rent was levied by an Bhumihar absentee zamindar who lived in 
Gaya District. If dowry is regarded as inextricably linked to property, it can therefore be 
hypothesised that substantial dowries spread among the Kurmis after they gained land 
ownership rights in the period following zamindari abolition. However further research 
would be required to verify this.
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Table 32: Mean value of dowry paid on marriage bv brides* families in Chandkura 
at 1995-96 prices, by amount of land owned
Land ownership category Mean cost of dowry in Rs.(1995-96 
prices)
Landless 5,666
Up to 0.49 acres 12,500
0.5 to 2.49 acres 16,583
2.5 to 4.99 acres 60,833
5 acres and above 67,500
Source: Fieldwork
Table 33: Mean value of dowry paid on marriage bv brides* families in Chandknra 
at 1995-96 prices, by caste
Caste Mean cost of dowry in Rs.(1995-96 
prices)
Scheduled Caste 7,190
Lower Backward Caste 17,500
Yadav 34,775
Kurmi 40,642
Source:Fieldwork
Table 34: Mean value of dowry paid on marriage by brides’ families in Chandkura 
at 1995-96 prices, by economic class
Class Mean cost of dowry in Rs.(1995-96 
prices)
Agricultural Labourer 5,850
Poor Peasant 21,250
Middle Peasant 37,333
Rich Peasant 30,000
Landlord 82,500
Source:Fieldwork
Interestingly, the value of dowry among rich peasants appears to be less than that among 
middle peasants (Table 34). This may be a result of the rather fuzzy distinction between 
these two class categories (see Chapter 3 ); since it refers to dowries paid out by 
‘bride-giving’ families, it could also be reflecting the higher demand faced by less well-off 
Kurmi families who marry their daughters into better-off families (middle peasant and rich 
peasant households both mainly belong to the Kurmi caste). Dowries vary most
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systematically according to caste: the big leap in dowry values between landownership 
categories of ‘up to 2.49 acres’ and 2.5 - 4.9 acres (Table 32) reflects a difference in 
caste.
But what is also significant from the point of view of accumulation is the high level of 
dowries in 1995-96 when viewed as a proportion of surpluses accumulated by households 
in Chandkura through cultivation. In fact these payments exceeded average total annual 
net crop income for every landholding size group. This was the case even for households 
with no other source of income other than cultivation.
In this context it is perhaps not surprising that raising the costs of dowry for a daughter’s 
marriage was one of the main reasons given for the sale of small portions of land (see 
Chapter 5, ‘Changing Patterns of Land Ownership and Access to Land’). However, it is 
also important to note that firstly, land itself was never part of the dowry, which was paid 
largely in cash, although also including jewellery and consumer durables ranging from 
watches and bicycles in poor households to televisions, refrigerators, sofa sets and 
motorcycles in richer ones. Secondly, none of the richer cultivating households who had 
received large quantities of cash on the marriage of a son had invested them either in 
buying land or in agricultural production. Some of the tangible uses to which the money 
was put included house construction, setting up a member of the family as a contractor or 
in a transport business, and paying the bribes necessary to procure a government job. This 
reflects current perceptions among cultivating households that more effective avenues for 
accumulation lie outside the agricultural sector and suggests that the surpluses which are 
translated into dowries generally find their way into essentially ‘unproductive’ sectors of 
the economy.
While Tables 32 - 34 confirm that dowries are considerably higher among larger 
landowners, dominant classes and higher castes, there has been a qualitative change in 
dowry patterns among dalit agricultural labourers during the last fifteen years. Women and 
men who had married in the 1970s and earlier explained that in their day, the ‘tilak’ was a 
token payment of five rupees or so. During the past fifteen years, a more substantial dowry 
of at least Rs 1,000, quite distinct from the expenses of the wedding itself, had become 
commonplace. For a husband who had matriculated (and thus had a chance of getting 
non-manual employment), a dowry as high as Rs 30- 40,000 could be demanded. As one
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fifty year old man in Bhokila village put it, ‘we have to give these amounts if we want to 
marry our girls into more developed families. Otherwise the dowry is only Rs 1,000 - but 
the girl will have to work in the kisans’ fields right from the day of her wedding’.
This emergence of dowry among the landless and near- landless dalit communities gives 
further credence to the theory that dowry, while remaining linked to property and 
accumulation, is no longer tied to land ownership and agricultural production, and 
therefore underlines the growing disarticulation between agricultural production and 
accumulation patterns in the fieldwork area.
The fact that the limited increase in access to education and non-manual employment 
which has occurred in these communities since the early 1980s appears to have led to the 
adoption of the practice of dowry, previously limited to the higher castes, also raises 
questions about women’s status. It suggests that while the ideology which legitimises 
caste-based inequalities is being challenged in a number of ways, these challenges have not 
involved questioning the values and practices of the higher castes in relation to gender, 
which have remained dominant. Rather, a perceived improvement in status for lower caste 
households has been associated with the adoption of these values and practices.7. This has 
been discussed earlier in the context of attitudes to women’s participation in agricutural 
wage labour (see Chapter 6).
In the case of dowry however, dalit women involved in the movement of agricultural 
labourers and poor peasants have spoken out against its emergence among these classes 
and its detrimental impact on women’s position. In fact this is one of the issues which has 
been raised when women have organised autonomously within the context of the 
movement.
The luxury consumer goods included in dowries also raise questions about the changing 
nature of ‘conspicuous consumption’. In the ‘semi-feudal’ model, conspicuous 
consumption by the dominant landowners signifies power and status which, in theory at
7 Referring to differences in practice regarding widow remarriage, Chakravarti (1995: 2248) argues that 
in the past, upper caste practices have often been prohibited for the lower castes because, ‘a single caste 
framework functioning both at the level of ideology and material arrangements requires distinctive 
patriarchal arrangements and cultural codes among the hierarchy of castes to reproduce the structure of 
production’.
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least, is ascribed by birth and cannot be acquired through a process of acumulation. Who is 
allowed to consume what is limited and subject to strict rules. Contemporary rural society 
in Central Bihar is however, now integrated into a wider capitalist market, even while 
relations and forces of production have not been fully transformed. This capitalist market 
perpetuates itself through the myth that its commodities are accessible to all. Thus in 
Central Bihar today, conspicuous consumption is one of the goals of accumulation of 
surpluses for all social groups. And unlike the earlier, relatively static ‘semi-feudal’ 
conspicuous consumption, it is constantly changing and growing in response to new 
‘needs’ and demands created by the market. The practice of dowry further fuels these 
demands and dowries themselves in turn continue to grow.
3. Development, the Administration, Crime and Accumulation
When asked if he uses the new varieties of HYV seed supplied by the block development 
office, Siri Doman, a dalit agricultural labourer and marginal cultivator in Chandkura, 
replies: Svhen those seeds come in us poor people don't even get to hear about it - the rich 
peasants buy them up at low rates from the block by paying bribes. Then they sell them 
again - but they charge too much for us to afford.'
In another Hilsa village, when asked about development funds, a group of poor peasants 
point out one of the ruins of partially constructed state tubewells which dot the land on 
both banks of the Lokayan river - part of the World Bank-funded ‘Bihar Public Tubewell 
Project’8: ‘politicians, officials and contractors ate up all the funds - and this is what we 
are left with’.
The state, as Engels and later Lenin wrote, is ‘as a rale, the state of the most powerful, 
economically dominant class, which, through the medium of the state, becomes also the 
politically dominant class, and thus acquires new means of holding down and exploiting
8 This project was initiated in 1985-86 and was intended to construct 500 new state tubewells as well as 
constructing dedicated power lines to 5,212 state tubewells. According to Basavan Sinha, ex-Chief 
Engineer, Irrigation, the project was a ‘disaster’: by April 1994, only 89 new tubewells had been 
completed under the project (256 had been drilled) and only 47 per cent of all energised state tubewells in 
the state were working. Dedicated power lines turned out to be unworkable given the extremely poor 
power supply in Bihar (Interview, Patna, 26.4.%). The final cost was estimated at more than double the 
appraisal estimate of Rs 1296.2m, and the World Bank itself ultimately financed only 19 per cent of the 
total estimated cost, compared to 70 per cent on appraisal, ‘severely increasing the burden on the State 
budget’ (Government of India, 1995).
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the oppressed class’ (F. Engels cited in Lenin, 1968:270). As we will see, the state in Bihar 
not only fulfils this role but it is also a medium through which the dominant class can 
consolidate its economic power. For the rural poor of Hilsa and other parts of Central 
Bihar, the nature of the local state apparatuses as not only representatives of the interests 
of the dominant groups, but as a source of further accumulation for these groups is 
glaringly obvious.
By the mid-1990s, as little as ten acres was estimated as the minimum size of landholding 
neccessary to gain access to such sources - once a landowner owned more than this 
amount of land and was generating a surplus, he potentially gained access to political 
power and this transformed his position, this transformation being far more significant than 
the quantitative change in landholding size or income from land (P.P. Ghosh, Director of 
the Asian Development Research Institute (ADRI), Patna, personal communication).
One of the indicators of the extent to which resources are being appropriated through the 
state structures is the remarkable proliferation in the number of administrative districts in 
Bihar. The State, which consisted of 17 districts in the early 1970s, was composed of 55 
separate districts in 1997. According to observers there are two main reasons for this. 
Firstly, in order to facilitate the repression unleashed during the first phase of the 
‘Naxalite’ agrarian struggles in the early 1970s, new police districts were created; these 
later became administrative districts. Secondly, more recently there has been a continuous 
process of lobbying by locally dominant classes for the creation of sub-divisions from 
blocks and districts from sub-divisions. For them, the creation of a new district means the 
creation of new jobs within the bureaucracy, a District Development Corporation with its 
own funds, and other resources.
In this context Choudhary (1991) describes the ‘wider social connections’ of the rich 
peasants of the area: ‘one member of his family will be found working in any public sector 
or private industry in South Bihar, one may be a daroga, another may be a doctor or an 
engineer, one close relative will be found working as a peon or clerk while another relative 
may be a state government official, and some other a political leader’.
A small survey of twenty contractors holding contracts from the Public Works Department 
and other State government departments which I carried out in 1995 illustrates similar
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connections, with members of the same family working in the administration, the police, as 
contractors and as leaders of political parties, and in some cases engaging in organised 
crime such as smuggling, as well as cultivating the family land (see Table 35). However, 
more significant than the kinship links of the personnel of state and political institutions, or 
even their class affiliations, are the specific ways these institutions articulate to provide, 
maintain and protect the patterns and sources of accumulation of the dominant classes as 
a whole.
The situation prevailing in Hilsa in 1995-96 was not an extreme one by Central Bihar 
standards, but illustrates the dynamics of the relationship between social power based on 
landownership, administrative corruption, crime and electoral politics which characterises 
the region as a whole.
During this period peasants and small shopkeepers in a large part of the block were being 
terrorised by an armed criminal gang led by Dhananjay Singh which was extorting money 
and had committed a number of murders. In a typical attempt to intimidate and terrorise 
the inhabitants, the gang staged military style marches through the villages, armed with 
around 50 rifles, firing into the air. The police were clearly not prepared to take action 
against the gang. According to the Sub-Divisional Officer for Hilsa, the major problem in 
arresting Dhananjay Singh was the inaccessibility of his area of operation, the Karai 
Parsarai area bordering Patna and Jehanabad districts, which she described as a 'Naxalite' 
area, for the police. But even when the gang took out a march under their noses in 
Chiksaura village, where a police camp had been set up, nothing was done.
However, the Dhananjay Singh gang's activities were not restricted to extorting money 
from those who had managed to accumulate some surplus, however meagre. The gang 
was also close to many of the larger Kurmi landowners in the area, and had acted on their 
behalf, particularly during elections.
For example in Fatehpur village, agricultural labourers organised by the CPI(ML) went on 
strike for higher wages in 1982. During the strike, which lasted fifteen days, the 
landowners tried to bring in labourers from neighbouring villages, but the village labourers 
prevented them from working. The strike was successful in increasing wages and in
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4
reducing the incidence of attached labour, and since then there has been continuing tension 
between the ‘mazdoors’in the village, and the ‘kisans’ who in different periods have had links 
with various Senas (see Chapter 6) as well as political parties such as the Janata Dal and the 
Samata Party. During the 1995 Assembly elections, the landowners brought in Dhananjay 
Singh’s gang to ‘capture’ the polling booth and prevent the labourers from casting their votes 
for the CPI(ML) candidate.9 The CPI(ML) activists of the village resisted and bullets were 
exchanged. While the police refused to take action against either the gang or their patrons in 
the village, the incident was used as a pretext for the police to register cases against five of the 
people who had been active in the wage struggle, cases which were still continuing.
While the police are generally, as in the Fatehpur case, openly collusive with the dominant 
landowners, (some of the many more extreme examples of this have been cited in Chapter 6, 
‘Agricultural Labour in the Fieldwork Area’), a whole range of state apparatuses reinforce this 
collusion both practically and ideologically. The attitude of the recently appointed 
Sub-Divisional Officer for Hilsa, V. Nirja, when asked about the problems and issues of 
conflict in her area, was revealing: ‘in a lot of these villages, the poor - they are not really 
poor because they are armed - they are extortionists! So our sympathies are not with them. 
Wages are always mutually agreed. The problem is when political parties intervene. Initially it 
helps, but now people are so aware in Nalanda! Now the real poor are only the 
Musahars10’(Interview, Hilsa, 3.3.96).
Meanwhile, in February 1996, the Dhananjay Singh gang murdered Binay Paswan, a landless
dalit who was also a CPI(ML) sympathiser, in Berthu village in the Karai Parsarai area of
Hilsa Block. The background to this was that the construction of fifty pakka houses for dalit
9 ‘Booth-capturing’ - the forcible takeover of polling booths by armed men affiliated to one of the candidates, 
in order to prevent the supporters of other candidates from casting their votes - has become a hallmark of 
elections in Bihar. In the fieldwork area, until the late 1980s it was common for agricultural labourers not to 
attempt to vote at all: their votes would be cast by the landowners who dominated their village, fin whichever 
party the landowners were affiliated to. This situation changed with the advent of the Indian People’s Front (a 
mass organisation linked to the CPI[ML] ). The IPF began fielding candidates in Bihar in 1985. The IPF 
began fighting elections precisely in order to challenge this disenfranchisement of the poor which was rooted 
in the very structure of agrarian power. For the first time poor dalit men and women began to assert the right 
to vote for the candidate of their choice. Not surprisingly then, the landowners and their candidate (whose 
party affiliation varied considerably from one constituency to the next - as well as in many cases changing 
from one election to the next) responded by considerably strengthening the armed force they deployed during 
elections.
10The Musahars, a Scheduled Caste, are almost exclusively landless, and have historically been among the 
poorest of the poor as their name, which means ‘mouse-eaters’ implies.
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households in this village had been sanctioned under the Indira Awaz Yojana scheme. The 
Block Development Officer (BDO) had demanded bribes of Rs 1,000 per household and was 
refusing to allow the construction to go ahead until he received this money. Binay Paswan had 
initiated resistance to this illegal demand.
The BDO concerned was notorious for his corruption. But these phenomena and the linkages 
they illustrate - between corruption, violent crime, the protection of landed interests, the 
manipulation of electoral politics, and state and private acts of repression against the working 
people - are replicated throughout Central Bihar.
4. Politics and Power: Competition and Collaboration Among the Rural Rich
There is today a marked heterogeneity among the classes which dominate Central Bihar. 
Developments in the 1970s and early 1980s led to the acceleration of a process of 
consolidation of a section of rich peasants, cultivating mainly through hired and family labour, 
which had been underway since Independence. While they included some of the Bhumihar 
ex-‘occupancy tenants’, a significant proportion belonged to ‘Backward Caste’ peasant 
groups: Yadavs, Kurmis and Koeris. This process, which in the political arena culminated in 
the coming to power of Laloo Prasad Yadav's Janata Dal government in 1990, posed a 
powerful challenge to the economic and political dominance of the upper caste non-cultivating 
landowners, Bhumihars, Rajputs and Brahmans.
As we have argued in this chapter, control over state institutions - in collaboration with 
politicians and officials - is a key factor in the accumulation strategies of both the ‘old’ and 
the ‘new’ rural rich. But while these institutions may be local - often block level - for a 
particular section of rich peasants to gain control of them in this way presupposes organising 
on a larger scale to intervene in the electoral process. Thus competition between these 
different sections of the rural landed classes - for resources themselves, and for political 
power, is an inevitable feature of Central Bihar’s contemporary political economy. It is a 
competition whose edge is sharpened by a much longer history of Backward Caste resistance 
to the oppression of the upper castes.
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In this context the increasing collaboration of these competing landed groups in attempting to 
suppress movements of the rural exploited classes is all the more striking. Whereas during the 
1980s the ‘private armies’ organised by landowning groups had been identified with a 
particular caste - for example the Bramarshi Sena of the Bhumihars, the Lorik Sena of the 
Yadavs, the Bhoomi Sena of the Kurmis and the Kuer Sena of the Rajputs - the early 1990s 
saw the emergence of armies like the Kisan Sangh which brought together Bhumihars, Yadavs 
and Kurmis with the support of both the Janata Dal and the Congress Party.
However the Kisan Sangh proved short-lived, and was succeeded by the Ranvir Sena. This 
was an armed gang explicitly representing the upper caste Bhumihars and increasingly also 
Rajputs. Despite this, the response of the political parties of the Backward Caste rich 
peasantry to the Ranvir Sena has been an ambivalent one to say the least, with 
well-documented instances of these parties providing the Sena with tacit support. In this 
context it is worth looking at the character of the Ranvir Sena in more detail.
The Ranvir Sena
The Ranvir Sena, which was formed in Bhojpur in 1994, is now also active in several adjoining 
districts of Central Bihar, and has carried out a series of massacres of dalit labourers, which 
have been characterised by their scale and barbarity and in particular by their extreme violence 
against women (see for example Bhatia 1997a and 1997b; Chaubey 1998). The Ranvir Sena 
can also be distinguished from earlier landlord armies' which have been active in the region by 
the extent of its resource mobilisation, with funds flowing in from upper caste-controlled 
mafias in the steel and coalmining towns of Bokaro and Dhanbad; and by its organic links with 
the Hindu communal Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) which provides it with direct and 
systematic support.
As it has grown in strength across India, the BJP has emerged as the most aggressive 
representative of upper caste landed interests in Bihar. Its practical connections with the 
Ranvir Sena - sharing local leaders, funds and arms - have been well-documented (see for 
example PUDR, 1997). The links are also reflected in the Ranvir Sena’s specific targetting of 
Muslims and attempts to create divisions along communal lines such as their attempt to build a 
Hanuman Temple on ‘Karbala’ land (land reserved for Muslim burials) in 1995; or their
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‘celebration’ of the 1998 Pokhran nuclear tests by killing several dalits and Muslims. In terms 
of propaganda too, the Ranvir Sena’s discourse bears the stamp of the BJP, accusing the 
CPI(ML) of being ‘agents of foreign powers’ seeking to destroy the ‘social fabric of Indian 
society’ (for which read the caste-based social hierarchy) and vowing to wipe out the ‘red 
flag’ not only from Bhojpur but from the face of India.
While the victims of Ranvir Sena massacres have been almost all dalits and Muslims, their 
treatment of other non-upper caste people reflects their determination to maintain the 
privileged status of the upper castes. In Belaur village, where a protracted struggle culminated 
in the formation of the Ranvir Sena, the actual trigger for conflict was an incident where a 
Bania shopkeeper refused to sell a cigarette to a member of one of the Bhumihar landowner 
families. One of the main issues in Belaur was the attempted rape of a Yadav woman by the 
son of one of the largest Bhumihar landowners. When a people’s court was organised to hear 
the case, this landowner is reported to have responded with the remark ‘I have reared a stud’ 
( 'maine sard posa ha? ). In the same village, the Ranvir Sena later prevented a Backward 
Caste bride from travelling in a palanquin because this was seen as usurping the traditional 
prerogative of the upper castes (group interview, Belaur, 15.2.95). In yet another case in 
Kauran Dihri village, they threatened to shoot a Backward Caste labourer who ‘dared to belch 
in front of us’!
But despite this open party allegiance and aggressively caste supremacist approach, the Ranvir 
Sena has also received material and moral support from the political parties which represent 
the intermediate caste rich peasantry. Around the time of the Sena’s formation, when 
Congress© and other leaders representing upper caste landowning interests were visiting the 
village and making inflammatory speeches encouraging the Bhumihar landowners, local Janata 
Dal politician Brijendra Yadav also visited the village and threatened the people with dire 
consequences if they did not ‘leave the Red Flag’ and come under the banner of the Janata 
Dal. Several well-known criminals from other districts, known to be close to Chief Minister 
Laloo Yadav, also visited Belaur and are believed to have taken money from the Bhumihars 
(group interview, Belaur, 15.2.95). Tacit support from the Janata Dal intensified in the period 
after CPI(ML) candidates won two seats in Bhojpur in the 1995 Assembly elections, in the 
run-up to the 1996 parliamentary elections. Subsequently, the Janata Dal MP for Ara 
constituency (which includes much of Bhojpur), Chandradeo Prasad Verma, who was also
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serving as Union Minister of State for Rural Areas Employment, demanded a lifting of the ban 
on the Ranvir Sena, and that the CPI(ML) be banned in its place. Shortly afterwards, on July 
11 1996, as national newspapers reported, the Ranvir Sena hacked to death ten women, nine 
children and one man in the Bathani Tola hamlet of Barki Kharaon village in Bhojpur, where 
many Dalit and Muslim households were close to the CPI(ML). It subsequently emerged that 
the Janata Dal ruled administration and the police had been informed in advanced about the 
planned attack, but chose to take no action. In fact, there were three police posts within a one 
kilometre radius of the village, but no police arrived there for over six hours, during which 
time the Ranvir Sena men remained in the village ‘celebrating’ the atrocity (see for example 
PUDR, 1997, Sinha and Sinha, 1996).
Since then, the peculiarly political character of the Ranvir Sena, acting for a heterogeneous 
alliance of landed interests against the electoral intervention of the rural poor through the 
CPI(ML), has become more marked, with the scale, timing and other features of recent 
massacres in Bhojpur, Patna and Jehanabad districts of Central Bihar seemingly determined by 
clear electoral calculations11
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have looked at the extent to which the dominant landowners in the 
fieldwork area have adopted strategies of accumulation which involve directing surpluses into 
unproductive channels outside agriculture.
Credit is a key aspect of this: earlier studies have identified ‘moneylending’ by landowners and 
the ‘interlocking of markets’ associated with it as a key factor inhibiting agrarian 
transformation. On the other hand, institutional credit can play an important role in promoting 
such a transformation in the hands of production-oriented cultivators. But it is also a 
mechanism through which those who have preferential access to institutional loans, or control 
over their disbursement, can divert and appropriate resources.
11 It is important to note that these massacres cannot be viewed as ‘reprisals’ for actions carried out by 
agricultural labourers - in fact since the Bathani Tola massacre, the Ranvir Sena has largely targetted villages 
where the labourers and poor peasants are unorganised and have no links with the CPI(ML). The aim seems to 
be to create a general climate of terror among the rural poor, particularly around the time of elections.
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My fieldwork showed that in the period between 1981-82 and 1995-96, ‘traditional’ loans 
remained a significant source of credit in Chandkura and other villages in Hilsa. Rich peasants 
in the creditor’s village were the major lenders. There was significant interlocking: of credit 
and labour markets in the case of loans to agricultural labourers (which are often consumption 
loans); and of credit and the market for hired and purchased agricultural inputs in the case of 
loans to poor and middle peasants (which are frequently production loans). However, as well 
as using credit to facilitate surplus appropriation from the borrower in other markets, as 
described by Bharadwaj (1974b; 1985) and Bhaduri (1973; 1983; 1986), these lenders 
attempted to use the credit market to maintain the status quo in response to challenges to their 
economic and social power. As I have argued, the interest rates charged by these lenders have 
become more highly differentiated according to the class of the borrower, as class conflicts 
have intensified. When agricultural labourers have demanded higher wages, interest rates 
charged to them have been increased to such an extent as to make credit inaccessible to them. 
At the same time, much lower rates - or even, in the case of Kurmi middle peasants, interest 
free loans - serve to reinforce solidarity among different classes of employers.
As this implies, the gains from moneylending cannot be assessed simply in terms of direct 
returns to capital advanced. However, my observations also suggest that even the direct 
returns on lending make it a profitable alternative to investment in agriculture. On the one 
hand, there has been an increase in real production costs since the early 1990s, which is 
exacerbated by the relatively small and fragmented landholdings of even the richer cultivators 
in the fieldwork area. On the other hand, the persistence of acute poverty, as well as the lack 
of access of small cultivators to institutional credit, ensures continued demand for, and 
dependence upon, traditional credit. In fact as we have argued in Chapter 4, ‘Agriculture, 
Technology and Class’, this dependence has if anything increased in the case of small 
cultivators, who have effectively been compelled to adopt the ‘new’ technology. In this 
context a number of rich peasants, while continuing to cultivate their own land, choose to 
invest surpluses in lending rather than making capital investments to sustain a process of 
expanded reproduction in agriculture.
The major portion of institutional credit to agriculture was received by rich peasants in the 
period 1981-82 to 1995-96, although in the 1990s overall credit flows had declined in 
comparison to their levels in the 1970s and 1980s, when many rich peasants had taken loans
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for one or more tractors to hire out and use in non-agricultural activities like construction and 
transport. While the 1980s and early 1990s saw poor peasants being compelled to adopt ‘new’ 
technology under unfavourable conditions, their access to institutional credit had not 
increased proportionately. Where they applied for such loans and they were sanctioned, a 
significant proportion was appropriated by bank officials and block level state functionaries 
who demanded bribes in order to disburse the loans. This was also a source of accumulation 
for powerful landowners in the fieldwork area who had links with these officials.
The pattern of major expenditures also throws light on the ways in which surpluses are 
utilised. There had been very little expenditure on agricultural capital goods during the period 
between 1981-82 and 1995-96, and land purchase too, had been negligible. House 
construction and dowries paid on the marriage of daughters accounted for nearly all the major 
expenditures by surplus producing households in Chandkura. Rich peasants in the fieldwork 
area also used surpluses to invest in buses, brick kilns, shops or cinemas, to buy weapons, and 
in some cases to build political careers. Dowry payments constituted a significant proportion 
of income for all classes in Chandkura and were much higher among higher castes, dominant 
classes and larger landowning groups. However dowries did not include land, nor was cash 
received as dowry used to buy land, or invested in agricultural production. Rather dowries 
were used for house construction, setting up a member of the family in business or for paying 
the bribes necessary to procure a government job. Thus while dowry remains inextricably 
linked to accumulation, it is disarticulated from landed property and from the process of 
surplus accumulation in agriculture, even as it has become articulated with a wider market. 
This is also reflected in the rise of dowry among landless dalit households, where dowries 
depended largely on the access of the groom to salaried employment.
The situation in the fieldwork area in 1995-96 also illustrated how social power based on 
landownership on the one hand, and administrative corruption, crime and electoral politics on 
the other, interact to create, sustain and protect the prevailing patterns of accumulation. While 
inevitably difficult to quantify, state apparatuses and institutions are clearly being used by the 
dominant landowners in the fieldwork area to appropriate resources on a significant scale. But 
to do this requires political power, which has meant competition at a wider level with other 
powerful landed groups in Central Bihar. However the 1990s have seen all these groups
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collaborating to resist the economic, social and political challenge posed by the organised 
movements of the rural working people.
Overall, the findings presented in this chapter demonstrate that in the 1980s and early 1990s 
accumulated surpluses were channeled, in the form of both consumption and investment, into 
a variety of unproductive avenues outside agriculture. But in order to assess the impact of this 
on the process of expanded reproduction in agriculture - and potential agrarian transformation 
- we also need to ask whether these non-productive activities are actually taking place at the 
expense of - rather than just alongside - productive ones.
Many of the phenomena we have described here have also been observed in regions which 
have witnessed substantial capitalist development in agriculture. For example, rich peasants 
have used their connections with the local bureaucracy to appropriate and resell subsidised 
inputs in Haryana (Bhalla,1976); traditional credit has remained a significant input in 
agricultural production in Punjab and new forms of informal credit have emerged (Gill, 1996); 
and interlinked markets have characterised new relations of production which have 
accompanied rapid development of the productive forces in Haiyana and Western U.P. 
(Bhalla, 1976; Srivastava, 1989b). This reflects the complexities of the transition to 
capitalism, in which elements from an earlier mode of production may be retained during the 
early stages. These elements may in fact be incorporated into new, capitalist forms of surplus 
extraction and reinvestment. The point to be noted is that, as all the sources cited here testify, 
these activities have not substantially displaced the process of accumulation and productive 
reinvestment of surpluses in agricultural production12. The balance of forces between those 
‘promoting productive accumulation’ and those ‘stabilising, perpetuating and reinforcing 
unproductive investment’(Bharadwaj, 1985:21) appears to have shifted decisively in favour of 
the former.
These areas have witnessed increasing concentration of land holdings in the hands of larger 
holders through the operation of both land and lease markets (see Chapter 5); and investment 
in technological inputs, particularly agricultural machinery, leading to an increasing organic
12In fact, Gill (1996) gives the surplus of demand for agricultural credit from investment-oriented large 
cultivators over the supply of institutional credit as a reason for the development of new forms of informal 
credit in Punjab. This contrasts with the situation observed by Sarap in Orissa, which has witnessed relatively 
little capitalist development, where large farmers had access to institutional credit in excess of their production 
needs under existing production conditions(Sarap, 1987).
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composition of capital (see for example Gill, 1988). Changes in the relations of production 
which have taken place in these areas, including those which have created new forms of 
‘unfreedom’ for the exploited groups (Brass, 1990), have been geared towards increasing 
dominant landholders control over labour in the context of new production processes (see for 
example Srivastava 1989a and b).
In the fieldwork area, by contrast, underlying structures which favour the diversion of 
surpluses into unproductive avenues have not been transformed. The area continues to be 
characterised by widespread dependence on the land as the only means of survival, extreme 
inequality of land distribution, and a preponderance of small and marginal holdings. This 
pattern and the acute poverty associated with it, perpetuates the dependence of poor peasant 
and agricultural labour households on the dominant landowners in interlocked credit, input and 
labour markets. This has been further exacerbated since the early 1980s as small landholders 
producing for subsistence have found themselves compelled to adopt the ‘new’ technology. 
Given these conditions, even in the absence of productive investment in agriculture, a very 
high rate of exploitation of labour ensures that rich peasants continue to extract some 
surpluses. These surpluses form the initial capital which provides access to networks which 
link administrators, criminal gangs and political parties. Thus agrarian power provides not only 
the social but the economic basis for entry into other, more lucrative, avenues of 
accumulation.
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CONCLUSIONS
The findings of this study confirm the hypothesis that the process of transition to a more 
dynamic agriculture based on ‘peasant’ capitalism which appeared to have begun in parts of 
Central Bihar in the 1970s has subsequently encountered powerful constraints which are 
rooted in both the agrarian structure itself and the nature of State power in Bihar. The findings 
also confirm that the movement of agricultural labourers and other sections of the exploited 
classes which has emerged and developed during the same period is bringing about significant 
changes in the relations of production, and challenging the basis of power in rural Central 
Bihar.
The agrarian economy of Central Bihar is firstly characterised by acute inequalities and an 
extremely high incidence of landlessness. Secondly, small and marginal landholdings 
predominate in the region. Thirdly, even the small number of dominant big' landowners rarely 
cultivate large tracts of land. And in the absence of land consolidation, their holdings generally 
consist of a large number of small plots, while the persistence of chronic fragmentation 
continually increases the numbers of small holdings.
An impetus towards 'peasant capitalist' development emerged in certain parts of Central Bihar, 
including the fieldwork area, under uniquely favourable conditions which prevailed during the 
1970s. However, this impetus did not prove powerful enough to effect a transformation of the 
relations and forces of production along the lines observed elsewhere in India (notably Punjab, 
Haryana and western U.P). Instead surpluses accumulated in this phase were directed into 
unproductive activities, the conditions for which were created by the prevailing poverty, 
inequality and dependence on the land for survival. The most widespread of these are 
moneylending, and the hiring out of agricultural machinery. When more substantial surpluses 
have been accumulated in agriculture, they have been diverted into avenues such as 
contracting and organised crime, which are inextricably linked to political parties and the state.
This is also one of the factors behind the virtual collapse of the infrastructure since the early 
1980s, leading to spiralling costs of production, which in turn has served to reinforce a 
situation where it is more profitable for richer peasants to use their assets to extract a rental 
surplus from poor peasants - whether through moneylending, hiring out equipment, or using
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their control over the local bureaucracy to appropriate and re-sell subsidised inputs - than to 
invest in agricultural production.
Further, these activities, and the very nature of the state in Bihar which facilitates them, are 
underpinned by the continuing stranglehold of the dominant classes over rural society. The 
left-led movements of mainly dalit agricultural labourers, who are the most exploited section 
of this society, pose a direct threat to this power. And the experiences of the land and 
particularly wage struggles which are currently forming the central thrust of these movements 
suggest that they represent the most resilient and potent force for change in the region today.
Comparisons and Contrasts
In the previous four chapters we have noted a number of comparisons between the fieldwork 
area and regions of India which have witnessed more resilient capitalist development, and 
about which a considerable literature exists (notably Punjab, Haryana and Western Uttar 
Pradesh in north-western India). These have proved illuminating in the context of various 
aspects of our hypotheses.
In summary, these regions have witnessed sustained productive investment in agriculture by 
substantial lanowners, leading to increasing productivity of land and labour. There has been 
considerable concentration of land through the operation of both land and lease markets, so 
that the increase in the numbers of marginal holdings has been accompanied by an increase in 
the proportion of land controlled by large cultivators.
Against this background, these rich peasant "proto-capitalists1 have mobilised along class lines 
to create the conditions for accelerating capitalist accumulation, raising demands relating to 
access to agricultural inputs, agricultural prices, infrastructural development and consolidation 
of landholdings. Further, this class has responded to attempts to organise by agricultural 
labourers by introducing new forms of exploitation and control over labour suited to the needs 
of capitalist productioa
All these phenomena stand in sharp contrast to our observations of the fieldwork area 
presented in the previous four chapters. These findings are summarised below.
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Technological Change
The period from the mid-1960s until 1981-82 saw a process of accumulation through 
investment in agricultural production among larger cultivators in the fieldwork area. The 
introduction and rapid extension of tubewell irrigation was accompanied by a change in the 
cropping pattern, in particular the adoption and spread of High Yield Variety rice and wheat, 
increased fertiliser use, and some initial mechanisation. However, the period from the early 
1980s until 1995-96, when my study was carried out, did not see further development along 
the same lines.
While irrigated area and per hectare fertiliser use continued to increase, in the second phase 
this increase represented primarily the adoption of the ‘new’ technology by small and marginal 
cultivators cultivating less than 2.5 acres. A large proportion of these cultivators are 
essentially subsistence producers who have been compelled to adopt high yielding crops and 
technologies in order to pay rents and service debts. These producers are characterised by the 
marketing of a ‘distress surplus’ and by the large proportion of land devoted to the cultivation 
of high value crops for sale. Our findings cast considerable doubt on studies which have 
characterised adoption of these inputs by small and marginal cultivators as leading to ‘income 
diffusion’. In the fieldwork area, poor peasants’ dependence on rich peasants has actually 
increased as a result of their adoption of new technology, and their forced integration into a 
number of markets.
Irrigation has largely been extended through larger cultivators hiring out diesel pumpsets to 
smaller cultivators. With the electricity supplies cut off from the early 1980s onwards, 
irrigation costs have increased steeply, with much of the burden of the increase being borne by 
those who hire in irrigation facilities. Fertiliser costs have also risen sharply in the 1990s, after 
the withdrawal of subsidies. All this has made poor and middle peasants more dependent on 
rich peasants for loans to cover both consumption as well as input costs. Very high rates of 
interest are frequently charged on these loans. And the supply of fertiliser, seeds and diesel at 
the block level is frequently cornered by rich peasants with links with the administration, who 
resell it at much higher prices.
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At die same time, with the rise in production costs, the rich peasants who were identified as 
potential ‘capitalist farmers’ in the early 1980s have ceased to invest their surpluses in 
agricultural production. They are using their existing assets (diesel pumpsets, tractors, and 
threshers) largely to exploit smaller cultivators through the operation of rental markets. Far 
from overcoming the resource constraints faced by the smaller cultivators, as neoclassical 
economists suggest, these rental markets are characterised by the appropriation of surpluses 
produced by them on the basis of monopoly rents. However, unlike the exploiting peasants in 
Kritsman’s model of rental markets for means of production, rich peasants in the fieldwork 
area are not investing the surpluses thus appropriated in agricultural production. Rather they 
are engaged in moneylending and other non-productive activities, while there has been little 
further technical change. The process of expanded reproduction in agriculture, a key indicator 
of capitalist development, has not been established.
Land Ownership and Access to Land
The concentration of cultivated land, either owned or operated, in the hands of a small 
proportion of landowners which is associated with the development of capitalism in 
agriculture has not occurred in the fieldwork area during the period from 1981-82 until 
1995-96. In fact, the reverse phenomenon, that of dispersion of land in increasing numbers of 
small and marginal holdings, can be identified. While a decline in tenancy (involving leasing 
out by larger to smaller landowners) has reduced poor and landless households’ access to land, 
it has not been sufficient to counter other trends away from the concentration of operated 
land.
Some of these trends result from increased demographic pressure on cultivable land. Both the 
number of households and the total population fully or partially dependent on cultivation have 
increased considerably during the reference period. The division of land on inheritance has 
been a major factor in increasing the numbers of small and marginal holdings without a 
corresponding increase in the share of land controlled by larger holdings. This has been 
accompanied by fragmentation of holdings which has important implications for production.
These factors in themselves would not be expected to act as a barrier to concentration in a 
situation where large-scale surplus producing landowners were oriented towards acquiring
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land through purchase and lease. But this is clearly not the case in the fieldwork area. The 
extent of land transfers through the market has continued to be marginal during the reference 
period. And the phenomenon of large landowners using the lease market to concentrate 
operated land in their hands is completely absent.
A decline in the profitability of investment in agricultural production; increased access to state 
structures opening up new avenues of accumulation; a growing culture of conspicuous 
consumption; and increasing class conflicts with labourers (and potential tenants) all militated 
against land concentration by the richest section of the peasantry.
For poor and middle peasants, these same conditions have effectively blocked any possibilities 
for accumulation or land acquisition. Having been compelled to adopt the new technology, 
they have been badly affected by increased input costs, and by the virtual collapse of the 
infrastructure (both of which have been exacerbated by the appropriation of resources by rich 
peasants described above). Faced with chronic fragmentation of holdings through inheritance, 
they are becoming increasingly pauperised.
Patterns o f Accumulation and Investment o f Surpluses
Moneylending was an important channel into which surpluses accumulated by rich peasants 
were channeled. Under the conditions we have described, even the direct returns on lending 
make it a more profitable alternative to investment in agriculture. But the gains from 
moneylending cannot be assessed simply in terms of direct returns to capital advanced. There 
was significant interlocking: of credit and labour markets in the case of loans to agricultural 
labourers (which are often consumption loans); and of credit and the market for hired and 
purchased agricultural inputs in the case of loans to poor and middle peasants (which are 
frequently production loans).
As well as using credit to facilitate surplus appropriation from the borrower in other markets, 
these lenders attempted to use the credit market to maintain the status quo in response to 
challenges to their economic and social power. The interest rates charged by these lenders 
have become more highly differentiated according to the class of the borrower, as class 
conflicts have intensified. When agricultural labourers have demanded higher wages, interest
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rates charged to them have been increased to such an extent as to make credit inaccessible to 
them. At the same time, much lower rates serve to reinforce solidarity among different classes 
of employers.
The major portion of institutional credit to agriculture was received by rich peasants in the 
period 1981-82 to 1995-96. While the 1980s and early 1990s saw poor peasants being 
compelled to adopt ‘new’ technology under unfavourable conditions their access to 
institutional credit had not increased proportionately. Where they applied for such loans and 
they were sanctioned, a significant proportion was appropriated by bank officials and block 
level state functionaries who demanded bribes in order to disburse the loans. This was also a 
source of accumulation for powerful landowners in the fieldwork area who had links with 
these officials.
In terms of the pattern of major expenditures in the fieldwork area, there had been very little 
expenditure on agricultural capital goods during the period between 1981-82 and 1995-96, 
and land purchase too, had been negligible. House construction and dowries paid on the 
marriage of daughters were the most significant major expenditures by surplus producing 
households. But dowries did not include land, nor was cash received as dowry used to buy 
land, or invested in agricultural production. Dowries remained inextricably linked to 
accumulation, but had become disarticulated from landed property and from the process of 
surplus accumulation in agriculture. Rich peasants in the fieldwork area also used surpluses to 
invest in buses, brick kilns, shops or cinemas, to buy weapons, and in some cases to build 
political careers.
The situation in the fieldwork area in 1995-96 also illustrated how the social power based on 
landownership, administrative corruption, crime and electoral politics interact to create, 
sustain and protect the prevailing patterns of accumulation. State apparatuses and institutions 
are clearly being used by the dominant landowners in the fieldwork area to appropriate 
resources on a significant scale. But to do this requires political power, which has meant 
competition at a wider level with other powerful landed groups in Central Bihar. However the 
1990s have seen all these groups collaborating to resist the economic, social and political 
challenge posed by the organised movements of the rural working people. This resistance has
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taken extremely violent forms, and has been explicitly or tacitly supported by various political 
parties and the administration.
Thus in the 1980s and early 1990s accumulated surpluses were channeled, in the form of both 
consumption and investment, into a variety of unproductive avenues outside agriculture. 
Further, these activities have taken place at the expense of productive investment in 
agriculture, because, as we have argued above, the underlying structures which favour them 
have not been transformed.
Relations o f Production and Struggles o f Agricultural Labourers
The initial spurt of capital accumulation among a section of larger landowners employing 
wage labour provided the catalyst for the emergence of concerted struggles waged by the rural 
exploited classes in the fieldwork area, shaped by the interrelated questions of class, caste and 
gender. Based predominantly among the mainly dalit agricultural labour households, these 
struggles were part of the movement led by the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Lemnist) 
in Central Bihar.
Changes which had taken place in agricultural production relations since the early 1980s were 
in general a result of demands put forward by agricultural labourers through these struggles. In 
contrast to areas where capitalist development has taken root, employers in the fieldwork area 
had not been able to incorporate new forms of exploitation and control of labour into 
processes of production. Rather their responses were essentially defensive attempts to 
maintain the status quo.
Firstly, the movement has succeeded in enabling the dalit poor and landless to challenge the 
practices which underpin the social and economic authority of both the older and the more 
recently emerged dominant classes: forms of oppression based on caste and gender as much as 
class.
Secondly, organising by agricultural labourers in the 1980s and 1990s has been a key factor in 
bringing about wage increases - albeit on the basis of extremely low previous levels. This is 
despite, firstly, technological changes in agricultural production reducing overall labour
240
demand in the 1970s and early 1980s, secondly, the declining profitability of cultivation from 
the mid-1980s, and thirdly, the collapse of non-agricultural employment leading to a fall in 
labour productivity in agriculture from the late 1980s.
In the wake of struggles over wages and an increase in the agreed rates, employers in the 
fieldwork area have introduced a number of changes in their daily practices which reflect 
direct or indirect attempts to reduce the labourers' share in the produce. Employers have also 
responded to successful agitations over wages by withdrawing from credit and tenancy 
relations with the labourers.
However, the withdrawal of credit and land from casual labourers does not appear to be 
primarily a systematic attempt to create new relations of dependence, but rather a long term 
extension of the 'social boycott’ strategy of withdrawing key resources in a bid to maintain the 
status quo - particularly as far as wages are concerned - in the context of an agricultural 
economy where the process of accumulation has essentially come to a standstill. Significantly, 
the incidence of permanent labour has also declined more dramatically in those villages where 
organisation by agricultural labourers has been sustained.
In the 1990s, these struggles have drawn the movement into direct conflict with a network of 
criminal gangs, politicians, administrators and powerful landowners. As a result, the 
movement is gaining the support of wider sections of rural society, who see it as providing the 
only resistance to the endemic corruption and criminalisation rooted in the agrarian economy.
Under existing conditions, demands for higher wages will ultimately face limits set by the 
stalling of capitalist development in agriculture. But it is precisely when these limits are 
exposed through struggles that wider goals of political and economic transformation take on 
the character of mass demands. Similarly the limited scope for redistribution of ceiling surplus 
and vested land in much of Central Bihar, which is currently seeing fragmentation and 
sub-division rather than capitalist concentration of holdings, is serving only to reinforce and 
widen a growing popular conviction of the neccessity of a fundamental reorganisation of the 
distribution and use of land and resources, which will require a radical change in the character 
of the state in Bihar and beyond.
241
In fact, while the dominant patterns of accumulation effectively direct surpluses away from 
agriculture, it is the relations of production in agriculture which underpin these patterns - by 
perpetuating both rural poverty and rural power.
Firstly, the extreme inequality of land distribution which characterises the region, with a 
growing proportion of marginal holdings, and the acute poverty associated with it, 
perpetuates the dependence of poor peasant and agricultural labour households on the 
dominant landowners in interlocked credit, input and labour markets. This has been further 
exacerbated since the early 1980s as small cultivators have found themselves compelled to 
adopt the ‘new’ technology.
Secondly, even in the absence of productive investment in agriculture, a very high rate of 
exploitation of labour ensures that rich peasants continue to extract surpluses. These surpluses 
form the initial capital for entry into other, more lucrative, avenues of accumulation. Agrarian 
power provides not only the social but the economic basis from which to enter networks of 
politicians, administrators, police and criminals.
Thirdly, the relations of production in agriculture are inextricably linked to the nature of the 
state in Bihar. Rich peasants have not, as elsewhere, mobilised to demand state intervention 
which will create favourable conditions for investment in agriculture; rather development 
resources have been treated as a source of ‘primitive accumulation’ through corruption and 
crime. This has been one of the factors leading to a crisis in the availability of key inputs - 
including the 'de-electrification' of large areas and the deterioration of state irrigation facilities 
- which in turn has made agricultural investment even less profitable.
Fourthly, the articulation of caste identities, which are reinforced by existing agrarian 
production relations, are crucial to the process of political intervention by heterogeneous 
dominant landholding groups, through which these groups gain access to such sources of 
accumulation.
Finally, the continuation of all these processes, premised as they are on the denial of basic 
resources to the direct producers, the agricultural labourers and poor peasants, clearly requires 
the perpetuation of the repressive and coercive practices which are inherent in existing
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relations of production. These are epitomised by the literal disenfranchisement of the dalit 
poor.
All these factors serve to explain why a challenge to the agrarian structure constitutes a threat 
to the entire accumulation process of the dominant groups, and is met with extreme violence, 
whether through state apparatuses or private armed gangs supported by an increasing range of 
political parties representing different sections of the rural rich. However, such challenges are 
growing in strength, and as this polarisation intensifies, we can only expect more decisive 
battles ahead.
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APPENDIX 1; Chandkura Census Survey Questionnaire (All Households)
1. Name
2. Age
3. Caste
4. Main occupation/Source of income
5. Subsidiary occupations/Sources of income
6.Household members: sex; age; occupation
7. Land owned (area)
a)irrigated (area); method of irrigation
b)unirrigated(area)
8.Land leased in, fixed rent (area)
a) irrigated (area); rate; method of irrigation
b) unirrigated (area); rate
9. Land leased in, sharecropped (area)
a) irrigated (area); rate; method of irrigation
b) unirrigated (area); rate
10. Land leased out, fixed rent (area)
a) irrigated (area); rate; method of irrigation
b) unirrigated (area); rate
11. Land leased out, sharecropped (area)
a) irrigated (area); rate; method of irrigation
b) unirrigated (area); rate
12. Wage labour hired in (harvest and transplanting)
permanent: number; days per year 
casual: number; days per year
13. Wage labour hired in (other times)
permanent: number; days per year 
casual: number; days per year
14. Wage labour hired out (harvest and transplanting)
permanent: number; days per year 
casual: number; days per year
15. Wage labour hired out(other times)
permanent: number; days per year 
casual: number; days per year
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16. Loans given to labourers/ received from employees) (Y/N)
If yes:amount; purpose; interest rates
17. Land given to labourers/ received from empioyer(s)(Y/N)
If yes:amount
18. Farm implements and machinery (owned(number)/hired in (number)/not used)
i.plough
ii.tractor
iii. power tiller
iv.harvester
v.rice thresher
vi.wheat thresher
vii.diesel pumpset
viii.private tubewell
ix. other
19. Cattle owned: number 
bullocks
cows
buffaloes
20. Currently outstanding loans: source; amount; purpose; interest rate
21. Recent expenditures on marriage: on marriage ceremony; on dowry(cash); dowry (in 
kind - specify)
22. Perceived changes which have occurred in the village over time 
(Increased/Decreased/No Change; Reason for change if any;
Period when change occurred if any)
Land leased out 
Extent of sharecropping 
Extent of fixed rents 
Extent of self-cultivation 
Use of permanent labour 
Use of casual labour 
Wages for permanent labour
i.men
ii.women
Wages for casual labour
i.men
ii.women
Extent of irrigation 
Cropping pattern
Use of machinery(specify)per acre 
Fertiliser type and use per acre 
Labour days/acre 
Output per acre
i.wheat
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ii.rice
iii.other crops (specify)
Prices
i.wheat
ii.rice
iii.other crops (specify)
iv. irrigation costs
v.fertilisers 
vipesticides
vii. seeds
viii.machinery (specify)
Public Investment 
Availability of Credit 
Availability of Fertilisers 
Availability of HYV seeds 
Employment outside the village 
Marriage Expenses
Other Changes
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APPENDIX 2: Agricultural Labourers’ Questionnaire
1. Name
2. Age
3. Caste
4. Main Occupation/Source of income
5. How long have you/your family engaged in this occupation?
What was your family's previous main source of income?
6. Subsidiary Occupation
How long have you/your family engaged in this occupation?
What were your family’s previous subsidiary occupations/income sources?
7.Education
8. Details of household members
Name Age Relationship Education Occupation
9. Details of agricultural labourers in household 
Name
No. of employers 
Casual/Permanent
Contract if any (details)
Advance if any
Land allotted if any
Loans given if any
Tasks carried out/ 
days per year/ 
wages
(give details of crops)
Unpaid labour if any
Have tasks and arrangements changed over time? If so, what are the reasons for this (e.g. 
changes in cropping pattern, new inputs, mechanisation etc.)
Has women's employment increased or decreased? If so what are the reasons?
10. Permanent/attached labourers 
Reasons for this arrangement
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Length of current arrangement (From...to.. 
How often is there a change of employer
What are the reasons for the changes
11. Cultivation of allotted land
Input Costs borne by labourer
plough and bullocks
seeds
fertiliser
pesticide
machinery (specify)
irrigation
other(specify)
Cropping pattern 
Irrigated land 
Season Rabi
Crop
Area
cultivated
Seeds (HYV/
Local)kgs/Acre
Fertiliser
kgs/acre
Pesticide
kgs/Acre
Diesel Ltrs/acre
Yield
qtls/acre
tractor(hours/acre)
thresher (total hours)
diesel pumpset (hours/acre)
other machinery 
(specify)
Unirrigated land
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borne by employer
Kharif
Season Rabi Kharif
Crop
Area
cultivated
Seeds(HYV/
Local) Rs/acre
Fertiliser
kgs/acre
Pesticide
Rs/Acre
Yield
qtls/acre
tractor (hours/acre)
thresher (hours)
other machinery 
(specify)
21. Non-Agricultural Occupations/Sources of Income 
Activity
Days per year
Income/Wage
How long have you/your family engaged in this activity? Is it a traditional caste 
occupation? Has income from it increased or decreased?
22. (Landless Households) Did the household own any land previously? (give details)
When owned (from...to...)
Leased Out Self-Cultivated
Family Labour Number Days Per Year
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Wage Labour Number Days per year
Crops Cultivated 
Sale of Output 
Crop
Quantity Sold 
Value(Rs)
Earnings per year
What happened to the land? What were the reasons for the change?
23. (Non-leasing Households) Did the household lease-in any land previously? (give 
details)
When leased in (from...to...)
Sharecropped Fixed cash rent Fixed kind rent 
(details)
Family Labour Number Days Per Year
Wage Labour Number Days per year
Crops Cultivated
Sale of Output 
Crop
Quantity Sold 
Value(Rs)
Earnings per year
What were the reasons for ending the lease?
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APPENDIX 3: Self-Cultivating Landowners* Questionnaire
1. Name
2. Age
3. Caste
4. Main Occupation/Source of income
5. How long have you/your family engaged in this occupation?
What was your family’s previous main source of income?
6. Subsidiary Occupation
How long have you/your family engaged in this occupation?
What were your family's previous subsidiary occupations/income sources?
7.Education
8. Details of household members
Name Age Relationship Education Occupation
9. Village(s) where land owned owner resident owner non-resident
Total land owned
Cultivated
Uncultivated
10.Land cultivated by owner 
Total Area
Number and Sizes of plots 
Dates (from...to...)
11. Area Irrigated Owned Hired(rate) Borrowed
Diesel Pumpset/open boring
Private Tubewell 
Government Tubewell 
Well
Government Canal 
River
Other(specify)
12. Area Unirrigated
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13.Cropping pattern 
Irrigated land 
Season Rabi
Crop
Area
cultivated
Seeds (HYV/ 
Local)kgs/Acre
Fertiliser
kgs/acre
Pesticide
kgs/Acre
Diesel kgs/acre
Yield
qtls/acre
tractor (hours/acre)
thresher (total hours)
diesel pumpset (hours/acre)
other machinery 
(specify)
Unirrigated land 
Season Rabi
Crop
Area
cultivated
Seeds(HYV/ 
Local) kgs/acre
Fertiliser
kgs/acre
Kharif
Kharif
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Pesticide
kgs/Acre
Yield
qtls/acre
tractor (hours/acre)
thresher(hours)
other machinery 
(specify)
14. Machinery Owned Hired(rate) Borrowed
Plough and Bullocks
Tractor 
(who drives)
Power Tiller
Rice Thresher
Wheat Thresher
Other
15. How have cropping patterns and technology used changed? What are the reasons for 
the changes? (Were HYVs ever used in the past)
16.Consumption of output 
Crop
Quantity Consumed (per annum)
17. Sale of Output 
Crop
Quantity sold 
Value (Rs)
To whom sold 
consumer 
retailer 
wholesaler 
local trader
Where sold 
around village 
market(details)
253
field
home
When sold (months after harvest)
Storage facilities if any 
Contract with buyer if any
18.Family labour
men women children days per month/year
Task(Cultivation)
19.Rearing own livestock 
Task
Household members
Days per month/year
Amount produced per month/ 
year
Amount consumed per 
month/year
Where Sold
Price
Average Earnings per 
month/year
20. Wage labour(Permanent)
Tasks
Men
Women
Children
Caste
Days per year 
Wages in cash 
Wages in kind 
When paid
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Contract
written
oral
witnessed
Conditions of 
contract
Length of contract
Advance
Allotted plot 
size
crops grown 
inputs provided 
-by worker
-by owner
Loans
purpose
security
amount
interest rate
mode of repayment
Are contracts with permanent workers renewed?
21. Wage Labour (Casual)
Tasks
Men
Women
Children
Caste
Days per year 
Wages in cash 
Wages in kind 
When paid
Loans
purpose
security
amount
interest rate
mode of repayment
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22. Reasons for employing labour (e.g. scarcity of family labour, alternative occupations, 
caste and status considerations). Has extent of employment changed?
23. Have conditions of employment of labourers changed? What has been the reason for 
these changes?
24. Was land earlier leased out? (give details)
What was the reason for the change?
25. Have any improvements been made to the land?(give details)
26. Non-Agricultural Occupations/Sources of Income 
Activity
Days per year
Income/Wage
How long have you/your family engaged in this activity? Is it a traditional caste 
occupation? Has income from it increased or decreased?
27. Are loans given to anyone other than employees? 
purpose
security
amount
interest rate
mode of repayment
Average estimated income/annum
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APPENDIX 4: Tenants’ Questionnaire
1.Name
2. Age
3. Caste
4. Main Occupation/Source of income
5. How long have you/your family engaged in this occupation?
What was your family’s previous main source of income?
6. Subsidiary Occupation
How long have you/your family engaged in this occupation?
What were your family's previous subsidiary occupations/income sources?
7.Education
8. Details of household members
Name Age Relationship Education Occupation
9.Land Leased-in
Owner resident owner non-resident
Total land owned by landowner 
Main occupation of landowner
10.Land leased-in by respondent 
Total Area
Number and Sizes of plots 
Dates Aquired
11. Leasing Arrangements 
Fixed Cash Rent
Fixed Kind Rent
Sharecropping
Tenant Landowner
Rental Share
Contract
Written
Oral
Witnesses
Conditions of Contract
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Length of Contract
How often are tenants changed? For what reason are they changed?
Is there a threat of eviction?
Does the tenant do any agricultural labour or other paid or unpaid work for the 
landowner? (give details)
12. Input Costs borne by tenant borne by landowner 
plough and bullocks
seeds
fertiliser
pesticide
machinery (specify)
irrigation
other(specify)
13. Decisions taken by tenant owner jointly 
crops grown
amount/type of seed, 
fertiliser etc.
Is harvesting or any other process supervised? If yes by who?
(For sharecroppers)Where does sharing of crops take place?
14. Area Irrigated Owned Hired(rate) Borrowed 
Diesel Pumpset/open boring
Private Tubewell 
Government Tubewell 
Well
Government Canal 
River
Other(specify)
15.Area Unirrigated
16.Cropping pattern 
Irrigated land
Season Rabi Kharif
Crop
Area
cultivated
Seeds (HYV/
Local)kgs/Acre
Fertiliser
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kgs/acre
Pesticide
kgs/Acre
Diesel ltrs/acre
Yield
qtls/acre
tractor(hoiirs/acre)
thresher (total hours)
diesel pumpset (hours/acre)
other machinery 
(specify)
Unirrigated land
Season Rabi
Crop
Area
cultivated
Seeds (HYV/ 
Local)kgs/Acre
Fertiliser
kgs/acre
Pesticide
kgs/Acre
Diesel ltrs/acre
Yield
qtls/acre
tractor(hours/acre)
thresher (total hours)
other machinery 
(specify)
Kharif
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17. Machinery etc. Owned Hired(rate) Borrowed
Plough and Bullocks
Tractor
Power Tiller
Rice Thresher
Wheat Thresher
Other
18. How have cropping patterns and technology used changed? What are the reasons for 
the changes?
19. Have improvements been carried out by the tenants? (specify). Who takes the decision 
regarding this?
20. Have improvements been carried out by the landowner? (specify). Who takes the 
decision regarding this?
21 .Consumption of output 
Crop
Quantity Consumed (per annum)
22. Sale of Output 
Crop/by-product 
Quantity sold 
Value (Rs)
To whom sold 
consumer 
retailer 
wholesaler 
local trader
Where sold
around village
market(details)
field
home
When sold (months after harvest)
Storage facilitites if any 
Contract with buyer if any
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23 .Family labour
men women children days per month/year
Task(Cultivation)
24. Rearing own livestock 
Task
Household members
Days per month/year
Amount produced per month/ 
year
Amount consumed per 
month/year
Where Sold
Price
Average Earnings per 
month/year
25. Wage labour(Permanent)
Tasks
Men
Women
Children
Caste
Days per year 
Wages in cash 
Wages in kind 
When paid
Contract
written
oral
witnessed
Conditions of 
contract
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Length of contract
Advance
Allotted plot 
size
crops grown 
inputs provided 
-by worker
-by owner
Loans 
purpose 
security 
amount 
interest rate 
mode of repayment
Are contracts with permanent workers renewed?
26.Wage Labour (Casual)
Tasks
Men
Women
Children
Caste
Days per year 
Wages in cash 
Wages in kind 
When paid
Loans
purpose
security
amount
interest rate
mode of repayment
27. Reasons for employing labour (e.g. scarcity of family labour, alternative occupations, 
caste and status considerations). Has extent of employment changed?
28. Have conditions of employment of labourers changed? What has been the reason for 
these changes?
29. Reasons for Leasing-in
30. Non-Agricultural Occupations/Sources of Income
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Activity 
Days per year 
Income/Wage
How long have you/your family engaged in this activity? Is it a traditional caste 
occupation? Has income from it increased or decreased?
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APPENDIX 5: Leasing Out Landowners* Questionnaire
1.Name
2. Age
3. Caste
4. Main Occupation/Source of income
5. How long have you/your family engaged in this occupation?
What was your family's previous main source of income?
6. Subsidiary Occupation
How long have you/your family engaged in this occupation?
What were your family's previous subsidiary occupations/income sources?
7.Education
8. Details of household members
Name Age Relationship Education Occupation
9.Land Leased-out
Owner resident owner non-resident
Total land owned by landowner
Total Area Leased Out 
Number and Sizes of plots 
Dates Acquired
Number of tenants, caste of tenants, do tenants own land?
10. Reasons for leasing out
11. Was land previously self-cultivated?
12. Leasing Arrangements 
Fixed Cash Rent
Fixed Kind Rent
Sharecropping
Tenant Landowner
Rental Share
Contract
Written
Oral
Witnesses
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Conditions of Contract
Length of Contract
How often are tenants changed? For what reason are they changed?
Are contracts renewed?
Does the tenant do any agricultural labour or other paid or unpaid work for the 
landowner? (give details)
Are loans given to tenants?
purpose
security
amount
interest rate
mode of repayment
13. Input Costs borne by tenant borne by landowner 
plough and bullocks
seeds
fertiliser
pesticide
machinery (specify)
irrigation
other(specify)
14. Decisions taken by tenant owner jointly 
crops grown
amount/type of seed, 
fertiliser etc.
Is harvesting or any other process supervised? If yes by who?
(For sharecroppers)Where does sharing of crops take place?
15.Area Irrigated Owned Hired(rate) Borrowed
Diesel Pumpset/open boring
Private Tubewell 
Government Tubewell 
Well
Government Canal 
River
Other(specify)
16. Area Unirrigated
17.Cropping pattern 
Irrigated land
Season Rabi Kharif
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Crop
Area
cultivated
Seeds (HYV/ 
Local)kgs/Acre
Fertiliser
kgs/acre
Pesticide
kgs/Acre
Diesel litres/acre
Yield
qtls/acre
tractor (hours/acre)
thresher (total hours)
diesel pumpset (hours/acre)
other machinery 
(specify)
Unirrigated land
Season Rabi
Crop
Area
cultivated
Seeds(HYV/ 
Local) kgs/acre
Fertiliser
kgs/acre
Pesticide
kgs/Acre
Yield
qtls/acre
Kharif
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tractor (hours/acre)
thresher (total hours)
other machinery 
(specify)
18. Machinery etc. Owned Hired(rate) Borrowed
Plough and Bullocks
Tractor
Power Tiller
Rice Thresher
Wheat Thresher
Other
19. How have cropping patterns and technology used changed? What are the reasons for 
the changes?
20. Have improvements been carried out by the tenants? (specify). Who takes the decision 
regarding this?
21. Have improvements been carried out by the landowner? (specify). Who takes the 
decision regarding this?
22.Consumption of rental share 
Crop
Quantity Consumed (per annum)
23. Sale of rental share 
Crop
Quantity sold 
Value (Rs)
To whom sold 
consumer 
retailer 
wholesaler 
local trader
Where sold 
around village 
market(details) 
field
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home
When sold (months after harvest)
Storage facilities if any 
Contract with buyer if any
24. Use of Rental Income 
consumption (give details) 
investment(give details)
25. Non-Agricultural Occupations/Sources of Income 
Activity
Days per year 
Income/Wage
How long have you/your family engaged in this activity? Is it a traditional caste 
occupation? Has income from it increased or decreased?
26. Are loans given to anyone other than tenants? 
purpose
security
amount
interest rate
mode of repayment
Average estimated income/annum
27 .Rearing own livestock 
Task
Household members
Days per month/year
Amount produced per month/year
Amount consumed per month/year
Where Sold
Price
Average Earnings per month/year
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APPENDIX 6: Assets and Expenditure Questionnaire
Number Value(Rs.) When acquired
1.Total Owned Land(acre)
2.Homestead Land (acre)
3.House(s) (kacha)
House(s) (paka)
Cattlesheds 
Grain Stores 
Other Structures
5.Cattle 
Bullocks 
Cows 
Buffaloes
6.Goats 
Pigs
Other Livestock
7 .Vehicles 
Personal (specify)
Commercial "
8 .Non-Agricultural 
machinery/equipment 
(specify)
9.Farm implements Plough Bullock cart Diesel Pumpset Tractor Power Tiller
Date bought
Price
Reason
Current Value
Date Sold
Price
Reason
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Rice Thresher Wheat Thresher Private Tubewell Other
Date bought
Price
Reason
Current Value
Date Sold
Price
Reason
10.Household consumer durables Date bought Price Current Value 
TV
Radio 
Fridge 
Sofa Set 
Others(specify)
11. Gold/silver 
jewellery
12.Weapons Date bought Price Reason Current Value
13.Financial assets
a.Savings(Rs)
Source
Form
b. Outstanding dues 
(give details)
c. Outstanding loans 
(give details)
14.Major household expenditures (Rs/Annum 1995/6)
Cooking Oil
Rice, Wheat 
Other foodgrains 
Vegetables 
Other food 
Kerosene
House maintenance
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Education
Medical
Other (specify)
15. Ceremonial expenses (Rs)
Marriage ceremony 
Dowry (specify)
Other ceremony(specify)
16.Sources of credit 
institutional loans
Source Date Purpose Amount Interest Rate Outstanding
consumption
investment
informal loans
Source Date Purpose Amount Interest Rate Outstanding 
consumption 
investment
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APPENDIX 7: Contractors’ Questionnaire
1.Name
2.Age
3.Village/Town of origin
4. Village/Town of residence
5.Caste
6.Educational background
7.Main occupation / source of income
8.For how long have you/ your family engaged in this occupation? 
9.Subsidiary occupations / sources of income
lO.For how long have you/ your family engaged in these occupations?
11.Occupations of other family members
12. Children's education
13.Asset position
1975
1985
1990
1995
1975
1985
1990
1995
1975
No./value(Rs)
1985
No./value(Rs)
1990 1995
No./value(Rs)
No./value(Rs)
House(s)
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Commercial buildings
Non-Agricultural 
machinery/equipment 
(specify)
1975
No./value(Rs)
Vehicles 
Personal 
Commercial
Homestead land (acre)
Owned land (acre)
Cattle owned
Farm implements Plough Bullock cart Tractor Harvester
Date bought
Price
Reason
Current Value
Date Sold
Price
Reason
Thresher Diesel Pumpset Pvte Tubewell Other
Date bought
Price
Reason
Current Value
Date Sold
Price
Reason
Farm implements Plough Bullock cart Tractor Harvester
Hired from, to
Rate
Reason
1985 1990
No./value(Rs) No./value(Rs)
1995
No./value(Rs)
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Thresher Diesel Pumpset Pvte Tubewell Other
Hired from, to
Rate
Reason
Household Consumer durables Date bought Price Current Value
TV
VCR
Fridge
Sofa Set
Others(specify)
Gold/silver jewellery
Weapons Date bought Price Current Value
Financial assets
Savings(Rs)
Source
Form
14.Major household expenditures (Rs/Annum)
Food, Clothing etc.
Education 
Other (specify)
Ceremonial expenses (Rs)
Marriage ceremony 
Dowry (specify)
Other ceremony(specify)
15. Earnings and Investment 
Agriculture
1975 1985 1990
1995
earnings per annum 
investment per annum 
Other Activities
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(specify)
1975 1985 1990
1995
earnings per year 
investment per year
16. Sources of credit 
institutional loans
Date Purpose Amount Interest Rate Outstanding
consumption 
investment 
traditional loans
Date Purpose Amount Interest Rate Outstanding
consumption
investment
Landowners
17.Village(s) where land owned owner resident owner non-resident
18.Total land owned 
Cultivated 
Uncultivated
19. Land leased out (Fixed Rent)
Total Area
Dates (from...to...)
No. of tenants
Caste(s) of tenants
Sizes of plots
Area Irrigated
Tubewell
Well
Government Canal 
River
Other(specify)
Area Unirrigated
275
20. Cropping pattern 
Irrigated land
Season Crop HYV/Local Area cultivated
Rabi
Kharif
Fertiliser(type)per acre
Machineryitractor,harvester,thresher,other(specify) 
Unirrigated land
Season Crop HYV/Local Area cultivated
Rabi
Kharif
Fertiliser(type)per acre
Machineryitractor,harvester,thresher,other(specify)
21.Leasing arrangements
In kind
area
amount
In cash
area
amount
Contract
written
oral
witnesses
22. Input costs bome by tenant borne by landlord 
bullocks(own/hired) 
fertiliser(type) 
pesticide
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machinery(specify)
irrigation
23. Decisions 
who takes the decision regarding crops to be grown 
owner 
tenant 
jointly
who takes the decision on what/how much fertiliser, seed etc. is used?
owner
tenant
jointly
are certain investments in the land carried out by tenants?(specify)
if yes, who takes the decision?
owner
tenant
jointly
are certain investments in the land carried out on a share basis by owner and
tenants?(specify)
if yes, who takes the decision?
owner
tenant
jointly
are certain investments in the land carried out by owner(specify)
24.1s harvesting supervised?
If yes, by who?
Does supervision occur at other times?
25. Do the tenants employ labour?
Number Days/year Wages Caste
Men
Women
26.Length of lease 
Are leases extended?
27. Are loans given to tenants?
purpose security amount interest rate mode of repayment
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28.Sale of Output by tenant 
Crop
Quantity sold 
Value (Rs)
Earnings/year
To whom sold
retailer
wholesaler
trader
owner
Where sold 
market 
field 
home
When sold (months after harvest)
Storage facilities if any 
Contract with buyer if any
29. Do tenants or members of their families do any paid or unpaid work for the 
landowner(specify)
30. Number of years landowner has engaged in this type of contract
31 .Land leased out (Sharecropping)
Total Area
Dates (from...to...)
No. of tenants
Caste(s) of tenants
Sizes of plots
Area Irrigated
Tubewell
Well
Government Canal 
River
Other(specify)
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Area Unirrigated
32.Cropping pattern 
Irrigated land
Season Crop HYV/Local Area cultivated
Rabi
Kharif
Fertiliser(type)per acre
Machinery:tractor, harvester, thresher, other(specify) 
Unirrigated land
Season Crop HYV/Local Area cultivated
Rabi
Kharif
Fertiliser(type)per acre
Machinery :trac to r,harvester, thresher, other(specify)
33.Leasing arrangements 
Rental payments cash 
kind
tenant landowner
Percentage rental share
Contract
written
oral
witnesses
Input costs borne by tenant borne by landlord 
bullocks(own/hired) 
fertiliser(type) 
pesticide
machinery(specify)
irrigation
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34. Decisions 
who takes the decision regarding crops to be grown 
owner 
tenant 
jointly
who takes the decision on what/how much fertiliser, seed etc. is used?
owner
tenant
jointly
are certain investments in the land carried out by tenants?(specify)
if yes, who takes the decision?
owner
tenant
jointly
are certain investments in the land carried out on a share basis by owner and
tenants?(specify)
if yes, who takes the decision?
owner
tenant
jointly
are certain investments in the land carried out by owner(specify)
35.1s harvesting supervised?
If yes, by who?
Does supervision occur at other times?
36. Where does the sharing of crops take place?
37. Do the tenants employ labour?
Number Days/year Wages Caste
Men
Women
38.Length of lease 
Are leases extended?
39. Are loans given to tenants?
purpose security amount interest rate mode of repayment
40.Sale of Output by tenant by landowner 
Crop
Quantity sold
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Value (Rs)
Earnings/year
To whom sold
retailer
wholesaler
trader
owner
Where sold 
market 
field 
home
When sold (months after harvest)
Storage facilities if any 
Contract with buyer if any
41. Do tenants or members of their families do any paid or unpaid work for the 
landowner(specify)
42. Number of years landowner has engaged in this type of contract
43 .Land cultivated by owner 
Total Area 
Dates (from...to...)
Sizes of plots
Area Irrigated
Tubewell
Well
Government Canal 
River
Other(specify) 
Area Unirrigated
44.Cropping pattern 
Irrigated land
Season Crop HYV/Local Area cultivated
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Rabi
Kharif
Fertiliser(type)per acre
Machinery itractor, harvester, thresher, other(specify)
Unirrigated land
Season Crop HYV/Local Area cultivated
Rabi
Kharif
Fertiliser(type)per acre
Machinery itractor,harvestor,thresher,other(specify)
45 .Family labour
men women children days per year
Task
46.Wage labour(Permanent)
Tasks Men Women Children Caste Days per year Wages
47. Wages 
in cash
in kind 
when paid
48. Contract 
written 
oral
witnessed
49. Conditions of contract
50.1s worker given a plot of land? 
size
crops grown
inputs provided by worker owner
51.length of contract 
Is contract renewed?
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52. Are loans given to permanent workers?
purpose security amount interest rate mode of repayment
53. Wage Labour (Casual)
Tasks Men Women Children Caste Days per year Wages
54. Wages 
in cash
in kind 
when paid
55. Contract 
written 
oral
witnessed
56. Conditions of contract 
57.length of contract
Is contract renewed?
58. Are loans given to casual workers?
purpose security amount interest rate mode of repayment
59.Sale of Output 
Crop/by-product 
Quantity sold 
Value (Rs)
To whom sold 
retailer 
wholesaler 
trader
Where sold 
market 
field 
home
When sold (months after harvest) 
Storage facilitites if any 
Contract with buyer if any
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60. Land cultivated by owner (leased-in)
Total Area 
Dates (from...)
Sizes of plots
Total land owned by lessor(s)
Area Irrigated
Tubewell
Well
Government Canal
River
Other
Area Unirrigated
61 .Cropping pattern 
Irrigated land
Season Crop HYV/Local Area cultivated
Rabi
Kharif
Fertiliser(type)per acre 
Machinery:tractor,harvestor,thresher,other 
Unirrigated land
Season Crop HYV/Local Area cultivated
Rabi
Kharif
Fertiliser(type)per acre
Machinery:tractor,harvestor,thresher,other
62. Leasing arrangements 
Fixed rent in kind
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area
amount
Fixed rent in cash
area
amount
Sharecropping
area
percentage rental share
Contract
verbal
oral
witnesses
63.Family labour
men women children days per year
Tasks
64.Wage labour(Permanent)
Tasks Men Women Children Caste Days per year Wages
65. Wages 
in cash
in kind 
when paid
66. Contract 
written 
oral
witnessed
67. Conditions of contract
68.1s worker given a plot of land? 
size
crops grown
inputs provided by worker owner
69.1ength of contract 
Is contract renewed?
70. Are loans given to permanent workers?
purpose security amount interest rate mode of repayment
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71. Wage Labour (Casual)
Tasks Men Women Children Caste Days per year Wages
72. Wages 
in cash
in kind 
when paid
73. Contract 
written 
oral
witnessed
74. Conditions of contract
75.length of contract
Is contract renewed?
76. Are loans given to casual workers?
purpose security amount interest rate mode of repayment
77.Sale of Output 
Crop/by-product 
Quantity sold 
Value (Rs)
To whom sold 
retailer 
wholesaler 
trader
Where sold 
market 
field 
home
When sold (months after harvest)
Storage facilitites if any 
Contract with buyer if any
Changes over time 1970 1980 1990 1995 Reason for change
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Land leased in
Land leased out
Extent of sharecropping
Extent of fixed rents
Extent of self-cultivation
Use of permanent labour
Use of casual labour
Wages for permanent labour
men
women
Wages for casual labour
men
women
Extent of irrigation 
Cropping pattern
Use of machinery(specify)per acre 
Value (Rs)
Amount
Fertiliser type and use per acre 
Rs
quintals
Labour days/acre
Output per acre
wheat
rice
others(specify)
Price
wheat
rice
others(specify)
Public Investment 
Availability of Credit
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